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ABSTRACT	
The aim of this thesis is to examine issues pertaining to freshwater quantity in New Zealand 
agriculture. Currently, freshwater is managed under the Resource Management Act (1991) and 
the allocation system is essentially on a “first-come first-served” basis – whoever gains access to 
water rights first blocks out subsequent users, if catchment allocation limits have been reached. 
One of the recommendations from a government taskforce engaged to look at the issues of 
freshwater management suggests that market mechanisms or charges could be viable options of 
demand management. For any such market or price mechanism to work, it is imperative to know 
the value of irrigation water in New Zealand as well as to understand wider economic 
ramifications of establishing such mechanisms. Currently, there is relatively little research 
concerning these issues and this thesis aims to fill this research gap. The methodologies used 
include an econometric analysis of dairy farm panel data, a stated choice experiment of irrigation 
consent holders and a computable general equilibrium [CGE] analysis. In addition to filling the 
research gap, this thesis also aims to provide improvements in each of the methodologies used. 
Panel data analysis imputes the water demand function without actual data on water through 
examining the relationship between milksolid production and output-weighted expected payout – 
a unique dairy price index developed that more accurately reflects farmers’ incentives than the 
final payout. The choice modelling section pays particular attention to the issue of attribute non-
attendance [ANA], examining its effects on model outputs and compares methods of data 
collection on ANA. The main findings of the survey suggest that the majority of farmers would be 
willing to pay for water instead of facing an abstraction ban. In terms of ANA, the results indicate 
that not accounting for ANA, particularly if it is due to heuristics or respondent fatigue, may 
significantly bias the welfare estimates and decrease statistical significance. A novel calibration 
method is presented to negate the ANA bias. Finally, the CGE modelling work modifies the well-
known GTAP model to include water as factor of production, as well as to disaggregate the results 
to a regional level within the New Zealand economy. The findings indicate strong 
interconnectedness between sectors and regions, with policies in one region having the potential 
to affect economic activity and resource demand in other regions.  
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CHAPTER	I:	NEW	ZEALAND	FRESHWATER	ISSUES	AND	VALUATION	METHODOLOGIES
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1. INTRODUCTION	
New Zealand’s current freshwater management system is fast becoming inadequate to deal with 
the growing demand from competing users. The perception of seeming inexhaustibility of this vital 
resource is but an illusion fostered by a history of virtually unrestricted access to it. Without a 
functioning market, in order to better manage this resource, one needs to first know its value to 
different users. There is currently relatively little understanding with regards to the value of 
freshwater in New Zealand. Hence, it is the aim of this thesis to quantify the value of irrigation 
water as well as to model the economy-wide implications of potential changes in the water 
allocation mechanism.  
As part of this research, first, dairy farm panel data analysis is performed to estimate demand for 
irrigation water for dairy farms – New Zealand’s largest freshwater consumers (Chapter II). Next, 
discrete choice experiment methodology is used to elicit willingness to pay for water among a 
sample of existing irrigation water consent holders (Chapters III and IV). Finally, Computable 
General Equilibrium modelling (Chapter V) is used to study the impacts of policy changes on the 
economy as a whole.  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. First, the issues facing the current freshwater allocation 
system will be outlined, together with the motivation behind this study. Second, relevant literature 
outlining studies pertaining to New Zealand, as well as those relating to various methodological 
techniques will be presented. Finally, the methodologies used as part of this research will be 
introduced along with their underlying theoretical underpinnings. 
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1.1.	 New	Zealand	Water	Issues:	Background	
New Zealand’s freshwater issues are certainly a far cry from those in places such as Murray-
Darling Basin, Australia, where the “Big Dry” and generations of intensive irrigation farming 
depleted the river to such extent that at one time it literally stopped flowing. The situation is 
certainly not as severe as in Spain, where climate change threatened the agricultural sector so much 
that the government now provides desalinated water at subsidised prices to agricultural producers 
(Fuentes, 2011). However, New Zealand’s current method of managing of what is arguably one of 
the most undervalued resources is fast approaching the point of inadequacy, as explained below.  
New Zealand is seemingly relatively abundant with freshwater. It has the fourth highest per capita 
total renewable freshwater resources among OECD countries with over 80 thousand cubic metres 
per capita (Fuentes, 2011). By comparison, Australia and the US have approximately 15 and 10 
thousand, respectively. Even when coupled with our second highest freshwater abstraction per 
capita level in OECD, New Zealand is still third lowest in terms of abstraction vis-à-vis its relative 
freshwater endowment (Ministry for the Environment, 2010). However, “much of it needs to be 
retained in the rivers, lakes and aquifers to maintain the ecological, recreational, or cultural 
values”, with only a relatively small portion allocated for consumptive use (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2010). Limits are set by regional authorities to manage freshwater abstractions. For 
example, in the Waikato Region the default allocation for freshwater are only 5% for upland and 
10% for lowland catchments of Q5 – the low flow statistic derived from analysing the frequency 
of 7 consecutive day annual low flow in a catchment that has a 20% of occurring in a particular 
year (Waikato Regional Council, n.d. ).1 However, Snelder et al (2014) argue that such limits alone 
                                                 
1 The council determines each catchment’s environmental flow – the level deemed necessary for a particular catchment 
to maintain its environmental and ecological health – through setting it proportional to Q5. For example, the Waikato 
River at Hamilton is deemed to need an environmental flow of 140 cubic metres per second [cms]. Its Q5 is 156 cms, 
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are insufficient and further scientific tools are required to improve transparency and efficacy of 
allocation. 
The current system of water take allocation in New Zealand has been described as “first-come 
first-served”: whoever applies first for a resource consent obtains it first. There is a nominal fee 
for an application, and a limit is set on the maximum allowable intake, but otherwise the water 
from freshwater sources is virtually free. This system has been established since the introduction 
of the Resource Management Act [RMA] in 1991 (Scrimgeour, 1997). According to this 
legislation, regional authorities are entrusted with managing their territories’ natural resources, 
including water. The Act stipulates a number of provisions specifically addressing the issues 
pertaining to freshwater management, including the settlement of limits of fresh water intakes, 
allocation of rights of freshwater intakes and other functions to maintain quality of water (NZ 
Parliament, 2011). Regional authorities generally use Regional Water Management Plans to 
manage water. However, such plans are widely seen as inadequate as they overall lack measurable 
limits and are generally ambiguous (Snelder, et al., 2014).  
When this system was established, there was little need for an alternative solution as freshwater 
was deemed to be an inexhaustible resource in New Zealand. However, with the proliferation of 
irrigated farming, as well as a general growth from other competing needs of water such as 
hydropower generation, ecosystem management, and recreation, among others, this system is fast 
becoming unable to keep up with its objective.  
                                                 
which means that 16 cms is available for allocation. The likelihood of flow falling below the environmental level is 
20%, during which time water intake restrictions will apply.  
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Table 1 shows the areas under an irrigation system in 2002, 2007, and 2012. Approximately 3% 
of all agricultural land in New Zealand is reported to be under an irrigation system.2 The South 
Island, Canterbury and Otago in particular, account for most of irrigated land in New Zealand. 
Still, most regions experienced double digit percentage growth of irrigated land area within the 
last five year period – an overall increase of 17% since 2007. 
Region 
Total 
agricultural land 
(2002) 
Land under an irrigation system 
2002 2007 2012 
Northland 810 7 9 8 
Auckland 302 6 6 6 
Waikato 1,730 13 17 21 
Bay of Plenty 600 9 10 12 
Gisborne 643 1 2 5 
Hawkes Bay 962 18 25 26 
Taranaki 497 3 3 7 
Manawatu-Wanganui 1,545 8 12 22 
Wellington 504 10 13 17 
TOTAL North Island 7,593 75 97 121 
          
Tasman & Nelson 298 10 11 12 
Marlborough 696 20 27 30 
West Coast 225 2 1 2 
Canterbury4 3,200 287 385 445 
Otago 2,379 69 91 94 
Southland 1,198 4 8 17 
TOTAL South Island 7,997 393 522 600 
TOTAL New Zealand 15,590 468 619 721 
  
                                                 
2 According to Aqualinc, 2010, the area of land consented to be irrigated differs slightly to this figure as not all area 
has been actually equipped to be irrigated, as defined by Statistics NZ.  
3 Defined, by Statistics New Zealand as land area that could have been irrigated using existing resource consents 
and equipment that is on the farm. 
4 Includes Chatham Islands 
Table 1. Irrigable Land3 by Region (000's ha) 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 2002, 2007, 2012. (Stats NZ, 2002) (Stats NZ, 2007) 
(St t NZ 2012)
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Aqualinc Research reported in 2004 that in Waikato surface water is close to full allocation and 
the current surface water allocation processes do not account for variations in seasonal demand 
(Aqualinc Research, 2004, p. 15). So much so, that in 2006 Environment Waikato [EW] declined 
two applications to take “significant volumes of water from the Waikato River for the purposes of 
dairy farm irrigation” (EW, 2008, p. 26). The applications were particularly opposed by hydro 
electricity generators and municipal water suppliers (EW, 2008). 
In 2010, there were 20,500 consented fresh water takes in New Zealand, 75% of which was for the 
purposes of irrigation (Aqualinc Research, 2010). In terms of annual consumptive allocation,5 
irrigation was also the dominant user, constituting 53% of annual consumption allocation, in 
addition to industrial (23%), municipal (17%) and stock (7%)  (Aqualinc Research, 2010). 
When considering top weekly consumption6 – irrigation constitutes 78% of allocation. This higher 
relative and absolute demand is due to the seasonal nature of farming – planting and dairying 
seasons are predominantly in warmer months from October to March. Of all volumetric annual 
irrigation allocation, 81% of it is for pasture irrigation (or 76% of consented irrigated area in 2010). 
On top of the extra demand from farming, hydro power stations, due to the increased demand for 
air-conditioning in the summers, require more water to generate electricity. Unfortunately, this 
coincides with the periods of lowest rainfall levels in most regions in New Zealand (NIWA, 2010). 
In 2012, of the 721,200 ha of irrigable land, 245,000 ha (34%) were under irrigation schemes 
                                                 
5 For drinking, stock water and industrial users, annual rate is calculated as weekly times 52. For irrigation, annual 
rate depends on the number of irrigating weeks typically 12 to 22 weeks.  
6 Consumptive use means the usage of water after which no other users can use the same water, like irrigation or 
municipal water take. Hydro power is generally not considered to be consumptive since water is later made available 
to users downstream, except in the case of Manapouri Hydro Power Plant, which outlets the water to the Doubtful 
Sound. For the purposes of this analysis, the consumptive use of water by this power plant is omitted.  
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(National Infrastructure Unit, 2015). The vast majority of such irrigation schemes lack storage 
capacity and hence are prone to water restrictions during dry summers.  
Jenkins (2013) notes that reliability is increasingly valued among the irrigators, and some farms 
are choosing to invest in storage capacity to safeguard against droughts and water restrictions. He 
notes, that, for example instance, during the drought of 2011/2012 it is estimated that $30 million 
worth of output was lost due to irrigation restrictions at the irrigation Waimakariri Irrigation 
Scheme. Investment in storage capacity would allow such schemes to have reliable access to water 
even when restrictions are in place.  
1.2.  Climate	Change	and	“Virtual	Water” 
In addition to medium to short-term potential water scarcity in some New Zealand regions, longer 
term issues arising from climate change will also make managing water more efficiently an 
important issue. Ministry for the Environment [MfE] (2007) reports that eastern parts of both 
islands are expected to experience less annual rainfall over the next century. In addition, other 
parts of New Zealand will experience more variable weather, including more severe floods and 
droughts (ME, 2001). Droughts, in particular, will require an efficient system of distributing water 
among the competing users.  
Moreover, global demand for food products, arising from rapid population growth, growing 
scarcity of suitable farmland as well as climate change is increasingly putting stress on global food 
and water supplies (Chartres & Varma, 2010). Willenbockel (2011) uses a Dynamic Computable 
General Equilibrium [CGE]7 model to predict that by 2030, global prices of rice and wheat will 
increase by 75% relative to 2010 prices under a “business-as-usual” scenario which includes only 
                                                 
7 Discussed in Chapter IV. 
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population and factor productivity growth. The results are even more pronounced when climate 
change is factored in: price of wheat more than doubles, as do prices of most other food products.  
Allan (1998) introduces the concept of “virtual water” – water embedded in the production of each 
good – to suggest that water deficit in one region is compensated for by imports of “virtual water”, 
or products that use water intensively in their production process, from another region. In his 
example, arid regions of North Africa and the Middle East experienced water deficit since as early 
as 1950’s. The region’s acquisition of “virtual water” through imports of grain amounts to more 
than 40 billion tonnes of water annually (embedded in 40 million tonnes of grain). Hence, water 
endowed countries are likely to be increasingly relied on to be the breadbasket of the world.  
New Zealand is in a unique position to profit from these trends because of its comparative 
advantage in agriculture. However, this would likely to result in intensification of farming, which 
would put more demand on the already stressed freshwater resources. 
1.3.	 Fresh	Start	for	Fresh	Water	
Recognizing the growing need to better manage all the more scarce water, the New Zealand 
government commissioned a task force, the Land and Water Forum [LAWF], to study the current 
fresh water situation in New Zealand and advise as to how it should be managed better (Land and 
Water Forum, 2010). LAWF also concludes that many water catchments are fully allocated, or 
close to full allocation (Land and Water Forum, 2011). They recognize freshwater’s growing 
scarcity and recommend establishing more effective allocative processes than the “first-come first-
served” basis system currently in place.  
Since there are competing users of water (such as municipal suppliers, farms and hydro electricity 
generators), who have a rivalrous water demand, it is advisable to establish a system that distributes 
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water to users who hold it in the highest value. This requires actually knowing what that value is 
to various users. As intakes of water are only just starting to being measured (in relationship to 
how much a user was consented to take or otherwise) and at source water8 being virtually free, for 
most users the value of water has not yet been adequately measured.  
Since the time LAWF stakeholder consultations and analysis were carried out, a number of 
initiatives pertaining to freshwater management have been implemented (MfE, 2016). The initial 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management directed all regional council to set 
objectives for water quality and quantity (MfE, 2011). The government also created a $14.5 million 
fund to restore waterways from pollution and a $35 million fund to develop further irrigation 
infrastructure.  CGE modelling by NZIER estimated the benefit of new irrigation schemes to be 
$8 billion over 35 years in terms of present value consumption (Kaye-Blake, Schilling, & Zuccollo, 
2010). Most recently, in 2014, the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management included 
a specific framework to help the regional councils evaluate water-related plans. The most recent 
policy statement also required councils to “account for how much water is taken from a water body 
and any contaminants that are discharged into it” (MfE, 2016). Measuring water intakes alone, 
while may induce efficiency, is not enough to address the long-term problem of allocation, and 
before that issue is addressed, it is imperative to know the value of water. 
                                                 
8 Meaning at the source of abstraction, as opposed to point of consumption, which incurs further measurable costs, 
such as equipment and pumping costs. 
10 
 
1.4.	 	Motivation	&	Objectives	
In most cases, an economist’s answer to the question of scarcity is a market: let buyers and sellers 
decide their respective value of a good, and distribute this good accordingly. In the case of water, 
however, as Ward & Michelsen (2002) note, it is not that easy to achieve: 
“Due to the high cost of capturing and holding water and because its supply is subject to a 
steady stream of unexpected changes, it is typically expensive or impossible to define, 
establish, and enforce property rights required by a water market system. Therefore, well-
defined market institutions that could generate prices that could serve to allocate water 
resources are typically lacking” (p.424).  
Hence, freshwater allocation among users, time periods and locations is generally, at least partially, 
regulated by government bodies. Such allocation requires accurate estimates of the economic value 
of water (Ward & Michelsen, 2002). As Young (2005) puts it, estimating the value of water would 
“provide signals of relative scarcity that are not available due to the absence of markets” (p.11). 
The main objectives of this thesis are therefore:  
 to quantify the economic value of water to one of New Zealand’s biggest freshwater users 
– dairy pasture irrigators; 
 to study factors that influence the value of water to the pasture irrigators; 
 to determine the responsiveness of the pasture irrigators to potential scarcity and price 
changes of water; 
 to model and study the impact of potential availability and price changes of water on the 
New Zealand economy as a whole. 
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In addition to answering the above research questions, methodological improvements are 
developed to the fields of non-market valuation, stated choice modelling as well as applied 
computable general equilibrium analysis. In Chapter II a novel method to estimate the value of 
water to dairy farmers through panel data analysis is introduced; in Chapters III and IV a discrete 
choice experiment is carried out targeting farmers who irrigate, and particular attention is paid to 
the issue of Attribute non-Attendance. Finally, in Chapter V a well-known CGE model [GTAP] is 
used as a basis to examine the effect of water charges and disaggregate the results by New Zealand 
regions.  
1.5.	 New	Zealand	Water	Valuation	Studies	
There are relatively few studies in New Zealand attempting to measure volumetric value of water 
to various end users. Part of the reason is that water scarcity was largely a ‘non-issue’ in New 
Zealand until relatively recently (whereas other regions, such as Australia and some parts of the 
United States, have a much longer history of scarcity and/or had episodes of severe droughts). 
Another reason is perhaps due to such perception of abundance, compulsory measuring of water 
intakes has not been introduced until just recently as part of the National Policy Statement for 
Freshwater Management.9 One of the few valuation studies available actually stated that: “the 
value of water per cubic metre cannot be calculated as water use data is not yet available” (Doak, 
2005, p. 2). 
Grimes & Aitken (2008) use a hedonic pricing approach to value irrigation water in a drought-
prone area in McKenzie District, Canterbury. This method values irrigation through estimating the 
                                                 
9 Permit holder must now keep records of water taken (Satyanand, Anand, 2010). These regulations apply only to a 
takes of 5 liters/second or more. 
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difference between irrigated and non-irrigated farms’ sales price and valuation, while controlling 
for spatial differences, such as distance from towns, rainfall, soil and slope characteristics. They 
find that flatter areas with poorly draining soils get the most benefit from irrigation, suggesting 
that it may be due to water being able to stay longer periods in these lands. Drier areas benefit 
more than wetter areas. The authors join the criticism of the RMA allocation mechanism by 
suggesting that some farms that may benefit from irrigation cannot get access to water rights 
because of existing regulation and lack of mechanisms of transferring water rights. The study finds 
that net returns of irrigation are negative to farms due to high investment costs. 
The Ministry of Primary Industries [MPI] conducted an extensive study attempting to quantify the 
value of irrigation to New Zealand as a whole (Doak, Parminter, Horgan, Monk, & Elliot, 2004). 
They put the economic value of irrigation at $920 million10 (in 2002/2003 dollars) by estimating 
a counter-factual scenario where currently irrigated land was used as dry land instead. Their 
method is as follows: they classify all agricultural land into 14 agricultural sectors in each region, 
subdividing each sector into irrigated and non-irrigated. Next, the authors acquire the difference 
in yields between irrigated and dryland production for each sector in each region based on 
specialist opinions. Finally, they decrease the yield on the irrigated farms to match dryland yields 
and thereby estimate the effect of irrigation. In their subsequent analysis they use yields to estimate 
the impacts of new irrigation systems, and consider the effect of varying output on sector output 
prices.  
This study was updated in 2014 using NZIER’s proprietary New Zealand Regional Computable 
General Equilibrium model (NZIER, 2014). Using the same methodology as MPI in 2004, the 
                                                 
10 This figure includes their analysis of price changes resulting from sectoral output changes.  
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current value of irrigation was estimated to be $2.19 billion (in 2011/2012 dollars). With CGE 
methodology (which takes into account flow-on effects of irrigation to the rest of the economy) 
they find that without irrigation GDP would be 2.4% (or $4.8 billion) less.  
Most recently, using a variety of imputation methods, Jenkins (2015) estimated the value of water 
to municipal, irrigation and hydropower generators. The cost of (treated) water supplied to 
residential and commercial consumers – as estimated by relevant local authorities – ranged 
between $0.47/m3 in Christchurch to $1.91/m3 in Tasman; the cost of irrigation water from 
irrigation schemes – as measured by cost of buy-in access amount allocated – was between 
$0.0475/m3 to $0.32/m3; and the value of each cubic metre of water to hydro-electricity generators 
was between $0.0057 (for one station at Opuha) to $0.036 (for 8 stations at Waitaki).  
1.6.	 Methods	of	Valuing	Water	&	Water	Policy	Analysis	
Young (2005), in his treatise on determining the economic value of water broadly classifies 
methods of valuing water into two categories: inductive and deductive. Inductive techniques 
involve using formal econometric techniques to infer generalizations from individual observations, 
whereas deductive techniques involve “logical processes to reason from general premises to 
particular conclusions” (Young, 2005, p. 44). Inductive techniques include methods such as 
observation of water market transactions, hedonic pricing, choice modelling and estimation of 
production and cost function. Deductive approaches include mathematical programming; value 
added estimation, and computable general equilibrium modelling. The following will outline a 
selection of these methodologies.  
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1.6.1. Observation	of	Water	Market	Transactions	
Perhaps the only true way to measure an item’s economic value to users is by selling it in a well-
functioning, full information market, devoid of externalities and market power. In Australia water 
market comes close to such, where the government established a water transfer system so that 
farmers are able to sell either temporary or permanent water rights. Temporary rights are the rights 
to fresh water takes in a particular year, whereas permanent water rights are the allocated water 
takes rights attached to a property. During the 2006 drought in Northern Victoria, temporary water 
rights have reached AU$1,200 per mega litre of water, and permanent water reached AU$2,400.11 
This arguably reflects rather accurately how users value freshwater since in this type of spot 
markets prices are determined through what sellers are actually willing to sell for and, perhaps 
more importantly if the government is the main seller, what buyers are willing to pay for.  
For this method one would need to have a well-defined water market with clear definition and 
allocation of water rights. While technically allowed for in the provisions of the RMA, it is 
governed by the same rules as new allocations, hence any trades in water-stressed areas – such as 
in the case of Canterbury (close to or above full allocation) are governed as new applications and 
have to go through the same application evaluation procedures – which may or may not be granted 
and/or require certain conditions (HydroTrader, 2016) . There is some trading activing as part of 
HydroTrader website operational in the Canterbury Region. Jenkins (2014) noted that traded price 
was between $1.59/ m3 to $0.25/ m3 with an average of average of $0.88/m3 from 24 instances of 
trade available between May 2008 and September 2013.   
                                                 
11 Rob O'Connor, personal communication, 12 May 2011. 
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1.6.2. Hedonic	Pricing	Method	
This method is used extensively in resource economics and involves comparing the values of 
properties that are at various distances away from a particular environmental factor, while 
controlling for other variables (Harris, 2006). The price difference is then attributed to the non-
market value of that particular factor. For instance, properties that overlook a river command a 
higher market price than properties of the same size right behind them. The price differential is 
then an estimate of the “shadow price” that buyers are willing to pay for access to the view – a 
non-market resource.  
As described in Section 1.5, Grimes & Aitken (2008) use a hedonic pricing method to elicit the 
value of access to irrigation in Canterbury. Young (2005), however, notes that when actual water 
quantities are not used, it is not, strictly speaking a hedonic approach, but rather what he calls a 
“quasi-hedonic” approach. He also notes that hedonic pricing approach provides an estimate to “at 
source” water rather than “at site”, as is normally measured by other methods, thereby resulting in 
higher estimates.  
In addition, Young (2005) notes that to obtain meaningful results one needs to have access to a 
type of natural experiment – a selection of comparable agents scattered randomly with and without 
irrigation around the same area and corresponding property sales prices, while controlling for all 
other variables that may influence the sales price. To demonstrate the difficulty of obtaining the 
relevant data, even Grimes & Aitken (2008) had to rely on QV valuations to substitute for 
relatively low number of actual farm sales figures, hence casting doubt on the reliability of their 
results, since the derived irrigation value was estimated using figures based on regressions used 
by the QV valuation agency, rather than relying entirely on scant market price data. 
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1.6.3. Survey	Methods:	Choice	Modelling	and	Contingent	Valuation	
Contingent Valuation [CV] basically involves surveying agents and asking them directly how 
much they would be willing to pay (or accept) for a particular good or service. The fundamental 
assumption being that the respondents’ underlying preferences are revealed in their responses. 
Hanley, Mourato, & Wright (2001) note this method’s original variant included open ended 
questions with regards to how much one would be willing to pay for a specific item described. 
This method, they note, suffered from cognitive burden and potential for strategic bidding.  
Partly out of such concerns, during the 1980’s methodology shifted to incorporate dichotomous 
choices. However, this method was also shown to suffer from strategic bidding: Posavac (1998) 
demonstrated that depending on the expectation of whether the actual cost was going to be actually 
incurred by the respondents altered their willingness to pay to a statistically significant level. 
Moreover, dichotomous choice CVs seemed to elicit substantially higher values than those elicited 
through open-ended questions, perhaps attributing to the “yea-saying” of the respondents (Hanley, 
Mourato, & Wright, 2001). Cummings & Taylor (1999) also note that a substantial number of CV 
studies are prone to “hypothetical bias”, although various techniques to address issues have been 
developed. Finally, CV methods are also noted to be ill-suited with complex multidimensional 
changes and evaluation of a multiple number of policy options (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001; 
Blamey, Gordon, & Chapman, 2002).  
Partly due to the shortcomings of CV methods, Choice Modelling [CM] (also known as conjoint 
analysis) approach became a more popular survey method. This method involves presenting 
respondents with choices in which attribute levels are varied across choice sets, and then asking 
the respondents to state their preferred alternative. This method is particularly suited for situations 
where choices are complex and involve a large number of varying parameters, providing 
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researches with relatively more details on respondents’ utility function than the CV approach 
(Young, 2005; Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001). Since CM approach avoids direct questions 
with regards to the willingness to pay, through instead eliciting these values indirectly through 
analysing the choice preferences, it is argued CM minimizes some of the disadvantages of CV, 
namely strategic behaviour and “yea-saying” (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001). 
There are, however, numerous pitfalls and considerations when designing a CM study, such as 
cognitive burden, serial status-quo answers and sensitivity to design (Caussade, Ortúzar, Rizzi, & 
Hensher, 2005; Rolfe & Bennett, 2009; Swait & Adamowicz, 2001). These issues will be discussed 
in more detail in the Section 3 of this chapter and Chapters III and IV. 
1.6.4. Budget	Residual	Method	
A popular deductive method to derive value of water is through the Budget Residual Method. It 
involves subtracting the value of all non-water inputs away from total revenue of a firm, with the 
residual being attributed to the shadow price of water ( ௐܲ∗ ): 
ௐܲ∗ ൌ
ሺܻ ∙ ௒ܲሻ െ ∑ ௜ܺ ∙ ௜ܲ௡௜ୀଵ
ܺௐ 	 
(1)  
 
Where  
ܻ  Quantity of Output 
௒ܲ  Price of Output 
௜ܺ  Quantity of input ݅ 
௜ܲ   Price of input ݅ 
ܺௐ  Quantity of water used 
Adapted from Young, 2005, p. 61 
However, this method requires detailed knowledge of quantities of water used – data that is 
currently mostly lacking in New Zealand context. Moreover, this method is very sensitive to 
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specification of what constitutes inputs since they include owners’ opportunity costs as well as 
depreciation of capital equipment, etc.  
1.6.5. Mathematic	Programming	
Garrido (2000) suggest that the most popular method of analysing water markets in hypothetical 
situation is through mathematical programming. This method involves constrained profit 
maximization, where water quantity is varied to determine its impact on the firm’s profit, thereby 
eliciting what water is worth to the agent. This entails accurate knowledge of a representative 
farm’s production processes. Mathematic Programming through non-linear optimization has been 
extensively used in the dairy sector in New Zealand for evaluating greenhouse gas emission and 
nitrogen management policies (Doole, 2012; Adler, Doole, Romera, & Beukes, 2013). The same 
model can be used to compute shadow prices of unpriced inputs, such as ‘feed energy’ and 
‘marginal value of metabolized energy’ (Doole, Romera, & Adler, 2013); and can also be used to 
estimate the shadow price of water.  
1.6.6. Computable	General	Equilibrium	
The effects of a drought, an introduction of volumetric water pricing or extensive irrigation 
schemes would be felt not just by industries directly relying on water, such as dairy and electricity 
production, but also by industries relying on these industries. They may include both their suppliers 
(such as fertilizer firms or farm labour for dairy), as well as their customers (electricity dependent 
producers for electricity generators). This inherent degree of interconnectedness between various 
sectors of an economy requires a modelling technique that is commonly not present in 
conventional cost-benefit analysis which typically only looks at the effects of the industry directly 
affected by an event. 
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One method to account for this interconnectedness is to use Regional General Equilibrium 
analysis, which essentially is using a simplified model of the whole economy where inputs (land, 
labour and capital) are converted into outputs by interconnected sectors of the economy. This 
approach is going to be discussed more thoroughly in the Section 4. 
1.7.	 Selected	Methodologies	
The selected methodologies to address objectives set by this thesis are panel data analysis (Chapter 
II), choice modelling (Chapters III and IV) and CGE analysis (Chapter V). The reasons for 
choosing these methodologies include the authors’ previous experience with such, the availability 
of suitable data, supervisors’ respective expertise, and, perhaps more importantly, the deemed 
appropriateness to address the issues at hand.  The next sections will outline each methodology in 
greater detail and review relevant literature pertaining to each method.  
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2. ESTIMATING	THE	VALUE	OF	WATER:	FARM	PANEL	DATA	ANALYSIS	
One problem with trying to elicit water value through methods that rely on hypothetical scenarios, 
such as survey methods, mathematical programming or residual budget analysis, is that agents’ 
actions are largely theoretical: it is assumed that a farmer would actually pay however much s/he 
said s/he would, or that the said farmer would spend all of their residual on water – these actions 
are not observed. Methods such as hedonic pricing, observing market transactions and 
experiments, on the other hand, observe actual behaviour and arguably, if modelled correctly, 
provide more generally accepted and realistic values. As mentioned earlier, New Zealand largely 
lacks a functioning water market; hedonic pricing requires hard-to-obtain information; and ethical 
considerations and logistical difficulties would prohibit execution of meaningful randomized 
controlled trials. However, as outlined in the following section, it is argued that market-linked 
water value can be elicited through analysis of farms’ marginal cost curves using readily available 
data of dairy farms. As mentioned earlier, dairy irrigation is the largest consumptive user of 
freshwater in New Zealand. 
2.1.	 Theoretical	Foundation	
For any given profit-maximizing firm, a profit is simply the difference between its costs and 
revenues. For a dairy farm, the bulk of the revenue comes from sale of Milk Solids [MS]; hence 
the profit function, ߨሺܳሻ, is as follows: 
  ߨሺܳሻ ൌ ܲ ∙ ܳ െ ܥሺܳሻ  (1)   
where 
ܲ  price of MS 
ܳ  quantity of MS 
ܥሺܳሻ  the total cost of producing a set quantity of MS 
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Assuming that individual farmers are price takers in both output and input markets and that the 
profit function is concave at its maxima, a reduction in the payout for MS (i.e. a ܲ decrease) would 
mean that the profit maximizing quantity of MS they produce decreases, and vice versa. Figure 1 
illustrates this: when output price is ଴ܲ , a firm’s profit maximizing output is ܳ଴  - where the 
difference between the Total Revenue [ܴܶ ] and Total Cost [ܥሺܳሻ ] is the greatest. Stated 
differently, profit maximization (or loss minimizing) is at ܳ  at which marginal costs equals 
marginal revenue (ܥ′ሺܳሻ ൌ ܴܶ′ሺܲ, ܳሻ), subject to the second order condition (increasing marginal 
costs, or ܥᇱᇱሺܳሻ ൐ 0). The firm’s profit is the difference between the Total Revenue and Total 
Cost (Figure 2). When price falls to ଵܲ, profit maximizing quantity decreases to ܳଵ. 
 
 
Figure 1. Firms Total Revenue and Total Cost Curves 
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The total cost function, ܥሺܳሻ, can be disaggregated into fixed (quantity invariant) and variable 
costs: 
  ߨሺܳሻ ൌ ܲ ∙ ܳ െ ሺܥி ൅ ܥ௏ሺܳሻሻ  (2)   
Where 
 
It is true that some variable costs can be considered to be as fixed costs in the short run, and hence 
would be incurred even if no MS production takes place. For instance, one would still purchase 
supplementary feed and pay for labour to distribute this feed to the stock, even if due to adverse 
climatic conditions the stock had to be dried off and hence no MS production took place. In such 
an instance, these costs would be considered fixed, and one would still be willing to incur them so 
ܥி   Fixed costs (i.e. land, interest, etc) 
ܥ௏ሺܳሻ  All the costs that depend on the amount of MS produced 
(i.e. labour, supplementary feed, fertilizer, etc) 
Figure 2. Firm's Profit Function 
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as to preserve the cows in good health for the next year (a case of loss minimizing). However, 
these same costs (feed and labour) can be considered as variable if the MS payout is relatively 
high, and in order to produce more, one would be willing to incur these higher marginal costs since 
they would be offset by higher marginal revenue. Whilst the distinction can be somewhat blurry, 
the premise of the existence of output variant costs is paramount to this analysis, since in the 
absence of such a farmer would always produce a set quantity of MS, irrespective of both the price 
of the variable inputs and its output.  
Qualitative study by Watters, Rowan, & Williams (2004) partially confirms the existence of this 
relationship as they conclude that there seems to be a “wide-spread inclination for farmers to 
respond to increasing prices through increasing input and production outputs” (p. 22). As one of 
their respondents confirms “if payout allows” s/he maintains or increases the use of fertilizer and 
brought in feed to increase the MS production. 
Irrigation water is currently an unpriced good, or ௐܲ ൌ 0 . If one were able to establish the 
relationship between the quantity of water used to produce a set quantity of MS, then the cost of 
that water would fall into the category of variable costs. This follows the logic that lowering the 
quantity of water would inevitably lower the amount of grass available for feed, and hence lower 
the amount of the MS production.  
Including the water price per milksolid (ܹܲ) in the equation – currently set at zero – would render 
the following equation: 
  ߨሺܳሻ ൌ ܲ ∙ ܳ െ ܥி െ ܥ௏ሺܳሻ െ ௐܲ ∙ ܳ  (3)   
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Again, term ܹܲ is set to zero, hence (3) equals to (2), except that all the water used to produce ܳ 
has been explicitly accounted for in (3). Rearranging terms on the RHS of (3) results in: 
  ߨሺܳሻ ൌ ሺܲ െ ௐܲሻ ∙ ܳ െ ܥி െ ܥ௏ሺܳሻ  (4)   
Stated differently, profit is a function of quantity produced, equal to the revenue less cost of water 
minus fixed and all other variable costs. Increasing the price of water per ܳ would result in lower 
revenue less cost of water, and hence lower profits, resulting in lower profit maximizing quantity 
of production. The consequence of (4) is that increasing the price of water per quantity of MS (ܲௐ) 
is equivalent to a decrease of the Marginal Revenue (ܲ) of the same magnitude. 
The relationship between price and quantity produced, controlling for all other factors, is relatively 
straightforward to determine – it is a firm’s marginal cost or a short-run supply curve (Figure 3). 
A higher output price would encourage a producer to produce more (incur higher variable costs), 
and vice versa.  
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Knowing by how much quantity of production (ܳ) would change following an increase in the 
marginal revenue (ܲ) would reveal by how much ܳ would change following a decrease in price of 
water per Q ( ௪ܲ) of the same pecuniary magnitude. Thus, a relationship between the price of water 
per ܳ and quantity of water per ܳ can be derived: 
 
Once this relationship is established, it would further be possible to use it to derive a volumetric 
price vs. quantity relationship (i.e. dollars per gigalitre, etc) though determining the amount of 
water required to produce a given quantity of MS. The relationship between MS and water is 
indirect, since water is used to grow grass, which is then fed to the stock. Brown & Haigh (2005) 
while building an irrigation model of the Waikato Region suggest that the amount of dry matter 
[DM] – staple stock feed in New Zealand –per hectare grown from a set quantity of water depends 
on slope of the land, soil’s response to irrigation, irrigation rates as well as type of feed grown. 
Additional factors that affect the total pasture growth per unit of water are the climatic conditions, 
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Figure 4. MS Production vis-a-vis Price of Water per MS 
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fertilizer regime as well as time of the year. Thomson (1996) also suggests that grazing intensity 
as well as intervals between grazing periods provide a difference to the amount of DM grown 
under irrigation schemes.  
Since the amount of DM grown using an amount of water varies significantly according to a 
number of factor, it would be impossible to produce one “universal demand curve” for water 
directly. What can be done, however, is defining the relationship between the quantity of water, 
DM production, conditional on various parameters, and subsequent MS production. The 
relationship between DM and MS production is well understood. DairyNZ (2010) provides an 
extensive list with formulas to establish MS production from DM which depends on a multitude 
of factors, such as how old the cows are, how far they have to walk, whether they are pregnant, 
their weight, whether the terrain is mountainous, etc. IntelactNZ (2010) suggests, as a rule of 
thumb, that 1kg of DM yields approximately 100 grams of MS, when taking into consideration a 
cow’s sedentary requirement.  
2.2.	 Estimating	the	MC	Curve	
2.2.1. Data	
For the purposes of this research project, Ministry of Primary Industry [MPI] kindly agreed to 
grant access to their annual financial dairy monitoring survey data under a strict confidentially 
agreement. This data includes detailed annual accounts from dairy farms participating in the survey 
across major dairying regions for the last 11 years. Variables include revenues from all sources 
(mostly MS, but also cattle trade, among others), as well as all operating expenses, including feed, 
fertilizer, water charges, labour, electricity, as well as physical statistics such the quantity of MS, 
the number of cows and the stocking rates. Sample size for Waikato Regions is 45; Taranaki – 25; 
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Southland – 25; Northland – 20; Lower NI – 20; and Canterbury – 25. In addition, NIWA database 
is used to control for the effect of rain since more rain translates into more DM grown and hence 
higher MS production, potentially causing an identification issues if excluded. MS payout forecast 
data from Fonterra, New Zealand’s largest dairy cooperative were used to estimate expected output 
prices.  
2.2.2. Methodology	
Since this data is longitudinal, which includes observations of farms within the same regions across 
time, a fixed effects specification was used. Farm systems within regions are likely to be relatively 
stable over time, hence an region-fixed effect, ߙ௜, is specified in the model: 
  ܙ݅ݐ ൌ ܠ݅ݐ઺ ൅ ߙ݅ ൅ ߣݐ ൅ ݑ݅ݐ  (5)   
In addition, regulations, such as with regard to surrounding water quality and effluent management 
are likely impact all farmers at the same time, hence time fixed effect, ߣ௧ , is also included. 
Independent variables comprised observables that were likely to influence the output of MS, ܙ௜௧ 
for farmer ݅ in year ݐ.  
The coefficient on the MS pay-out variable, ߚመ௉, could be interpreted as the marginal effect of price 
on quantity produced. Its negative, or, െߚመ௉, would be the effect of an increase in Price of Water 
per MS. This estimate then needs to be conditional on a range of factors coefficient (farm size, etc) 
which would yield a volumetric value of water. 
2.3.	 Limitations	
It should be acknowledged that there are limitations to this approach. Most notably is that varying 
levels of water utilization are likely influence the usage of other resources and hence the 
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relationship between quantity and the price of water may not be an exact inverse relationship 
between price of output and quantity. For instance, if price of water were to exceed a certain 
threshold, farmers may well find it more profitable to buy feed instead of water (as in the case of 
Australia), hence demand for water would fall more sharply than predicted. However, such 
threshold is arguably irrelevant to this analysis, at least at this stage, where water is yet unpriced, 
and any price variations sensitivity analysis are unlikely to breach this threshold.  
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3. ESTIMATING	THE	VALUE	OF	WATER:	CHOICE	MODELLING	
The second approach as part of this PhD thesis to elicit the value of water is through use of Stated 
Choice Modelling. It may not actually matter how much water is required by a farm to maximize 
profit, but how much farmers think is required. Individual risk preferences may cause risk-averse 
farmers to value irrigation higher in the face of uncertainty over weather patterns and/or expected 
MS payout, exchange rate, etc. When combined with unpredictability of rain, particularly in the 
short run during the critical milking or calving periods, water demand may prove to be substantially 
more inelastic than predicted by a model based on annual aggregation. To address these issues, a 
CM study is carried out. The following will outline theoretical underpinning of CM and review 
the relevant literature. 
3.1.	 Methodological	Overview	
3.1.1. Random	Utility	Model	
As noted in section 1.6.3 Survey Methods: Choice Modelling and Contingent Valuation, CM 
involves presenting survey respondents with a set of options with varying levels of different 
attributes, and asking them to pick or rank their preferred options. The theoretical framework of 
CM is based on Random Utility Theory (Alberini, Longo, & Veronesi, 2007). According to this 
theory, individuals always select an option that maximizes their utility subject to various 
constraints. This indirect utility of person ݅ with respect to alternative ݆, ௜ܸ௝, can be represented in 
the following form: 	
  ௜ܸ௝ ൌ തܸ൫ܠ௜௝, ઺൯ ൅ ߝ௜௝   (6)   
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The first component of the model, തܸ൫ܠ௜௝, ઺൯, includes a vector of observed choice attributes (and 
individual characteristics in some specifications), ܠ௜௝, and a set of unknown parameters, ઺. The 
second component, ߝ௜௝, is an error vector that captures unobserved to researcher choice attributes 
and individual characterises. 
The deterministic component of the model, തܸ , can be represented as linear function of attributes 
and individual characteristics, as well as the individual’s residual income ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜௝ሻ, if the price is 
one of the attributes: 
  തܸ௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜௝઺ଵ ൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜௝ሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜௝   (7)   
In a simple case, when there are just two choices, ݆ ൌ 0; ݆ ൌ 1, the deterministic component of the 
each choice’s utility takes on the following form (Cameron & DeShazo, 2011): 
  തܸ௜଴ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜଴઺ଵ ൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜଴ሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜଴  (8)   
  തܸ௜ଵ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜ଵ઺ଵ ൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜ଵሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜ଵ  (9)   
The difference between the utilities of two choices can be written as: 
  തܸ௜ଵ െ തܸ௜଴ ൌ ሺߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜ଵ઺ଵ ൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜ଵሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜ଵሻ െ ሺߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜଴઺ଵ
൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜଴ሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜଴ሻ 
(10)   
Both the intercept and income drop out, since they are common across both choices, resulting in: 
  തܸ௜ଵ െ തܸ௜଴ ൌ ሺܠ௜ଵ െ ܠ௜଴ሻ઺ଵ ൅ ሺܥ௜଴ െ ܥ௜ଵሻߚଶ ൅ ሺߝ௜ଵ െ ߝ௜଴ሻ  (11)   
The coefficient on the difference in cost attributes, ߚ2 , is excluded from the matrix of other 
observables since it is used in determination of the willingness to pay [ܹܶܲ]. By setting the 
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difference between the utilities to zero, (i.e. ഥܸ݅1 െ ഥܸ݅0 ൌ 0), a money metric estimate of the 
person’s ݅ ܹܶ ௜ܲ can be derived: 
  ܹܶ ௜ܲ ൌ ሺܥ௜ଵ െ ܥ௜଴ሻ ൌ
ሾሺܠ௜ଵ െ ܠ௜଴ሻ઺ଵ ൅ ሺߝ௜ଵ െ ߝ௜଴ሻሿ	
ߚଶ   (12)   
In more general terms, when there are more alternatives, the probability of choosing an option 
would be the highest if it commands the highest utility in a choice set: 
  ߨ௜௞ ൌ Pr൫ ௜ܸ௞ ൐ ௜ܸ௝൯	∀݆ ് ݇  (13)   
Substituting the linear functional form from (7) yields: 
  ߨ௜௞ ൌ Pr൫ߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜௞઺ଵ ൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜௞ሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜௞ ൐ ߚ଴ ൅ ܠ௜௝઺ଵ ൅ ሺݕ௜ െ ܥ௜௝ሻߚଶ ൅ ߝ௜௝൯	∀݆ ് ݇  (14)   
This, similarly to the two-choice case, causes income and intercept to drop out, since they are 
common across choices, simplifying to: 
  ߨ௜௞ ൌ Prሾ൫ߝ௜௞ െ ߝ௜௝൯ ൏ ൫ܠ௜௞ െ ܠ௜௝൯઺ଵ െ ሺܥ௜௞ െ ܥ௜௝ሻߚଶሿ	∀݆ ് ݇  (15)   
The most common model to analyse discrete choices is Conditional Logit Model (Caussade, 
Ortúzar, Rizzi, & Hensher, 2005). This model was pioneered by McFadden who used it to examine 
discrete choices of urban travel – a methodological breakthrough for which he was later awarded 
a Nobel Prize in economics (Stock & Watson, 2007; Caussade, Ortúzar, Rizzi, & Hensher, 2005). 
Under the assumption that the error terms are identically and independently distributed with a 
standard Type I extreme value distribution, (15) can be re-written as: 
ߨ௜௞ ൌ exp
ሺܠ௜௞઺ሻ
∑ exp൫ܠ௜௝઺൯௄௝ୀଵ
  (16)   
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This, in turn, can be used to determine the log-likelihood function, which then allows for estimation 
of the vector of parameters, ઺, using Maximum Likelihood estimation. Finally, willingness to pay 
for any attribute change can be calculated through: 
ܹܶ ௜ܲ ൌ െܠܑ઺
෡૚
ߚመଶ   (17)   
3.1.2. Experiment	Design	
To carry out a choice experiment, one must decide on attributes and their respective levels, as well 
as how to arrange them with a specified number of choice tasks. Caussade et al. (2005) note that 
the design of CM study can have a significant impact on the results. Their literature review 
summarizes the studies that show that dimensions such as the number of alternatives per choice, 
the number of attributes, the levels of attributes, and the total number of choices have all shown to 
affect the elicited values. In their own study, however, they found that the most significant 
dimensions were the number of attributes (optimum at 9-10) and the number of alternatives 
(optimum at four). Rolfe & Bennett (2009) tested two- versus three-alternative specification and 
found that the three-alternative CM design provide a more robust model.  
Recognizing large cognitive burden associated with considering all attributes of choices, Swait & 
Adamowicz (2001) examine strategies employed by respondents while making choices and 
conclude that faced with higher choice complexity (higher number of attributes and alternatives) 
respondents tend to focus more on brand effects and less on attributes, with higher instances of 
avoiding choice (i.e. they stick with status quo). Earlier work by Russo & Dosher (1980), who 
utilize eye tracking and debriefing, find that their respondents resorted to dimension reduction – 
simplifying choices by concentrating on fewer attributes – and ignoring magnitudes of attributes 
as cognitive burden reduction strategies.  
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3.2.	 Water	Valuation	Studies	Using	Choice	Modelling	
Choice modelling is a popular method of valuing water as an environmental public good (Young, 
2005). Such studies usually examine consumers’ willingness to pay for some sort of improvements 
in the quality of water (for examples see Blamey, Gordon, & Chapman, 2002; Marsh & Baskaran, 
2009; and Peters & Adamowicz, 1995). Young (2005) suggests that the primary use of CM is in 
non-use valuation of environmental goods. Similarly,  Rigby, Alcon, & Burton (2010) suggest that 
CM, in general, is not a preferred method to value water as an intermediate good. However, a 
number of recent studies employed CM in valuing consumptive use of water as well. 
Rigby, Alcon, & Burton (2010) used CM methodology to reveal the marginal values of irrigation 
water in Campo de Cartagena, Spain. Their methodology included asking farmers to choose 
between two options for water contracts, which included such attributes as price, quantity of 
guaranteed water and quantity of additional water (from rain) bundled with probability of rain, to 
study the effects of uncertainty. The last attribute (with levels of 0.5 and 0.25) was shown to be a 
highly significant factor. 
The authors also opted to exclude status quo choice in an effort to control serial non-participation, 
arguing that farmers would not want to opt for any option with a higher price than they already 
pay. This is an important concern pertaining to this study, since it is highly likely to be an issue as 
the price of water is currently zero and it is doubtful than any farmer would be willing to accept 
any mention of a water tariff. However, excluding status quo may inhibit elicitation of true 
willingness to pay, since the respondents’ current status must be present to enable “to interpret the 
results in standard welfare terms” (Hanley, Mourato, & Wright, 2001), as is noted by the authors. 
In their defence, they refer to studies that excluded the ‘opt-out’ alternative in choice modelling 
studies. However, these studies are hardly compatible as they look at premium “ethical” food 
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attribute (Carlsson, Frykblom, & Lagerkvist, 2007) and GE content on labelling attribute 
(Kontoleon & Yabe, 2003). The choice in the first study, arguably, commanded less emotional 
attachment to consumer since it was a non-necessity type of purchasing decision; whereas the 
second study outright confirmed the biasness of values elicited through exclusion of the ‘opt-out’ 
choice.  
In another study, Barton & Bergland (2010)12 conduct a choice experiment among farmers in 
Karnataka State, India, to evaluate hypothetical irrigation water pricing. The focus of the study 
was methodological development of status quo interpretation, since given the choice, most 
surveyed farmers (66 percent) showed preference to the status quo scenario, rather than choosing 
any one of the alternative scenarios with improved irrigation and a different charge (Barton & 
Bergland, 2010). The authors purport that by examining the farmer heterogeneity, meaningful and 
significant preferences can be derived from the status quo choice.  
Finally Kunimitsu (2009) conducts a choice experiment among paddy rice farmers in Japan in an 
attempt to elicit the marginal value of water. The author’s conclusion was that the marginal value 
of water was substantially higher than is currently charged, hence may hinder economic prosperity 
of rice farmers in Japan. A notable methodological difference is that the study used random 
parameter multinomial logit model (mixed logit). The researcher argued that preference 
parameters may vary across respondents, hence an error terms is added, ઺ ൅ ݒ࢏, where ݒ௜  is a 
random error that accounts for unobservable attributes. This permits a relaxation of independence 
of the irrelevant alternative (IIA) assumption, which accounts for unobserved factors over repeated 
choices by respondents, and thus allows for different agents to have different tastes (University of 
                                                 
12 Who similarly state that they are “unaware of previous examples using CE to assess the value of irrigation water” 
(Barton & Bergland, 2010, p. 322). 
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Berkley, 2000). With regards to non-participation, Kunimitsu reports that the opt-out rate was 
28%. The author decided to exclude those responses from the analysis, noting that such exclusion 
did not influence the integrity of the results since there were no observable differences between 
those who decided to opt-out and other respondents. A relatively low opt-out rate is not surprising 
given the findings as the respondents clearly demonstrated lower willingness to pay than the 
existing market price. 
3.1.	 Stated	Choice	Survey	–	Methodological	Improvements	
As per the overall objective of this thesis, the aim of the Stated Choice [SC] study is be to elicit 
the implicit value of water to farmers. The subset of farmers surveyed are farmers who currently 
have irrigation consents issued. In addition to eliciting the value of water, a special attention is 
given towards the issue of Attribute-non-Attendance [ANA] in SC surveys following a growing 
recognition in literature of its ubiquity. The following is an overview of this issue and relevant 
literature.  
3.1.1. Attribute	non‐attendance	in	DC	Research	
A critical assumption in SC is that participants consider carefully all the information (attributes 
and their levels) presented to them when making a choice. One of the concerns within the field of 
discrete choice experiments [DCE] is the issue of attribute non-attendance, or participants’ 
ignoring one or more attributes when making a choice. Participants are said to resort to heuristics, 
or a “method that uses the principles of effort reduction and simplification” (Shah & Oppenheimer, 
2008, p. 207). 
Swait & Adamowicz (2001) find that respondents use a simplifying choice heuristic as complexity 
rises (as measured by the number of attributes and choices via a measurement of ‘entropy’ the 
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authors develop), and hence cognitive load increases. They incorporate the complexity measure 
into their model and conclude that choice complexity has the potential to influence the decision 
rule and/or utility structure of the respondents. 
Araña, León, & Hanemann (2008) also examine the role of heuristics combined with the role of 
emotions,13 as measured by Emotional Intensity Scale.  They find that participants are more likely 
to deviate from the assumption of full linear compensatory decision rule (i.e. engage in heuristics) 
when their emotional intensity levels are high. Still, their analysis of heuristics was based on 
econometrics alone – they examined the experimental data and determine the heuristics used as 
opposed to directly observing participants. 
In one of the earlier papers on the subject, Russo & Dosher (1980), tracked participants’ eye 
movements when making discrete choices, in an attempt to examine decision strategies. This 
methodology included, first determining the participant’s utility functions, then conducting 
immediate post-choice debriefing surveys of participants’ own interpretation of the decision 
strategies. This methodology, however, would arguably be unsuitable for vast majority of applied 
DC surveys as the eye-tracking apparatus is rather invasive (even today, when they are still 
conducted at labs with specialized equipment) and the participants were arguably more likely to 
make sure they looked at each attribute and level as they were directly supervised to do that. 
Although the authors concede that simplifying heuristic practices are likely to happen (ignoring 
attributes and/or levels) their methodology did not address such issues directly. 
Ball (1997) achieved similar results Russo & Dosher (1980) by tracing the information gathering 
techniques via a computer aided survey. In his study, participants needed to hover over attribute 
                                                 
13 Defined as “stable individual differences in the strength with which individuals experience their emotions” (Araña, 
León, & Hanemann, 2008, p. 756). 
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levels to see the actual values. Ball summarized the decision processes and heuristics involved. 
For instance, when choice complexity increased (the number of choices was high) some 
participants concentrated on just a few of the attribute to shortlist the alternatives. The study, 
however, stopped short of extrapolating the influence of the findings on the decision outcomes. 
A study by Kaye-Blake, Abell, & Zellman (2009) similarly made use of computer-aided surveying 
whereby participants had to first click on the location of the concealed level of attribute on the 
information display board. Tracking this information enabled the authors to determine which 
attributes where ignored and which were instrumental in decision making. By collecting 
information on which attributes were ignored, the researchers were able to apply a zero weigh 
restriction on the individual coefficients when solving the model. Derived parameters were 
significantly different to those estimated under the assumption of full information gathering.  
3.2.	 Selected	methodology	
Following Kaye-Blake, Abell, & Zellman (2009) and Ball (1997), an online survey script was 
created for the purpose of this thesis which would provide information with regards to participants’ 
attributes non-attendance. Relevant attributes and their levels will be presented, with levels visible 
only when a respondent hovers their mouse cursor over the relevant attribute:  
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Figure 5. Screen-shot of a Choice Task 
 
As the respondent hovers over each level, information of each event is recorded. This method 
provides information on any attribute-non-attendance and decision methods (whether attribute-by-
attribute or choice-option-by-choice-option comparison), which is be incorporated in parameter 
estimation. The expected effects of ANA are first explored via a simulation analysis (Chapter III), 
then a SC survey is carried out, tracking ANA using the above stated method (Chapter IV).  
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4. USING	THE	VALUE	OF	WATER:	CGE	MODELLING		
As part of the last chapter of this thesis, a Computable General Equilibrium [CGE] methodology 
is used to measure the impact of price or quantity changes of water on the New Zealand economy 
as a whole, as well as within regions. There is not currently a publicly available regional CGE 
model for New Zealand, and rather than creating one from scratch, an existing global CGE model 
(GTAP) is disaggregated to form the starting point for analysis. At the same time, irrigated water 
is introduced as a factor of production, allowing for analysis required for this research. The 
following will briefly outline CGE methodology. A detailed literature review of water-related CGE 
studies is presented as part of Chapter V. While in New Zealand only very few papers discuss 
water issues at any level using CGE analysis, there are numerous studies conducted in other 
countries that apply this analysis to water.  
4.1.	 CGE	Methodology	Overview	
Applied General Equilibrium analysis is a growing field of economic analysis since the 
proliferation of computational power, hence this method is commonly referred to as CGE analysis. 
At the very core, CGE analysis relies on a balanced input-output table of an economic region. A 
simple illustration of this system is presented by Table 2.  
Suppose that an economy is made of just three sectors, namely Agriculture, Manufacturing and 
Power Production. In Table 2 rows of data demonstrate how outputs from that sector are consumed 
throughout the economy, by both final and intermediate users. For instance, the first data row 
shows that $20 mil worth of produce from the agricultural sector is used in its own sector as an 
intermediate good (like hay for dairy or seeds for planting), $15 mil worth of agricultural produce 
is used in the manufacturing sector (eg. fresh produce for value added processing) and none of the 
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agricultural produce is used for power generation. In addition, $60 mil worth of produce is 
consumed by households and the same amount is exported. The row total, 155, represents the total 
output of the agricultural sector, both for final and intermediate use.  
  Intermediate Use  Final Use   
  Agriculture  Manufacturing  Power  Household Consumption  Exports 
Total 
output 
Agriculture  20  15  0  60  60  155 
Manufacturing  15  15  5  90  15  140 
Power  10  40  5  10  0  65 
Imports  5  5  0  0  0  10 
Labour  50  5  5  0  0  60 
Capital  55  60  50  0  0  165 
Total Inputs  155  140  65  160  75  595 
Columns, on the other hand, show what it takes to produce the corresponding amount of output. 
In the first data column, again, it shows that it takes $20 mil worth of agricultural produce to 
produce $155 mil worth of agricultural output, as well as $15 mil worth of manufacturing inputs 
(like machinery), $10 worth of power (electricity required to pump water), $50 mil worth of labour 
and $55mil worth of capital. Row totals must equal to corresponding column totals, to reflect 
underlying assumption of market clearance. Thus, such representation of an economy incorporates 
the above mentioned interconnectedness of the sectors.  
Predecessors of CGE analysis used such Input/Output [I/O] tables to analyse policy impacts 
directly by using technical coefficient through Leontief matrix multiplication. This method 
includes creating a matrix of technical coefficients, in which the elements represent the value of 
Table 2. A Hypothetical I/O Table of an Economy 
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inputs required to produce $1 worth of each product. Using the data from table above, this matrix 
is as follows: 
 
ܣ ൌ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ20/155 15/140 0/6515/155 15/140 5/65
10/15 40/140 5/65
5/155 5/140 0/65
50/155 5/140 5/65
55/155 60/140 50/60ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ۍ0.13 0.11 00.10 0.11 0.08
0.06 0.29 0.08
0.03 0.04 0
0.32 0.04 0.08
0.35 0.43 0.77ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
  (18)   
The first column elements’ interpretation is that it takes 13¢ of agricultural inputs to produce $1 
worth of agricultural outputs, ¢10 of manufacturing inputs, and so on.  These proportions are 
assumed to be constant irrespective of the levels of production. The total demand, ܺ,14 is the sum 
of the intermediate demand and the final demand (which in this case is the sum of household 
consumption and exports). It follows that the total demand can be expressed as a sum of the final 
demand and the product of the matrix of technical coefficients and the intermediate demand: 
  ܺ ൌ ܤ ൅ ܣܺ  (19)   
Rearranging the terms in (19) renders: 
  ܤ ൌ ܺ െ ܣܺ  (20)   
Taking the common multiplier out on the RHS: 
  ܤ ൌ ሺܫ െ ܣሻܺ  (21)   
In (21) the Leontief matrix is given as ሺܫ െ ܣሻ, and its inverse can be used to express the total 
demand as a function of the final demand: 
  ܺ ൌ ሺܫ െ ܣሻିଵܤ  (22)   
                                                 
14 Matrix is comprised of the first five columns and six rows in Table 2. 
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Using (22) it is possible to determine the impact on any values in ܺ following a shock to the final 
demand, ܤ  (or any of it components, which in this case are the household consumption and 
exports). In other words, one could, for instance, estimate the impact of an increase in export 
demand on the whole economy by seeing how it would impact other sectors. Since an increase in 
export demand would necessarily require other sectors to produce more, which would, in turn 
require more inputs from other sectors and so forth, thereby an increase in export demand would 
actually cause a higher overall impact than the initial increase on an economy due to the stated 
interconnectedness of the sectors.  
There are, however, significant drawbacks to the I/O method. First, input supply is unconstrained, 
meaning there is assumed to be an infinite amount of land, labour and capital available to each 
sector (Kaye-Blake, Schilling, & Zuccollo, 2010). Next, I/O analysis does not incorporate prices, 
thus, for example, more intensive use of land does not translate into higher land prices, and hence 
firms do not experience higher costs. Another consequence of price exclusion is that there is 
assumed to be no substitution effect between goods. Among other issues, I/O based models are 
inherently closed economic representations – any export/import shocks are exogenously 
introduced. As a result, Input/Output models have been shown to consistently overestimate the 
impact of various shocks (Partridge & Rickman, 2007; Kaye-Blake, Schilling, & Zuccollo, 2010). 
CGE methodology addresses all of these issues and more. CGE models typically contain a set of 
supply and demand side behavioural equations, based on representative agents, that clear 
according to Walrasian perfect competition and market-clearing assumptions (Dixon, Parmenter, 
Powell, & Wilcoxen, 1992). The solution is essentially derived through solving a constrained 
optimization problem. The behavioural parameters representing agents are either econometrically 
acquired or based on informed opinions of the modellers (Strutt, 2010; Dixon & Rimmer, 2002). 
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Supply-side is typically structured so that primary inputs (land, labour and capital) can be 
substituted one for another using, for example, Constant Elasticities of Substitution [CES] - 
parameters, which may vary across industries. These incorporate how easy (or difficult) is it to 
substitute one input for another given a relative price change. Intermediate inputs can also be 
substituted with foreign inputs (as in the case of GTAP model), but with a distinct “home bias”, 
governed by Armington elasticities. Value added composite (comprised of combination of primary 
inputs) and foreign-domestic intermediate input composite are typically tied in together to produce 
the final sectoral output at set proportions, implying no substitution – using a Leontief elasticity 
function (Burfisher, 2011). The model then can be shocked to examine the effects of policy 
changes on the whole economy using a money metric equivalent welfare measures, as well as 
disaggregating and examining the effects on each sector, including output, employment and prices. 
In addition, dynamic variants of the models can also incorporate cumulative effects over time 
(static models do not have inter-temporal parameters) such as endogenous physical capital 
accumulation, financial asset and liability accumulation (though usually not included in CGE 
models) and lagged adjustment processes, as in the case of MONASH model (Dixon & Rimmer, 
2002).  
CGE models can be categorized according to the scale of analysis involved. Regional CGE models 
may incorporate just a small economic area within a country (as by Lennox & Diukanova (2010) 
of the Canterbury Region). Country-level analysis is possible through use of national models 
where the whole country is treated as a single entity (such as MONASH-New Zealand), or as an 
agglomeration of regions (such as TERM – discussed later). Finally, global models, most notably 
GTAP, may involve a multitude of interrelated countries and regions (usually grouped together for 
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practical purposes) and are typically used to analyse trade agreements, and any shocks that are 
likely to affect a number of economies (Hertel, 1997).   
4.2.	 Selected	Methodology	Overview	
Creating a CGE model from scratch, particularly with a high level of disaggregation is a very large 
task, even without developing water market specifics, since currently national I/O tables are not 
readily available and parameter estimation requires expert knowledge of all the behavioural 
interlinkages among various sectors. The current study aims to avoid “reinventing the wheel” to 
the extent possible by starting with an already existing model. Hence, the Global Tariff and 
Analysis Project [GTAP] model is used as the starting point (Hertel, 1997). While normally 
reserved for analysis in global trade and lacking within country disaggregation, this model has 
advantages through being open source and being well recognized and understood. In addition, the 
dairy sector is the largest consumer of irrigation water in New Zealand, and since 95% of New 
Zealand dairy is exported (DCANZ, n.d.), trade dynamics play an important part of the outcome. 
To get the required level of disaggregation, New Zealand is disaggregated within GTAP using 
production data of various agricultural sectors (litres of milk produced for the milk sector, number 
of cows and lamb for the cattle-sheep sector, etc.). This is a “second-best” approach, since detailed 
regional decomposition would arguably more likely capture the dynamics of the 
interconnectedness of regions. However, even the most advanced New Zealand regional CGE 
model – NZIER’s proprietary MONASH-New Zealand – is also built using a top-down approach 
(though weighting is done through sectoral employment) since New Zealand lacks regional input-
output data (NZIER, 2010). Finally, water is introduced into the CGE using the methodology 
described in Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol (2011). Irrigation data from Statistics New Zealand is 
used, as well as publicly available productivity comparisons between irrigated and non-irrigated 
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sectors within regions. The resultant adjusted GTAP model and database enables simulation 
analysis, including regional decomposition, of water events including droughts, withdrawal 
restrictions and water charges. 
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5. CONCLUSION	
New Zealand’s current freshwater management system is pushing the limits imposed by the RMA. 
Many catchments are close to full allocation, and some prospective users are denied access because 
of the first-come-first-served principle. Any policy change requires detailed knowledge of how 
much is water is valued by each sector, so as to create a more efficient system of allocation, where 
users who value it the most get access to it first. Yet any decision must also respect any non-market 
values, including Māori rights, ecological, environmental and recreational.  
This chapter outlined the motivation behind the planned area of study – New Zealand irrigation 
water valuation. This was accompanied by a review of methodologies, as well as an overview of 
the related literature. Since it was determined that pasture irrigation is one of the biggest (if not the 
biggest) user of freshwater in New Zealand, particularly during the summer when water is the most 
scarce, this study starts with a focus on this sector when estimating its value of water through short-
run supply curve analysis. Next, a CM study is carried out, where farmers are surveyed in order to 
elicit their water values indirectly thorough the analysis of their choices. Particular attention is paid 
towards the issue of Attribute non Attendance within the choice experiment. Finally, the adjusted 
GTAP model is developed to assess the impact of water management policies (restriction and 
charges) as well as examining the impact of weather variability, such as during droughts and as a 
result of climate change.   
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Introduction
Freshwater is fast approaching over-allocation in many catchments in 
New Zealand [NZ] and regional councils are struggling to cope with the 
outdated, ﬁ rst-come ﬁ rst served principle of allotment enacted by the 1991 
Resource Management Act (Land and Water Forum 2011). In all likelihood, 
some sort of demand management is going to be required to encourage 
efﬁ ciency of use among competing users, through instruments such as 
tariffs or regulated water markets. Either system will effectively raise the 
cost of water to users. Whichever system wins governmental support, it will 
require understanding of water users’ responses to such increases. While 
this paper does not attempt to champion any particular method of solving 
the problem of water allocation, it does attempt to answer the question of 
response to changes in water cost to NZ’s largest consumptive freshwater 
users—dairy farmers.
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NZ water issues: background
Water is an essential building block of life. Not only is it a pivotal element 
in a vast number of economic activities such as agriculture, horticulture, 
industry, electricity, and tourism, but it is also a spiritual substance and is a 
taonga1 for MƗori. NZ is seemingly relatively abundant in freshwater. It has 
the fourth highest per capita total renewable freshwater resources among 
OECD countries of over 80 thousand cubic metres per capita (Fuentes 2011). 
By comparison, Australia and the US have approximately 15 thousand 
and 10 thousand, respectively. Even when coupled with its highest water 
abstraction per capita level in OECD, NZ is still third lowest in terms of 
abstraction vis-à-vis its relative freshwater endowment (Ministry for the 
Environment 2010a). However, “much of it needs to be retained in the 
rivers, lakes and aquifers to maintain the ecological, recreational, or cultural 
values”, with only a relatively small portion allocated for consumptive use 
(Ministry for the Environment 2010a). For example, in the Waikato Region 
the default allocations for freshwater are only 5% for upland and 10% for 
lowland catchments of Q5—the low ﬂ ow statistic derived from analyzing 
the frequency of seven consecutive day annual low ﬂ ow in a catchment 
that has a 20% chance of occurring in a particular year (Waikato Regional 
Council, n.d.).2
The current system of water use allocation in New Zealand has been 
described as “ﬁ rst-come-ﬁ rst-served”: whoever applies ﬁ rst for a resource 
consent obtains it ﬁ rst. There is a nominal fee for the application, and a 
limit is set on the maximum allowable intake, but otherwise the water 
from freshwater bodies and aquifers is virtually free. This system has been 
established by the Resource Management Act [RMA] of 1991 (Scrimgeour 
1997). According to this legislation, regional authorities are entrusted 
with managing their territories’ natural resources, including water. The 
Act stipulates a number of provisions speciﬁ cally addressing the issues 
pertaining to freshwater management, including the settlement of limits 
of freshwater intakes, allocation of rights of freshwater intakes and other 
functions to maintain quality of water (NZ Parliament 2011).
When this system was established, there was little need for an alternative 
solution as freshwater was deemed to be an inexhaustible resource in NZ. 
However, with the proliferation of irrigated farming, as well as a general 
1 A taonga in MƗori culture is a treasured thing, whether tangible or intangible.
2 The council determines each catchment’s environmental ﬂ ow—the level deemed necessary 
for a particular catchment to maintain its environmental and ecological health—through 
setting it proportional to Q5. For example, the Waikato River at Hamilton is deemed to need 
an environmental ﬂ ow of 140 cubic metres per second [cms]. Its Q5 is 156 cms, which means 
that 16 cms is available for allocation. The likelihood of ﬂ ow falling below the environmental 
level is 20%, during which time water intake restrictions will apply.
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growth from other competing needs of water such as hydropower generation 
(which accounts for approximately 60% of all electricity generated in NZ), 
ecosystem management, and recreation, among others, this system is fast 
becoming unable to keep up with its objective. 
Table 1 shows the areas under the irrigation system in 2002 and 2007. 
Approximately 4.2% of all agricultural land in New Zealand is reported 
to be under an irrigation system.3 South Island, Canterbury and Otago in 
particular, account for most of the irrigated land in NZ. Still, most regions 
3 According to Aqualinc 2010, the area of land consented to be irrigated differs slightly to 
this ﬁ gure as not all area has been actually equipped to be irrigated, as deﬁ ned by Statistics 
NZ.
4 Farms using land for: tussock and danthonia for grazing; grassland; arable crop, fodder 
crop and fallow; horticulture; planted production forest; mature native bush; native scrub 
and regenerating native bush; and other (Stats NZ 2007b; Stats NZ 2004).
Table 1. Irrigable land by region (000’s ha).
2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007
Total Agricultural 
Land4
Total Area Equipped 
for Irrigation
Share of Total Ag. Land 
Equipped for Irrigation
Northland 810 765 7.0 8.7 0.9% 1.1%
Auckland 302 245 6.2 6.3 2.1% 2.6%
Waikato 1,730 1,600 12.7 16.6 0.7% 1.0%
Bay of Plenty 600 531 8.8 10.0 1.5% 1.9%
Gisborne 643 615 1.3 2.3 0.2% 0.4%
Hawkes Bay 962 952 18.2 25.2 1.9% 2.6%
Taranaki 497 470 2.9 3.4 0.6% 0.7%
Manawatu-Wanganui 1,545 1,417 8.0 11.7 0.5% 0.8%
Wellington 504 491 9.5 12.9 1.9% 2.6%
TOTAL North Island 7,593 7,086 74.7 97.1 1.0% 1.4%
Tasman 277 253 10.0 10.7 3.6% 4.2%
Nelson 21 18 N/A 0.3 N/A 2.0%
Marlborough 696 507 20.1 26.7 2.9% 5.3%
West Coast 225 200 2.5 0.6 1.1% 0.3%
Canterbury 3,151 3,080 287.2 385.3 9.1% 12.5%
Otago 2,379 2,331 68.9 91.1 2.9% 3.9%
Southland 1,198 1,178 4.1 7.5 0.3% 0.6%
Chatham Islands 49 47 N/A N/A N/A N/A
TOTAL South Island 7,997 7,615 393.0 522.2 4.9% 6.9%
TOTAL NEW 
ZEALAND
15,590 14,701 467.6 619.3 3.0% 4.2%
Source: Stats NZ 2002, 2007a.
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experienced double digit percentage growth of irrigated land area within 
the ﬁ ve year period.
Aqualinc Research reported in 2004 that in Waikato, surface water is 
close to full allocation and the current surface water allocation processes 
do not account for variations in seasonal demand (Aqualinc Research 2004, 
p. 15). So much so, that in 2006 Environment Waikato [EW] declined two 
applications to take “signiﬁ cant volumes of water from the Waikato River 
for the purposes of dairy farm irrigation” (EW 2008, p. 26). The applications 
were particularly opposed by hydroelectricity generators and municipal 
water suppliers (EW 2008). Similarly, other regions experience a growing 
number of declined resource consents due to increasing scarcity of allocative 
water. 
In 2010, there were 20,500 active freshwater consents in NZ, 75% of 
which was for the purposes of irrigation (Aqualinc Research 2010). In terms 
of annual consumptive allocation,5 irrigation constituted just over half 
of the amount. When considering top weekly consumption6—irrigation 
constitutes 78% of allocation (Fig. 1):
Figure 1. Top weekly consumptive allocation shares by sector.
Irrigation 
78% 
Drinking 
8% 
Industrial 
11% 
Stock 
3% 
5 For drinking, stock water and industrial users, annual rate is calculated as weekly times 
52. For irrigation, annual rate depends on the number of irrigating weeks typically 12 to 22 
weeks.
6 Consumptive use means the usage of water after which no other users can use the same 
water, like irrigation or domestic and industrial water use. Hydropower is generally not 
considered to be consumptive since water is later made available to users downstream, 
except in the case of Manapouri Hydropower Plant, which outlets the water to the Doubtful 
Sound. For the purposes of this analysis, the consumptive use of water by this power plant 
is omitted.
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This higher relative and absolute demand is due to the seasonal 
nature of farming—planting and dairying seasons are predominantly in 
warmer months from October to March. Of all volumetric annual irrigation 
allocation, 81% of it is for pasture irrigation (or 76% of consented irrigated 
area in 2010). On top of the extra demand from farming, hydropower 
stations, due to the increased demand for air-conditioning in the summers, 
require more water to generate electricity. Unfortunately, this also coincides 
with the periods of lowest rainfall levels (Fig. 2):
Figure 2. NZ monthly rainfall for selected cities.
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Color image of this figure appears in the color plate section at the end of the book.
Fresh start for fresh water
Recognizing the growing need to better manage all the more scarce water, 
the NZ government commissioned a task force, Land and Water Forum 
[LAWF], to study the current freshwater situation in NZ and advise as to 
how it should be managed better (Land and Water Forum 2010). LAWF 
also concluded that many water catchments are fully allocated, or close to 
full allocation (Land and Water Forum 2011). They recognized freshwater’s 
growing scarcity and recommended establishing more effective allocative 
processes than the “ﬁ rst-come-ﬁ rst-served” basis system currently in place. 
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The most recent report from the Forum speciﬁ cally mentioned water pricing 
as a desirable mechanism to allocative efﬁ ciency (Land and Water Forum 
2012).
Since there are competing users of water (such as domestic and industrial 
users, farms and hydroelectricity generators), who have a rivalrous water 
demand, it is imperative to establish a system that distributes water to 
users who hold it in the highest value. This requires actually knowing what 
that value is to various users. Since intakes of water so far have not been 
measured (in relationship to how much a user was consented to take or 
otherwise) and water being virtually free, for most users the value of water 
has not yet been adequately measured. 
In order to establish a functioning water market, it is ﬁ rst necessary to 
measure the value of water, and, subsequently, estimate users’ sensitivity 
to its pricing. At this stage, however, little research has been conducted 
with regards to the actual of value of water in NZ, much less with regards 
to users’ sensitivity to pricing.
White et al. (2004) reported that estimates of the value of water in New 
Zealand, let alone elasticities, are few. This is partly due to the perception 
that water quantity is not an issue in New Zealand and partly due to lack of 
suitable data (as discussed below). They put the ﬁ gure at $0.2/m3 for ﬁ eld 
and stock watering. It is derived from observing the land values without 
stock watering as well as per animal consumption of water, and contrasting 
it against property values with stock water (hedonic pricing method). 
McDonald and Patterson (1998, as cited in Ford et al. (2001)) presented 
results of using a value added technique to determine the value each cubic 
meter of water generated through various industries. These estimates 
ranged from an average7 of $2,783 per m3 in wood and wood product 
category to $12.3 per m3 in horticulture. The authors, among others (see 
Niewoundt et al. 2004; Young 2005; Schifﬂ er 1998), cautioned against 
reaching any conclusion based on the ﬁ gures obtained through this method 
since production in different sectors also requires other inputs.
In one of the few NZ academic studies, Grimes and Aitken (2008) 
addressed the subject and used a hedonic pricing approach to value 
irrigation water in a drought-prone area in McKenzie District, Canterbury. 
This method valued irrigation through estimating the difference between 
irrigated and non-irrigated farms’ sales price and valuation, while 
controlling for spatial differences, such as distance from towns, rainfall, 
soil and slope characteristics. They found that ﬂ atter areas with poorly 
draining soils received the most beneﬁ t from irrigation, suggesting that it 
may be due to water being able to stay longer periods in these lands. Drier 
7 Averages based on Northland, Auckland and Waikato Regions (Ford et al. 2001).
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areas beneﬁ ted more than wetter areas. The authors joined the criticism of 
the RMA allocation mechanism by suggesting that some farms that may 
beneﬁ t from irrigation cannot get access to water rights because of existing 
regulation and lack of mechanisms of transferring water rights. The study 
found that net returns of irrigation were negative to farms due to high 
investment costs.
Ministry of Primary Industries [MPI] conducted an extensive study 
attempting to quantify the value of irrigation to New Zealand as a whole 
(Doak et al. 2004). They put the economic value of irrigation at $820 million8 
(in 2002/2003 dollars) by estimating a counter-factual scenario where 
irrigated land was hypothetically used as dry land instead. Their method 
was as follows: they classiﬁ ed all agricultural land into 14 agricultural 
sectors in each region, subdividing each sector into irrigated and non-
irrigated portions. Next, the authors acquired the difference in yields 
between irrigated and dryland production for each sector in each region 
based on specialist opinions. Finally, they decreased the yield on the 
irrigated farms to match dryland yields and thereby estimated the effect 
of irrigation. In their subsequent analysis they used yields to estimate the 
impacts of new irrigation systems, and considered the effect of varying 
output on sector output prices. 
Since the recent emphasis of freshwater management restructuring, MPI 
commissioned the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research to conduct 
a study using their proprietary Dynamic CGE model to measure the impact 
of increased irrigation in New Zealand (Kaye-Blake et al. 2010). While this 
study did not consider pricing of water per se, it did consider the changes 
in productivity of various sectors’ post-irrigation schemes installations, as 
well as the costs of installing the schemes. 
As Doak (2005) noted, “the value of water per cubic metre cannot be 
calculated as water use data is not yet available” (p. 2). Indeed, it was only 
in November 2010 that regulations requiring recording of volumetric intake 
of water came into effect for new consents (Ministry for the Environment 
2010b). Still, this study targets to provide a starting point estimate of the 
farms’ short-run (annual) responses to at-site (irrigation cost inclusive) 
changes of water costs based on panel data analysis of dairy monitory 
survey data.
Analytical Framework
Scheierling et al. (2004), in their meta-analysis study, summarized the 
price elasticities of the derived demand for irrigation water using various 
8 This figure includes their analysis of price changes resulting from sectoral output 
changes.
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techniques since the 1960s. Their conclusion was that results obtained 
through different methods vary to a great extent partly because different 
methods were used: mathematical programming studies over-estimated 
elasticities, and ﬁ eld experiments produced the least elastic estimates 
(econometric studies were in between). Schifﬂ er (1998) noted that the most 
common way of determining the value of water as an intermediary good is 
through residual imputation method.9 In this method “the value of all non-
water factor inputs is subtracted from the total value of products generated 
by an agricultural activity” (Schifﬂ er 1998, p. 42). However, due the lack of 
accurate water usage data such approaches seemed unfeasible, and hence 
a unique approach has been developed speciﬁ cally for the case at hand. 
The main premise of this study is that farmers are rational economic 
agents and respond to changes in incentives by altering their production—
the higher the expected proﬁ t the more they produce. Indeed, a qualitative 
study by Watters et al. (2004) partially conﬁ rmed this as the authors 
concluded that there seems to be a “wide-spread inclination for [dairy] 
farmers to respond to increasing prices through increasing input and 
production outputs” (p. 22). As one of their respondents suggested, “if 
payout allows” s/he maintains or increases the use of fertilizer and brought-
in feed to increase the milk solid [MS] production.
Perhaps a more economically rational observation is that higher 
proﬁ tability (measured as an output-input price ratio) induces higher levels 
of production, and vice versa. Hence, an increase in the cost of water would 
essentially be the equivalent of a reduction in proﬁ tability, thus lowering 
the incentives for extra production. One possible way to visualize this 
relationship is considering what would happen if a hypothetical water tax 
for each milk-solid sold was introduced on the portion of the farm’s supply 
relying on irrigation (Fig. 3). If the output price remained unchanged, 
quantity supplied would fall from Q0 (quantity of MS produced due to 
irrigation prior to water tax) to Q1 (post introduction of water tax). An 
important feature to note is that production due to irrigation would cease 
altogether if output/input price ratio falls below unity since the cost of 
paying for one unit of production would exceed the revenue received (i.e., 
average variable cost would become higher than marginal revenue). Note 
too, that the quantity of MS produced in the rain-fed production process 
would remain unchanged. 
Finding a relationship between the volumetric cost of water and 
farmers’ responses one needs to know: 
 1.  the relationship between the quantity of water required for production 
of each milk-solid, and;
9 Also known as farm budget residual method when estimating value in the agricultural 
sector (Schifﬂ er 1998).
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 2.  the relationship between the output variations due to changes in the 
expected output-input price ratio.
The relationship between a volumetric unit of water and corresponding 
yields of kgMS production can be derived from the literature on pasture 
response to irrigation. It is conditional on the slope of the land, soil type, 
irrigation rates, grass type, fertilizer regime, climatic conditions as well as 
time of the year (Brown and Haigh 2005; Thomson 1996). Average responses 
will be used in the following explanation. In the study of predicting future 
demand for irrigation in Waikato, Brown and Haigh (2005) ﬁ nd that, 
on average, an extra millimeter of irrigation yields an additional 9.3 kg 
Dry Matter per hectare (DM/ha). In Canterbury, using an average of 7 
irrigations of 100 mm per season yielded an increase from of 6.7 t DM/
ha to 11.9 t DM/ha on average, or 5,200 kg/700 mm = 7.4 kg DM/ha per 
1 mm (McBride 1994). In Taranaki, the average yield response to 1 mm of 
irrigation is similarly 7.56 kg DM/ha/year, ranging from 3.9 kg to 10.1 kg 
DM/ha/year on average across zones (Rout 2003). 
In terms of relating DM to milk-solids, numerous factors affect 
cow productivity, such as cow weight, breed, distance needed to walk, 
topography of pasture, etc. (as well as the quality of DM itself). DairyNZ 
(2010) suggests that annual dry matter requirements for 350 kgMS/year 
producing Jersey weighting 400 kg that walks 4 km/day on ﬂ at land and is 
in milk for 270 days requires 4.6t DM + 6% of wastage = 4.9 t DM. Hence, 
each kg of DM would yield 350/4,876 = 0.072 kgMS. It follows that, on average 
and conditional on a range of factors, if 1mm of irrigation yields 7.4 kg DM/ha 
Figure 3. Effect of a hypothetical water tax on production.
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annually (in Canterbury), it is transferred into 7.4 * 0.072 = 0.52 MS/ha/year. 
Since 1 mm on a hectare is equivalent to 10 m3, then it follows that it takes 
approximately 10/0.52|20 m3 of irrigated water to produce 1 kgMS.
The relationship between the change in the expected output-input 
price ratio and corresponding change in output is the subject of subsequent 
data analysis. It seeks to establish a correspondence between expected 
proﬁ tability (as measured by the output-input price ratio) and its effect on 
a farm’s output in terms of kgMS, while controlling for other factors. Once 
such relationship is established, it would mean that the coefﬁ cient on the 
output-input price ratio could be interpreted as the expected change of an 
average farm to a change in proﬁ tability, due to an introduced “water tax 
wedge”. Since only a portion of production on farms is due to irrigation, 
the effect would only apply to that portion (rain-fed production would 
remain unchanged). 
Data
The data has been provided by the Ministry of Primary Industries [MPI] 
for the purposes of this research. It is an unbalanced panel data of a sample 
of dairy farms throughout New Zealand’s main dairying regions over 11 
ﬁ nancial years (from 2000 to 2011), with a total of 1,508 observations. Farm-
level data available and used includes the total kgMS produced, effective 
farming area (in hectares), number of cows and total expenditure (see Table 
2 for summary statistics). Additional series, namely precipitation, price 
indices and payout data were merged as described below. 
Table 2. Summary statistics.
No. of 
cows
kgMS area Total expenses
Mean 384 137,683 153 438,597
Median 330 110,116 127 330,518
SD 236 101,130 95 367,731
Min. 79 15,000 30 56,723
Max. 2,200 800,000 884 3,339,402
Normality Test Statistic 5,225* 6,070* 3,968* 5,991*
*indicates p-value <0.0001. 
Output-weighted expected payout and proϐitability ratio
New Zealand dairy farmers’ largest source of income is through the sale 
of MS to their cooperatives, the biggest being Fonterra (accounting for 
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approximately 90% of all milk production in NZ). The majority of famers 
do not have the scale to exercise market power, and hence are bound by 
the payouts. The payout per milk-solid consists of a farmgate milk-solid 
price as well as a proﬁ t share (Distributable Proﬁ t—formally known as 
“value added components”) from the proﬁ t of value-added activities of 
the cooperative.
Although farmers receive advance payments to aid their yearly cash 
ﬂ ow, the ﬁ nal payout is usually announced well into the next production 
season (usually around September, whereas the milking season coincides 
with ﬁ scal calendar and ends at the end of June), hence it has no effect on 
farm production in the corresponding milking season. What motivates 
short-run variability in the production is the forecasted payout—or how 
much the cooperative predicts the ﬁ nal payout to be. After the opening 
forecast at the start of each season, the cooperative updates its forecast, 
which is driven by such factors as currency ﬂ uctuations, international 
dairy auction prices as well as the expected proﬁ t from the value-added 
activities.
As per Fig. 4, initial forecasts sometimes substantially differ from the 
ﬁ nal payout. For instance, in the 2009/2010 season, the opening forecast was 
only $4.55 whereas the ﬁ nal payout was actually $6.55, making the actual 
payout an inadequate measure of farmer short-run incentive. 
Figure 4. Forecasted vs. Actual Payout.
Source: Fonterra 2000–2012.
Color image of this figure appears in the color plate section at the end of the book.
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To obtain a more reliable incentive indicator, an output-weighted 
forecast (O-W forecast) measure was developed, where the forecasts were 
weighted by the quantity of MS produced NZ-wide when each forecast 
was in effect. For example, the opening forecast for the 2009/2010 season 
of $4.55 was updated on 22nd September, 2009 to $5.1. Between the start 
of the season and 22nd September, approximately 205,340 thousands of 
kgMS was produced NZ-wide (DCANZ 2012).10 This corresponds to 14% 
of the 1,438,496 thousands kgMS produced in the 2009/2010 season. Hence, 
for 14% of the total production, the expected payout was $4.55 (see Fig. 5). 
Similarly, for 23% of the total 2009/2010 production, the forecasted payout 
was $5.1, for 43% it was $6.05, for 17% it was $6.15, and for 4% it was $6.55. 
Weighting each forecast by the proportion of milk produced NZ-wide in 
the period the forecast was effective results in average weighted expected 
payout for the season (output-weighted forecast) of 0.14*$4.55 + 0.23*$5.1 + 
0.43*$6.05 + 0.17*$6.15 + 0.04*$6.55 = $5.65.11 Detailed data on NZ-wide total 
MS production was available only for seasons 2008 through 2011, hence for 
other years, the average of four years of available total production record 
was used. Table 3 summarizes the disparity between the ﬁ nal payout and 
the OW forecast.
Figure 5. Output-weighted forecast estimation.
Data Sources: DCANZ (2012); Fonterra (2009, 2010).
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Color image of this figure appears in the color plate section at the end of the book.
10 DCANZ (2012) only published monthly MS production data, hence the cumulative 
production up to 22nd September was linearly extrapolated using the end of August and 
end of September cumulative production ﬁ gures.
11 Figures may not add up due to rounding.
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While the nominal payout more than doubled between 1999/2000 
and 2010/2011 seasons, the costs of production and costs of living have 
likewise risen (Fig. 6). The cost of producing (Producer Price Index (PPI)) 
Table 3. Output-weighted Forecast vs. Final Payouts.
Season O-W Forecast Final Difference
2010/2011 7.19 8.25 1.06
2009/2010 5.65 6.70 1.05
2008/2009 6.05 5.70 –0.35
2007/2008 6.60 7.90 1.30
2006/2007 4.10 4.35 0.25
2005/2006 3.98 4.10 0.12
2004/2005 4.18 4.59 0.41
2003/2004 4.03 4.25 0.22
2002/2003 3.68 3.63 –0.05
2001/2002 5.30 5.33 0.03
2000/2001 4.43 5.00 0.57
1999/200012 3.40 3.75 0.35
12 For the 1999/2000 season the NZ Dairy Group forecasts and ﬁ nal payout were used for the 
purposes of the analysis since this was prior to the establishment of Fonterra.
Figure 6. CPI, PPI and Payout Indices (1999 = 100).
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has risen at a substantially faster pace than cost of living (Consumer Price 
Index (CPI)). 
To adjust for the changing rates of price increases, as well as to mitigate 
for multicollinearity which would arise since the year and region dummy 
variables would be perfectly collinear with the same payout experienced by 
each farm, an output price/input price ratio (O/I ratio) was calculated for 
each farm. This ratio could be interpreted as proﬁ tability ratio, and hence 
changes in proﬁ tability due to either changes in payout or costs per each 
MS could be interpreted as having the same effect. In lieu of higher payout 
(output price) or lower expense (input price), the ratio would increase and 
hence motivate higher levels of production—a supply curve. Moreover, 
logistic transformation of the ratio could be interpreted as price elasticity 
of supply (Tauer 1998). As per Fig. 7, the expectation adjusted O/I ratio is 
centered just above 1.5 and is relatively steady over time except for the low 
payout year of 2003 and high payout year of 2008. 
Figure 7. Output price/input price ratio across years and its distribution.
Data Sources: Statistics NZ (2012); Fonterra 2000–2012.
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Precipitation
For each dairy region in the sample, a representative weather station was 
selected from the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research 
[NIWA] weather database and corresponding monthly total rainfall (in 
mm) was obtained. For each region and each production season, months 
November through April were selected, deemed to most impact the 
variation in production. Since both seasons, extremely wet (as in 2003) 
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and extremely dry (in 2008), can potentially negatively affect DM growth, 
the rainfall variable for each region was ﬁ rst centered on the mean in each 
corresponding region, then split into negative and positive deviations 
from it.
Results
To derive the relationship between the O/I ratio and output, total production 
of kgMS in a year from individual farms was regressed on the available 
explanatory variables. Table 4 summarizes the results of the model. The 
following describes each variable and their signiﬁ cance.
The number of cows (cows) was included to control for the scale of 
farms. Having the most explanatory power, the coefﬁ cient suggests that an 
additional cow can add extra 413 kgMS. This is somewhat larger than the 
average MS production per cow in the sample (344), but in line with the 
averages from recent years. Interestingly, variables attempting to control 
for the intensity of dairying—stocking_rate and area were not found to be 
statistically signiﬁ cant in most regressions. While farming area is highly 
Table 4. Regression output.
 Dependent Variable: 
Total kgMS 
Regressor
cows 413***
(15.6)
dry_year_rain (mm)CR  52.8***
(10.5)
wet_year_rain (mm)CR –26.0**
(8.0)
OI_ratio 10,865***
(1,704)
OI_ratio × stocking_ rateC –4,183**
(1,368)
OI_ratio × area (ha)C –48.7**
(18.9)
Standard Error of Regression 23,390
R2 0.947
Robust standard errors are given in parentheses under coefﬁ cients. Individual coefﬁ cients are 
statistically signiﬁ cant at the **1% or ***0.1% signiﬁ cance level. C denotes that the variable 
was centered by subtracting the mean of all observations in the sample, while CR indicates 
that the variable was centered with the mean of the corresponding region. 1999/2000 
season and CANDY region dummy variables were omitted from estimation to avoid perfect 
multicollinearity with the intercept. Heteroskedasticity adjusted F-statistic testing whether 
all year dummy variables are zero is 5, (p-values < 0.0001); and 44.0 testing that all region 
dummy variables are jointly insigniﬁ cant.
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correlated with the number of cows (r=0.82), suggesting low efﬁ ciency 
due to multicollinearity, lack of explanatory power of the stocking rate is 
harder to explain. 
Next, positive and negative deviations from the region’s average rainfall 
for months November through April were added to control for weather. 
Note that the coefﬁ cient on extra mm of rain in a dry year above the average 
(dry_year_rain (mm)) is 52.8, which, when divided by the average farm size 
(153 ha) yields a marginal effect of 0.35. This is smaller than the effect of 
1mm/ha of irrigation on MS production derived earlier—0.52 MS/ha/year 
(page 308)—and is in line with expectations since watering from rainfall 
(unlike from irrigation) does not follow an optimal schedule intended for 
maximum pasture growth.
 The effect of rain in a wet year has expected signs (exceedingly wet 
seasons slow down grass growth and bog down cows) and is less than half 
the size of the effect in a dry year.
The model also includes dummy variables for time and region speciﬁ c 
effects. The rationale behind this ﬁ xed effects speciﬁ cations is that in 
each year there are explanatory factors omitted that are shared among all 
farms (such as economic outlook and conﬁ dence); whereas some effects 
are likely to remain constant across time, but shared among neighboring 
farms (e.g., regional climatic attributes). Inclusion of the dummy variables 
ensured that these time and region speciﬁ c effects (although unobserved) 
are controlled for.
The coefﬁ cient on OI_ratio has an expected sign, but a comparatively 
low magnitude, suggesting a low responsiveness of farms to changes 
in output and input prices. Logistic transformation of both sides of the 
regression yielded a coefﬁ cient of 0.16, which can be interpreted as the 
price elasticity of supply—a 1% change in price ratio triggers only a 0.16% 
change in quantity supplied. This inelastic response suggests that farms 
have low ﬂ exibility in the short-run, due to constrained ﬁ xed resources 
(number of cows and land) and diminishing marginal returns to variable 
inputs (irrigation, fertilizer and feed). 
Farm size (area) and farming intensity (stocking_rate) were included 
as interaction terms with the OI_ratio, and their signiﬁ cance suggests that 
the effect of expected proﬁ t varies with farm sizes and farming intensity. 
Each interaction was centered by subtracting their respective means, so that 
interpretation of OI_ratio can be taken as that of a farm with an average 
stocking rate and farm size. Smaller farms and those with lower farming 
intensity tended to be more ﬂ exible when output/input prices changed.
The main advantages of centering of area and stocking_rate variables 
at their respective mean values are that the estimates on the variable of 
interest (OI_ratio) remain comparable with estimates from the models that 
do not include such interactions; and that the coefﬁ cient on the variable of 
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interest itself remains meaningful—as opposed to if the interactive terms 
were unscaled, and the coefﬁ cient on the OI_ratio would be evaluated for 
a farm with zero area and zero stocking rate (Woolridge 2003). Although 
interactions under linear transformation lack scale in variance, Aitken and 
West (1991) show that post-hoc analysis of interaction is not affected by 
such scaling. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that centering has an 
additional advantage of reducing the chance of multicollinearity of with 
the original multiplicative terms, thereby increasing the efﬁ ciency of the 
estimates. 
The conditional effect of the OI_ratio is estimated to be 10,865 kgMS for 
a unitary change in the OI_ratio for an average farm. Since interaction terms 
were included, it must be qualiﬁ ed by stating that coefﬁ cient holds for a farm 
of 153 hectares and a stocking rate of 2.64. This reduces to approximately 
10,865/153 ha = 71 kgMS/ha. The marginal effects of a unitary increase in 
the OI_ratio for larger/smaller farms as well as those with higher/lower 
stocking rate can be calculating by adding the average OI_ratio effect with 
a product of required values for area and stocking rate and their respective 
coefﬁ cients—see Table 5.13
As per Cohen and Cohen (2003), +/– 1 Standard Deviations (StDev) 
from the mean values were used to estimate the simple slope coefﬁ cients in 
Table 5. Standard errors (in parenthesis below the coefﬁ cient) were derived 
using a technique from Aitken and West (1991, pp. 24–25):
2
b 's bw  w S
Where w is the vector matrix of the coefﬁ cients included in the interaction and 
zeros for others  ( [0 0 0 1 _ 0 0]); and' stocking rate area  bw  =                     S  is 
the heteroskedasticity consistent variance covariance matrix (White’s). For 
each simple slope coefﬁ cient corresponding values of area and stocking_rate 
were substituted in w.
13 Note that coefﬁ cients are for centered variables, hence, the –1 StDev multiplier for stocking 
rate interaction term, for example, is 1.92–2.64 = –0.72.
Table 5. Marginal effects of O/I ratio with interaction terms.
stocking rate
1.92
(–1 StDev)
2.64
(mean)
3.36
(+1 StDev)
ar
ea
 (h
a)
58
(–1 StDev)
18,504***
(2,525)
15,488***
(1,870)
12,472***
(1,600)
153
(mean)
13,881***
(1,663)
10,865***
(1,704)
7,849***
(2,233)
248
(+1 StDev)
9,258***
(2,359)
6,242
(3,717)
3,226
(3,717)
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Coefﬁ cients on the interaction terms suggest that smaller and less 
intense farms are more responsive to changes in proﬁ tability. This makes 
economic sense as there is inevitably “excess capacity” within farms with 
lower stocking rates, and they are more likely to be ﬂ exible if there is a 
short-run change in either input or output prices. 
Application to Water Demand
To predict the response of a farm to an increase in a volumetric pricing 
of pasture irrigation water, it is ﬁ rst necessary to include a number of 
parameters and assumptions, some of which may be changed in accordance 
to application requirements. As an example, suppose there is a farm with 
the following attributes:14
Number of cows 425
Farm Size 144 ha
Stocking Rate-  2.95
Payout $7.23
Cost / MS $3.87
O/I Ratio-  1.87
MS Production 150,000 kgMS
Pasture Irrigation Response 7.4 kg DM/ha/mm
Proportion of DM grown due to irrigation 10%
DM requirements/cow 5 tons
Each cow requires 5 tons of DM to produce 150,000/425 = 353 kg of 
MS, so each kg of DM yields 353/5,000 = 0.0706 kgMS. Since 1 mm/ha 
of irrigation produces 7.4 kg DM/ha/mm, it results in 7.4*0.0706 = 0.522 
kgMS/ha. 1 mm/ha of irrigation is equivalent to 10 m3, then it takes 10/0.522 
= 19.14 m3 to produce 1 kgMS. In absence of water tariffs, the farm would 
consume 19.14*0.1*150,000 = 287,162 m3 of water. 
Now suppose a 5 cent/m3 tariff is introduced. Assuming no input 
substitution (e.g., for brought-in feed), the farm now faces a 287,162*0.05 = 
$14,358 bill for irrigation water. The overall farm working expense/MS rises 
from $3.87 to $3.87 + $14,358/150,000 = $3.97. The O/I ratio falls from 1.87 
to $7.23/$3.97 = 1.82, hence the O/I ratio changes by 1.87–1.82 = 0.05. 
Since the stocking rate and area are not at their mean values, the simple 
slope coefﬁ cient on the O/I ratio needs to be derived by including the 
multiplicative terms, i.e., 10,865 + (–4,183*(2.95–2.64)) + (–48.7*(144–153)) = 
10,015. Using this simple slope coefﬁ cient on the O/I ratio, the consequent 
14 Based on averages from the 2010/2011 production season.
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predicted fall in the production is 0.05*10,015 = 452 kgMS. As the increase in 
cost is only for the irrigated production, for the farm to produce 901 fewer 
kgMS, it would require 452*19.14 = 8,645 fewer m3 of water (or 8,645/287,162 
= 3% less water).
This formula can be extended to include any number of assumptions 
about the parameters of the farm in question, or the tariff levels. For instance, 
Figure 8 traces the quantities of water consumed by the farm with average 
parameters used in this illustrative example under various hypothesized 
water tariffs. Table 6 presents relative changes in water consumption.
Figure 8. Water consumption for an average farm vs. price (per 1 m3).
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Table 6. Changes in water consumption for an average farm.
Price Change in Water Consumption
$0.05 –3.0%
$0.10 –5.9%
$0.15 –8.6%
$0.20 –11.2%
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Conclusion & Limitations
This study’s aim was to produce a “starting point” estimate of the response 
curve to water price tariffs of dairy farmers and should be treated as such. 
It requires prior knowledge of a number of sensitive parameters and is 
based on restrictive assumptions including that all farms employ the same 
production function, there is linearity in DM yield in response to irrigation, 
and there is no substitution among factors of production.
In reality, faced with increasing water costs, farmers are likely to 
substitute to brought-in feed and water usage efﬁ ciency technologies. 
Allowing for substitution would theoretically yield much sharper responses 
(i.e., more production would be shifted towards using brought-in feed, 
less irrigated water). Indeed, in Australia farmers have to decide every 
year before the start of production season whether to invest in “temporary 
water” and make a loss if the year ends up to be wet, or risk it and face the 
prospect of having to purchase expensive feed (O’Connor, n.d.). Further 
study should be carried out to examine the trade-off between brought-in 
feed and irrigation.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the limitations of the data and restrictive 
assumptions, useful conclusions can be drawn: smaller and less intense 
farms are likely to be more ﬂ exible with production should they be faced 
with a freshwater tax (equivalent of a lower expected payout). Larger farms 
and those that operate closer to full capacity, on the other hand, are likely to 
internalize the costs in the short run, and hence their demand for freshwater 
is likely to be less susceptible to inﬂ uence in the face of levies. 
In conclusion, rather than relying on tools such as water intake 
restrictions and arbitrary distribution of water resource consents, theoretical 
rationale suggests that a pricing mechanism can be a viable alternative for 
water demand management in the face of scarcity. It is expected that this 
study adds perspective to discussion on the topic. 
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The issue of attribute non-attendance (ANA) has been gaining increasing attention in the
field of choice modeling. While the modeling issues, effects on parameter estimation, and,
to a lesser degree, causes of ANA have been the main concern of research in this area, to
date few studies have produced generalizable results about the effects of ANA on
parameter estimates and little attention has been paid to the efficiency of experimental
design in the face of ANA. This paper looks at these issues and also introduces a distinction
between random and systematic ANA, which is defined to be ANA that is persistent in the
face of choice task and/or attribute order randomization. As part of this study, Monte Carlo
simulations are run to examine the effects of ANA on parameter estimation, under the
conditions of random and systematic ANA. Simulations with respondent heterogeneity are
also carried out to test the efficiency of latent class model estimations. The models
perform well, but it is argued that the underlying assumption of serial ANA is
indistinguishable from zero preferences with respondent heterogeneity, and such ANA
is inconsequential to the choice made (i.e. the same choice is made whether or not the
attribute is being attended to). In contrast, when a non-zero preference attribute is
ignored, the latent model does not pick up the effects of ANA and additional data is
required. Not incorporating ANA data significantly biases estimates of all parameters,
especially when the marginal effects of the ignored attribute are relatively large. Finally, it
is shown that orthogonal design is significantly disturbed by systematic ANA, and there is
scope to improve it by using a D-efficient design.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The study of the effects of heuristics in choice modeling has been gaining increasing attention in the choice modeling
literature. The role of attribute non-attendance (ANA), a heuristic which seeks to decrease cognitive burden by ignoring
certain attribute levels in choice tasks or whole experiments, has been particularly prominent. Most literature, however,
concentrates on the modeling issues of ANA, examining its effect only on parameter estimation in specific case studies,
without resorting to making generalized statements about the role of ANA other than that not accounting for it may (or may
not) substantially alter willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates. This study seeks to examine the effects of ANA with regard to
parameter estimation and design through the use of Monte-Carlo simulations. A parsimonious main-effects only binary83
A. Kravchenko / Journal of Choice Modelling 11 (2014) 57–6858choice model with binary attributes is used, with various ANA specifications included for one of its parameters. The findings
effectively conclude that not accounting for ANA, particularly if the true models parameters are relatively large, may
substantially bias all parameters in the estimated model. In terms of design efficiency, random ANA, while disturbing
choice-task level design efficiency, maintains high design efficiency across pooled responses. However, if ANA is systematic,
due to perhaps the effect of other variables or the order of choice tasks, resultant correlations disturb the pooled design
efficiency as well. D-efficient design is shown to significantly outperform fractional factorial orthogonal main-effects design.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the ANA literature will be reviewed, followed by a brief overview of design
efficiency concepts. Next, each simulation scenario and its motivation will be explained in detail. Finally, the main results are
discussed, followed by concluding remarks. It must be noted, however, that these results are limited in their scope as they
were simulated and hence do not allow for any demand-induced design artifacts that would be present should real people
be faced with choice tasks. Further study is needed with regard to analysis of the issues described in the real world,
particularly with respect to the cognitive processes responsible for ANA, their differences and ultimately how these different
types of ANA impact on parameter estimation and design.
2. ANA and heuristics background
The use of what are argued to be less than ideal strategies in decision making has long been recognized in the decision-
making literature. Deviation from ideal, or non-fully compensatory processes can, however, “lead to elimination of
potentially good alternatives early in the decision process” (Payne et al., 1993, p. 5). The authors argue that there is a trade-
off between effort and the accuracy of a decision—more information gathering for more accurate decisions requires more
effort. Humans' limited cognitive capacity for storing information in short-term memory has been famously recognized by
Miller (1956), who showed that on average only 7 “chunks” of information can be stored in the cognitive brain to help with
judgments; whereas typical choice modeling applications involve significantly more than 7 attribute levels per choice task.
Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) follow the work of Payne et al. (1993) and introduce an effort reduction framework which
summarizes recent research in the field of heuristics—strategies to, broadly speaking, decrease the cognitive burden during
decision making ”...the weighted additive rule and other optimal strategies place five demands on people: to consider all
available cues; to retrieve cue values accurately; to weight cues properly; to integrate information for each alternative, and
to examine all alternatives. We therefore believe that people confront limited cognitive resources by addressing these five
demands. They can reduce the effort associated with any of these five demands individually or collectively” (p. 219).
Perhaps it is the role of unconscious thought that has been underestimated in models that attempt to only tap into the
processing power of the prefrontal cortex. Unconscious thought is distinguished from conscious thought through the role of
attention (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006). Conscious thinkers recall less information overall than unconscious thinkers
and the majority of conscious thinkers indicate that they base their decisions on only one or two attributes (hence 7
“chunks” may only be recalled consciously, whereas all or nearly all information can be unconsciously used to make near-
optimum decisions). In his earlier work, Dijksterhuis et al. (2004) demonstrated experimentally that people make better
decisions when they are induced to do so using subconscious processes.
At the same time, Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) argue strongly against the common accuracy-effort trade-off
paradigm, and suggest that heuristics that incorporate less information, computation and time can actually improve
decision accuracy. In fact, they view heuristics as a superior alternative to a fully additive view of decision making, a “less-is-
more” view. The crux of the argument is that precisely because of people's limited cognitive resources, forcing respondents
to consciously consider more information leads to lower precision in decision making than when using simplifying
heuristics.
Seeking to find the underlying reasons behind ANA in stated choice experiments, Alemu et al. (2012) added debriefing
questions in their stated choice study. Their conclusion is that although ANA is in most cases a manifestation of zero
preferences, combining a simplifying heuristic also plays a part. In addition, the authors find that eliciting the reasons
behind ANA may improve parameter estimation.
Yet, as Hensher (2009) states, nearly all practitioners of choice modeling still opt for the conventional full compensatory
approach where all attributes are fully considered in the model. Willemsen and Johnson (2010) also note that “decision
making research has largely progressed through the use of models that account solely for observed choices without
extensive consideration of underlying cognitive structures and processes”.
While there are many classifications of heuristics in decision-making research (e.g., Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008),
the most common one examined (at least in the context of environmental economics) is that of attribute non-attendance
(ANA)—when the respondents ignore one or more attribute levels over the whole experiment (serial ANA) or at a choice task
level. Under Shah and Oppenheimer's classification ANA can be a symptom of ‘examining fewer clues’ and ‘integrating less
information’.
Choice modeling studies that do consider heuristics (ANA in particular) generally find that it has significant impact on the
WTP and parameter estimates. Hensher (2009) concludes that “failure to accommodate process heterogeneity is a
significant contributing influence [of a large hypothetical bias]” p. 27. Hensher and Greene (2010) and Hensher and Rose
(2009) find the WTP is significantly higher than full relevance and attribute preservation specification. Hensher et al.
(2005b) also find that non-accounting for ANA produces significantly different WTP estimates. Scarpa et al. (2010, 2009)
note that including ANA data in model estimation improves fit and provides a ‘more plausible pattern of signs and greater84
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estimates were derived. Mariel et al. (2011) follow a simulation approach for non-attendance for 20%, 40% and 60% of
individuals and find that only choice task non-attendance (as opposed to serial non-attendance) significantly impacts the
estimates of both the non-attended attribute and other, fully attended attributes.
In terms of the prevalence of ANA, Kragt (2012) looked at serial non-attendance, and found that only 50% of respondents
attended to all the attributes, and nearly 20% concentrated on just one attribute. In Reisen et al.'s (2008) study, respondents
on average examined 22% of the available attributes. In Kaye-Blake et al.'s (2009) study, nearly 50% of cards (on a computer-
based information board—discussed below) of attribute levels were left unopened during the experiment.1
2.1. Approaches of detecting and dealing with ANA
There are two main methods of integrating ANA into choice modeling—through ‘stated’ or ‘inferred’ methods. Inferred
methods (such as Scarpa et al., 2009; Hensher and Rose, 2009) use a latent class approach, with the main advantage being
that no further data is required. The main assumptions in such models is that there is respondent heterogeneity where some
groups do not attend to one or more attributes (or, equivalently, have zero preference to for those attributes). Stated method
involves collection of further information on ANA, usually in the form of follow-up questions, such as ”is any of the
information shown not relevant when you make your choice?” (Hensher et al., 2005b; Hensher, 2006). Coefficients on
attributes that are ignored are then restricted to zero in model estimation (at either choice task or whole survey (‘serial’)
level–see Hensher, 2009).
There are contradictory findings with regard to the efficacy of each method. Hensher (2009) notes that stated APS are not
significant when included in the latent class model, meaning that the latent class model provides the same result but
without the need for further information collection. Yet, Campbell and Lorimer (2009) find a discrepancy between self-
reported and modeled attributes that are ignored. Hensher et al. (2012) also cite the concern of reliability of such
information. Similarly, Kragt (2012) finds that inferred and stated ANA models provide different results.
Alternative strategies for collecting information on ANA include eye and mouse tracking. However, such tools are mostly
used in the context of the actual decision-making process rather than the effect on the outcome and are usually, but not
always, confined to controlled lab environments. For instance, Russo and Dosher (1983) use eye tracking to detect decision
strategies, but their experiment forces a full compensatory decision strategy, concentrating more on dimensional versus
holistic strategies, (i.e. attribute versus alternative based strategies). Similarly, Ball (1997) examines the actual strategies via
analysis of the decision information window. Meißner et al. (2013), on the other hand, examine ANA using eye-tracking
techniques and conclude that in the later choices, respondents tended to focus only on important attributes. In a case
example, the authors describe the movement of attention of a respondent in a task near the end of the experiment,
concentrating on the levels of just one of several attributes. Once the desired level of that attribute (considered most
important—a lexicographic heuristic) is found, the respondent is then seen looking at the levels of alternative's other
attributes—ensuring that nothing is too undesirable before choosing the said alternative. Corresponding levels of other
alternatives are entirely ignored.
A study by Kaye-Blake et al. (2009) does consider the effects on the outcome by using an on-screen information display
matrix with attribute levels hidden (a type of mouse tracking). The attribute levels that are clicked on show up, thus
allowing the researchers to determine what information was potentially used and what was definitely ignored by the
respondents when making a decision. The study goes on to conclude that incorporating ANA study significantly influences
parameter estimates. However, Franco-Watkins and Johnson (2011) argue that mouse tracking introduces an experimental
artefact, influencing the experiment outcomes: mouse tracking takes longer than eye tracking. Mouse tracking increases
search costs (effort) compared to eye tracking, hence respondents spent less time double checking attribute levels.
In whatever way ANA is integrated in the modeling, it is important to consider what ANA may represent: perhaps it
detects ‘irrational’ responders who are not motivated strongly enough to take the study seriously; or the levels of ignored
attributes are not high enough to motivate full attention and hence lexicographic heuristics are employed. Perhaps it is
preference heterogeneity, failure to allow for which may ‘confound non-attendance with weak preferences’ (e.g., Hole et al.,
2012, p. 6). Cameron and DeShazo (2011), find that other attribute dissimilarity and own attribute dissimilarity is what
causes respondents to differentially allocate attention across attributes. It is also possible (as argued by Puckett and Hensher,
2008) that the attribute levels may be sufficiently high to deserve attention, but the differences in levels are not deemed
significant, hence ANA emerges. Kragt (2012) also notes that the way the questions are asked—‘species lost’ vs ‘species
present’ in her example—also influences attribute attendance.
3. Experiment design in choice modeling
Before respondents are able to ignore attributes during stated choice experiments, the researcher must first design a
stated choice study (for good descriptions of this processes, see Johnson et al., 2007; Hensher et al., 2005a; Louviere et al.,
2000). Once the researcher decides on the number of choices and attributes, he/she must decide how to arrange those1 For a thorough overview of stated ANA studies see Alemu et al. (2012).
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(2001), for instance, examine the role of task complexity, as proxied by the number of attributes and choices. Caussade et al.
(2005) summarize the studies that show that dimensions such as the number of alternatives per choice, the number of
attributes, the levels of attributes, and the total number of choices all affect the elicited parameter estimates. In their own
study, however, they find that the most significant dimensions are the number of attributes (optimum at 9–10) and the
number of alternatives (optimum at 4). Rolfe and Bennett (2009) tests two- versus three-alternative specification and finds
that the three-alternative CM design provides a more robust model.
Besides the number of choices and dimensions, one of the core concepts in the design process is that of orthogonality, or the
correlation structure among attributes. Zero cross-correlation design is said to be orthogonal, which ensures statistical
independence of the attributes and the highest level of statistical significance (Rose and Bliemer, 2009). While orthogonality is
achieved when a full factorial design is used (every possible combination of attributes and their levels), in most cases full factorial
designs are simply too large to be practical, hence a reduction of the number of choice tasks (while maintaining orthogonality) is
required. Hensher et al. (2005a) note that failure to use orthogonal design may yield biased estimates, in some cases with wrong
signs. Rose and Bliemer (2009) maintain that the estimates will still be asymptotically unbiased even with a moderate level of
cross-correlation among attributes, and that having an inefficient design will result in a loss of statistical significance (or the need
for a larger sample size to achieve a desired level of statistical significance). Another related consideration is that of level balance.
Johnson et al. (2007) note that any imbalance would increase information obtained about one parameter at the expense of another.
The author knows of just one study that considered experimental design in relation to ANA: Rose and Bliemer (2013)
derive a more efficient design algorithmwhen the probability of non-attending to a particular attribute is considered. Other
studies ignore the issue altogether or consider it indirectly by estimating coefficients and using a Bayesian dynamic design
(e.g., Rose and Bliemer, 2009), which may theoretically include ANA considerations in prior updating. Hensher and Collins
(2011) use computer-aided surveys to dynamically adjust levels based on respondents' answers (but not the underlying
design)—a pivoted design. Consequently, this study will also examine the performance of an orthogonal design (the
equivalent of an efficient design with zero priors) in the face of ANA.4. Motivation and simulation description
Real-world manifestation of ANA is likely to affect more than one attribute, differ among respondents, and differ
depending on the position of the choice task (the first few choice tasks are likely to have less ANA since respondents are
learning, while later choice tasks are likely to experience more ANA due to fatigue) and the complexity of the task (if some
alternatives are perceived to be very similar, more time/effort/attention is going to be taken; if some tasks have more
alternatives/attributes, this is likely to invite further ANA). As the literature overview demonstrated, there are contradicting
views on the significance of ANAwith regard to parameter estimation. The purpose of this study, however, is not to examine
any real-world case study real-data ANA, but rather to isolate the effects of ANA in a controlled fashion and examine them in
a very limited scope in order to draw some generalizable conclusions. It is, therefore, necessary to make certain assumptions
about the data-generating process. First, in the baseline scenario it is assumed that respondents are homogeneous and that
for each simulation they have the same preferences and tendencies to ignore attributes (in contrast to Mariel et al., 2011).
This does not correspond to any particular heuristic strategy, but rather demonstrates the effect of not considering a
particular attribute level on the subsequent choice.2 This assumption of homogeneity is later relaxed when examining latent
class estimation approach and heterogeneity. The second simplifying assumption is that only one attribute is being ignored
(albeit the significance of that attribute is varied). Third, for the purpose of this study, zero priors for unknown parameters
are assumed in the baseline scenario, meaning that an efficient design essentially collapses to an orthogonal design (Rose
and Bliemer, 2009). This too is later relaxed when examining the role of design on estimate efficiency in the face of ANA.
During analysis, there will be a distinction between when ANA data is used in estimation and when it is not. The source of the
ANA data can be thought of as either “revealed ANA” such as through mouse tracking or eye tracking (as in Kaye-Blake et al., 2009;
Meißner et al., 2013), or “stated ANA’—when respondents are asked after each choice task whether they paid attention to a
particular level or not. Hence, this analysis would assume that there is either very believable choice task stated data, or, preferably,
eye tracking or mouse tracking data. The purpose of this study is not to come up with techniques to substitute for this data, but
rather to highlight the problems that can arise when such data is not available, even when attempting to use latent-class model
estimation techniques. In addition, subsequent analysis demonstrates that even if reliable ANA data is available, ANA disturbs the
initial efficiency design when ANA is not purely random (as is most likely to be the case in real-world applications).4.1. Simulation design
This study used R to simulate utilities and to derive binary logit parameter estimates. A total of five binary attributes (X1 through
X5) were employed, with X5 ignored under various conditions. The ‘AlgDesign’ package was used to generate fractional orthogonal2 An equivalent way to think of the data generating process is that respondents are using a full attention strategy, but an attribute level for one of the
alternatives is randomly hidden during some choice tasks.
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25¼32).3 A fold-over method was then used to generate binary choices for a paired comparison design.4
The general model for each i¼ 1;…;N respondents, t ¼ 1;…; T ¼ 16 choice sets, and k¼1 or 2 choice alternatives in each
choice set is
Uikt ¼ 5 X1ktþ3 X2kt2 X3ktþ2 X4ktþβX5  X5kt  ANAX5þϵikt ð1Þ
with ϵikt  Type I extreme value; and ANAX5 following a binomial distribution,5 with the probability, 0rpANAX5o1,
following a uniform distribution across all choice tasks and respondents in the random scenario, and identically distributed
across each respondent, but randomly across the choice tasks each respondent had to face (this is discussed in more detail
below). Furthermore, since one of the prevailing hypotheses was that ANA is largely due to perceived insignificance of the
included attribute (i.e. βX5-0), βX5 took on integer values 1 to 5 to explore the consequence of the importance of this effect.
Choice values were set to one when Ui14Ui2, and to zero otherwise at each choice task. Finally, model parameters were
estimated using binary logit specification without alternative specific constants.4.2. Orthogonality & ANA
Full attribute non-attendance (serial ANA) is essentially the same as excluding an entire parameter from the model, and
hence would not disturb the orthogonality as this is akin to removing a column: correlation among the attended attributes
would not be affected. Moreover, any ANA of one attribute would only impact its own correlation with other variables,
leaving cross-correlations between other variables unchanged. For instance, this study looked at the impact of ANA of just
one variable, X5. Since there is no information on the value of the attribute in the choice tasks in which X5 is ignored, the
correlation analysis must only include rows that were fully attended to. Only the resultant correlations of other attributes
with X5 are of concern (in bold in Table 1a–d), with cross correlations of other attributes (fully attended) assumed to be zero.
While random ANA of X5 does disturb the initial choice task orthogonality, if such randomness is maintained across
choice tasks for every participant (e.g., Table 1a), when choice tasks are pooled for all respondents the cross-correlations
with X5 return to be close to zero due to the randomness of the ANA generating process (e.g., Table 1b). As such, purely
random ANA does not impact overall design orthogonality, leaving little scope for design improvement in terms of
accounting for ANA.
However, it is conceivable that ANA may not purely random. For instance, the respondents may pay attention to more
attributes to get familiar with them in the first few choice tasks, but ignore them in later choice tasks (as found by Kaye-
Blake et al., 2009; Meißner et al., 2013). They may also have strong lexicographic preferences for other attributes (or their
combination) that would cause systematic non-attendance. In either case, such non-random ANA would maintain a non-
zero correlation with and other attributes across pooled choice tasks (Table 1c and d). This study thus sought to differentiate
between the two (random and systematic types of ANA). Hence, in the systematic scenario, the ANA pattern was randomly
generated for 16 tasks (e.g. with pANAX5 of 0.5, X5 would be ignored in 8 random rows out of 16), but this ANA pattern would
be repeated for all respondents. In the random scenario, ANA would be random across all choice tasks and respondents.
In this analysis any particular pattern of systematic ANA is not itself an approximation of any particular heuristic, but rather
of the notion that such ANA can persist across choice tasks even if choice task and/or attribute orders are randomized.5. Results
A total of 100 simulations of N¼500 sample size were run for each of the five βX5 , with randomly generated instances of
X5 ANA, ranging from 0 to less than 1. Next, parameters were estimated using a binary logit specification, with and without
integrating ANA data.
Fig. 1a demonstrates the bias pattern of βX1 estimates under various probabilities of random βX5 ANA. The results for βX2 ,
βX3 and βX4 coefficients follow much the same pattern and henceforth analysis is largely restricted to βX1 with an
understanding that it is analogous to other coefficients.
The first thing to note is that values of pANAX5 close to 1 or 0 have no effect on parameter point estimates, with the bias
peaking at 0.5 for every value of βX5 . As expected, the lower the magnitude of the true βX5 parameter, the lower is the effect
of its ANA, with a value of 1 resulting in only a very marginal bias, even at maximum impact probability of ANA of 0.5. It is
important to note, however, that when the absolute value of the model βX5 parameter is large (4 or 5), even a seemingly
negligible ANA of 10% results in as much as a 20% bias of the βX5 estimates. Yet, when the information on ANA is included in
the model, this bias disappears (see Fig. 1b).3 A large fractional factorial was used for clearer illustration of the difference between the effect of random and systematic ANA.
4 Street and Burgess (2007) show a mathematical proof that for paired comparison designs with binary attributes, a fold-over method based on regular
orthogonal main effects design produces a D-efficiency of 100% for estimating main effects (with zero priors). A D-efficient design with true parameter
priors will be compared when exploring the effect of design in a later section.
5 Restricting the parameters to 0 yields the same outcomes as restricting the corresponding variables to being equal across choices when they are not
attended to.
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Table 1
An example of attribute correlations with unattended rows skipped (prob ANA¼0.5) using orthogonal coding.
a. In a random ANA choice task b. Across pooled random ANA tasks
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
X1 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.71 X1 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
X2 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 X2 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
X3 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 0.71 X3 0.01 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.00
X4 0.50 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.00 X4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02
X5 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00
c. In a systematic ANA choice task d. Across pooled systematic ANA tasks
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
X1 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.71 X1 1.00 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.71
X2 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 X2 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
X3 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 0.71 X3 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 0.71
X4 0.50 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.00 X4 0.50 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.00
X5 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 X5 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.00
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Fig. 1. Effects of random X5 ANA on MNL estimates of βX1 . (a) Without ANA data and (b) with ANA data.
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Fig. 2. Estimates of βX1 under the conditions of random vs systematic X5 ANA.
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Fig. 3. Dispersion of βX estimates for selected probabilities of systematic X5 ANA.
A. Kravchenko / Journal of Choice Modelling 11 (2014) 57–68 63By comparison, when ANA is systematic (Fig. 2), the distribution of biased estimates does not follow the same quadratic
pattern—the estimates are highly dispersed around their true value, with dispersion increasing noticeably with the nonzero
instances of systematic X5 ANA. Moreover, the higher the absolute value of the true model parameter, the higher is the
dispersion of the βX1 estimates under systematic X5 ANA. To demonstrate this, 1000 simulations for each βX5 were run under
systematic ANA of X5; then standard deviations of βX1 estimates were calculated for each possible ANA proportion—see
Fig. 3.6
16 For clarity only values for probabilities of ANA from 0.375 to 0.625 are presented, with the rest following the same trend.
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A. Kravchenko / Journal of Choice Modelling 11 (2014) 57–6864Finally, the effect of X5 ANA has an expected effect on its own (βX5 ) estimates for all simulated values—near zero
instances of random ANA provide estimates closest to true parameters. The estimates decline steadily with increasing
instances of ANA (Fig. 4). The effect is the same for systematic ANA (not shown). It is important to note that when true βX5
values are large (4 or 5), the effects of ANA seem to be non-linear around very small values of ANA—so that even small values
of ANA have a disproportionately large impact on parameter estimates without the ANA data.
5.1. Systematic ANA and design efficiency
As noted earlier, when ANA data is included in the model estimation, the point estimates are well-behaved and are
closely centered on their true values. This is true for both systematic and random instances of ANA. However, in the face of
systematic ANA, standard errors of the coefficients vary significantly across simulations—as shown in Fig. 5. Standard errors
of βX1 estimated under the systematic ANA scenario are significantly more dispersed and often higher for each level of ANA0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Fig. 4. Effect of random X5 ANA on βX5 estimates without using ANA data.
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Fig. 5. Effect of systematic vs random X5 ANA on SEβX1 . (a) Random ANA and (b) systematic ANA.
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To deal with the issue of resultant design inefficiency due to the systematic nature of ANA, it is first necessary to find out
the reasons behind it. If this ANA is due to the order of choice tasks (i.e. they are constant across the respondents and
respondents follow the same pattern of learning/fatigue, etc.), a simple and marginally effective remedy is to randomize the
order of choice tasks—see Fig. 6 for a demonstration.
If, however, systematic ANA is persistent after randomization of choice tasks and attributes, an orthogonal (zero-prior)
design may result in significant loss of efficiency. A simple remedy is to use an efficient designwith non-zero priors (perhaps
obtained after a pilot based on a sufficiently large number of responses). In Fig. 7, panels a and c, SEβX1 estimates obtained
using a D-efficient design (constructed using true value priors) under systematic and random patterns of ANA are contrasted
against panels b and d where orthogonal main-effects designs were used. In all scenarios ANA indicator data were used in
estimation. It is clear that under systematic ANA (which arguably is more likely to be evident in “real” data), D-efficient
design significantly outperforms orthogonal design, whereas, while still evident, the difference is less pronounced when
ANA is random.
5.2. Latent class specification—“Inferred” ANA
The rationale behind ANA latent class specification is addressing respondent heterogeneity with regard to attribute
importance. In particular, it is assumed that a subsample of respondents have a zero preference for one or more attributes,
and hence these attributes are ignored by the respondents. It is important to note, however, that as Scarpa et al. (2009)
states, “in the absence of further information, which in other studies might well be derived by debriefing questions, one
cannot distinguish between the case where a zero is the outcome of—for example—a simplifying heuristic, and where it is
instead a true manifestation of individual preferences.” In other words, even if all respondents were using a full
compensatory principle (not engaging in any heuristics), according to the assumption of such latent class specification
the results would be indistinguishable, since those that are not attending to attributes are assumed to have a zero
preference, so if they do attend to them, the result should be identical, regardless of whether or not they attend to the
attribute or not. Arguably, such models are more suited to explain preference heterogeneity than a true heuristic. ANA due
to heuristics, or simplifying strategies, should arguably result in choices that are different to those when a full compensatory
additive strategy is used.
As expected, latent class specification estimation attempts were not successful in eliciting better estimates when ANA
was homogeneous among the simulated respondents (i.e. each respondent did not attend to X5 with a probability of pANAX5 ).
To simulate heterogeneity, in a separate simulation half of the respondents fully attended to X5 and half fully ignored it.91
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Fig. 7. Orthogonal vs. efficient designs and ANA. (a) D-efficient design random ANA, (b) orthogonal design random ANA, (c) D-efficient design systematic
ANA and (d) orthogonal design systematic ANA.
A. Kravchenko / Journal of Choice Modelling 11 (2014) 57–6866Latent class specification (without an indicator of a class) estimation provided nearly identical results to logit estimation
with ANA indicator variables. Hence, under the assumption of serial ANA, such a technique works well.
6. Conclusion and discussion
This paper examined the effect of attribute non-attendance of one attribute on multinomial choice model estimates
through Monte-Carlo simulations. A parsimonious binary choice model design with binary attributes and multinomial logit
estimation was employed. Notwithstanding the fact that real-world applications are generally much more complex, this
study demonstrates a number of generalizable conclusions about ANA and choice design efficiency.
One of the main conclusions is that if ANA is a symptom of a weak preference among a homogeneous population,
standard logit modeling implementation should yield sufficiently unbiased results. When weak or zero preference affects
only a subsample, latent class modeling is a viable option. However non-attendance of just one attribute can significantly
bias its own estimates as well as other parameters when ANA concerns relatively important attributes. Furthermore, if the
ignored attributes' true parameters are large enough, relatively small instances of ANA (10%) can cause a relatively high
impact (a bias of 20%). While latent class model specification can pick up heterogeneity where classes are assumed to fully
ignore one or more attribute, such serial ANA is indistinguishable from zero preference, hence, arguably does not constitute
a deviation from a full compensatory strategy which this paper explores. Furthermore, latent class specification fails to pick
up non-serial ANA. The primary conclusion, therefore, highlights the importance of obtaining information to account for
ANA in estimations by asking a question after each choice task, or using mouse or eye tracking, unless a good reason exists
suggesting that non-serial ANA is not going to be an issue. Future research should examine whether real-world stated choice
studies tracking choice-task ANA of more than one attribute indeed result in biased estimates. For instance, large enough
datasets of stated choices can be partitioned according to the levels of stated/observed instances of ANA, then parameters92
A. Kravchenko / Journal of Choice Modelling 11 (2014) 57–68 67estimated and contrasted for each subsample using and ignoring ANA data. In addition, it is important to further
understanding of the behavior sources of ANA, particularly whether it is a symptom of zero or near-zero preference and
respondent heterogeneity.
This paper also draws a distinction between systematic and random ANA. Random ANA occurs with the same probability
irrespective of the question number in the choice task or the values of other attributes. Such ANA, although it disturbs
individual choice-task level design efficiency, allows for close to zero cross-correlations among attributes across the pooled
design, and does not significantly affect design efficiency. Systematic ANA, on the other hand, occurs due to either a
systematic pattern of attribute/attribute level learning over the course of the choice experiment; or the interaction of other
attributes (prompting lexicographic heuristics patterns). Such an ANA pattern is maintained even if the order of choice tasks
and/or attribute levels is randomized. Incorporating ANA data mitigates the biases as far as point parameter estimates are
concerned; however, systematic ANA can result in significant loss of efficiency if using an orthogonal design. It has been
shown, however, that using a non-zero prior D-efficient design can significantly improve efficiency even when faced with
systematic ANA. There has not been any mention of studies that distinguish whether actual ANA data patterns are
systematic or random, hence it would be interesting to see whether in real-life applications, design efficiency matters due to
ANA.Acknowledgement
Special thanks to Prof. Riccardo Scarpa for his ideas and help with this manuscript.
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Abstract
In New Zealand, water taken from rivers, lakes and aquifers is essentially free.
However, many catchments area are now approaching full allocation and the cur-
rent `ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served' rights distribution method is inadequate to deal with
the growing demand and to secure optimal resource allocation. Currently, however,
little research eﬀort has been dedicated to exploring the value of and willingness to
pay for water among various users  information that will be vital to designing any
new market mechanisms. To circumvent this chronic data paucity we use choice
modeling to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) of ground and surface water ab-
straction destined to irrigation. Particular attention is paid to the issue of attribute
non-attendance in the choice experiments, which has been highlighted as a potential
source of systematic bias in the literature. Data on attribute non-attendance (ANA)
in choice experiments is commonly collected via follow-up questions (stated-ANA)
or through latent class modeling (inferred-ANA). Using a custom designed online
survey tool, this study suggests a third, relatively unused method of measuring
ANAdubbed `revealed ANA'where information on attribute levels is concealed
until the choice experiment participants hover their mouse over (or maintain touch
on, in the case of touch devices) the location of the screen displaying the attribute
values of interest. This methodology is second best when compared to the more ex-
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pensive eye-tracking approach common in decision making research. Yet, it has the
appeal of being able to be applied outside the stringent laboratory conditions nec-
essary for eye-tracking. Our sample has three same size subsamples, each randomly
allocated to a treatment for ANA detection. Respondents on treatment 1 were asked
a conventional follow-up question regarding ANA asked at the end of the choice se-
quence (i.e. stated serial ANA); those on treatment 2 were asked ANA questions
after each of the eight choice tasks (stated choice task ANA), while the remaining
third (treatment 3) were exposed to the hover and reveal condition (revealed ANA).
The added burden of choice task and revealed ANA data collection methods results
in a signiﬁcantly lower completion rates for both T2 and 3, so the purpose of this
paper is to determine whether additional information gathered is worth the cost.
The ﬁndings suggest the Stated ANA methods correspond to relative signiﬁcance
of estimates, implying that stated ANA data is a proxy for a measure of preference
heterogeneity, whereas Revealed ANA tracks inattention to signiﬁcant attributes.
1 Introduction
Just over ﬁve percent, or 720 thousand hectares, of all New Zealand farmland is deﬁned
as `irrigable'-land that could have been irrigated using existing resource consents and
equipment of the farm (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). This represents a signiﬁcant
increase from 2007, when 4.2% (620 thousand ha) and 2002, when 3.0% (470 thousand
ha) were recorded as irrigable (Statistics New Zealand, 2008, 2003). The main driving
forces behind this increase are most commonly attributed to land use conversion to dairy
farming and general intensiﬁcation of farming within the dairy sectorboth of which are
expected to continue (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2013; Statistics
New Zealand, 2013).
The New Zealand water resources suitable for irrigation, however, are not unlimited.
In certain locales are reaching the maximum legal abstraction limitsand in some cases
have already surpassed them (Kaye-Blake, Schilling, & Destremau, 2014). The Resource
Management Act, RMA, enacted in 1992 delegates the operational management of re-
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sources from the central government to regional councils, without giving the regional
governments suﬃcient power to decide the ways they are able to manage those resources.
The provisions of RMA tasked to govern water allocation have been dubbed `ﬁrst-come-
ﬁrst-served' and have not been designed to cope with scarcity. Users of waterbe it
agricultural, industrial or municipalare essentially not allocated rights according to the
highest utility, and an increasing number of irrigation water applicants are unable to
obtain a consent from councils due to the legal limits set. Furthermore, there are no
provisions in the Act for the councils to make a preference of applications except for the
time of the lodgement. In addition, incumbent users can (and do) challenge new resource
applications if they feel that new users may decrease the availability of the resource for
them.1
Other than a nominal application fee, water taken from water bodies, rivers or aquifers
is essentially free, provided the necessary resource consent has been issued. Hence, the
cost of the water (zero) does not reﬂect its true value, since there are often users who
would be willing to spend a non zero price to gain access to it. Moreover, water availability
in New Zealand is highly seasonalrainfall (and thus supply in rivers, aquifers and lakes)
is generally lowest during the late spring and summer when the demand for water is the
highest. To maintain ecological health of water bodies, regional councils limit intakes of
water from bodies when supply is below certain thresholds for all users. Again, there
are no established mechanisms to identify users who may have a more valuable use to
put water to, or whose water related activities might be critically threatened by lack of
water, and blanket restrictions are generally set in places during the times of low ﬂows.
There are some limited examples of water trade,2 and in principle it is not illegal under
the Act. However, this practice is very limited and does not include involvement of the
government other than the cumbersome process of applying for the transfer, `which may
or may not be granted' (Hydrotrader, 2015a). The largest trading institution locating in
the Canterbury/Otago regions had just 65 Sales/Lease agreements between 2007-2015,
1For instance, in 2006 a hydro-power electricity generator successfully challenged the application by
a dairy farm in the Waikato on the grounds that it would reduce availability of potential energy and
hence have a direct negative impact on its (earlier) consent (Ward, 2006).
2Most notable is trading with `http://hydrotrader.co.nz' in South Island
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averaging just under 2,000 m3 per trade (Hydrotrader, 2015b).
A task force was set up by the government in 2010 to deal with the growing concern
about water allocation and quality. They identiﬁed water quantity issues as a signiﬁcant
concern for the future and suggested that price-based mechanisms could be a pathway to
manage water resources more eﬃciently. There are signiﬁcant hurdles to establishing such
mechanisms, not the least of which is political. First, it is quite unclear how much water
is being put to what usesome takes (stock watering) do not require a consent, and even
those with existing consents do not necessarily use all the water allocated (Rajanayaka,
Donaggio, & McEwan, 2010). Second, there are often competing claims to water, with no
clear rights of ownership or single point of governance. In one example, private users were
told they had to apply to 14 diﬀerent iwi3 to renew the water resource consent for their
home (Maas, 2014). Finally, in order to consider any potential price-based mechanisms,
it is important to have an idea of how farmers would respondent to changes in water
pricesinformation that is currently critically lacking.
Studies estimating the value of water in New Zealand are few and are generally limited
to estimating the overall beneﬁt of irrigation rather than in terms of its volumetric value.
Doak, Parminter, Horgan, Monk, and Graeme (2004), in particular, stressed that it is
impossible to derive volumetric pricing in New Zealand because data on water usage
was not collected. Not until 2010 was legislation put in place to require measuring and
recording water takes of 20m3/second, and 10m3/second from 2012 and 2014, respectively
(Ministry for the Environment, 2010). Hence, the purpose of the present study is to ﬁll
this literature gap and to estimate farmers' willingness to pay for the volume of water.
Below is a short overview of studies looking at estimating the beneﬁt of irrigation in New
Zealand.
Doak et al. (2004) estimated the beneﬁt of irrigation to New Zealand to be NZ$920 mil
by studying the diﬀerence in productivity between irrigated and non irrigated land. Kaye-
Blake, Schilling, and L (2011) used a CGE model to estimate the beneﬁt of 14 planned
irrigation projects across New Zealand and concluded that there is a substantial beneﬁt
3Maori tribes
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to the overall economy from irrigation schemes, in the vicinity of of 0.8% of the GDP by
2035. More recently Corong, Hensen, and Journeaux (2014) used their CGE model of
the NZ economy to update 2004 values of beneﬁt to the economy due to irrigation from
Doak et al. (2004). They estimated the net contribution to the economy to be $2.17 bn
in 2011/2012.
Other studies include Grimes and Aitken (2008), who used a hedonic pricing approach
and found that irrigated land has up to a 50% premium over unirrigated land of the
same characteristics. However, they found that net return to irrigation installation is
actually negative for many farms in their study area of MacKenzie District, Canterbury,
explaining relative abundance of dryland farms. Jenkins (2015) imputed volumetric costs
of providing water for residential, irrigation and hydro-electric generation uses. For the
latter, he estimated the value to be between $0.0057 to $0.036 per m3. By analyzing
dairy production data Kravchenko (2014a) estimated the demand elasticity of water for
dairy farms. He found that, under certain assumptions, a $0.05 increase in the price of
water (per m3) would reduce the demand by three percent.
Studies looking into the costs of irrigation found that annualized costs of irrigation
schemes to be between $0.02-$0.23 per m3 in Canterbury and $0.01-$0.43 per m3 nation-
wide, with mean values of $0.14 and $0.15/m3, respectively (Reese & Borrie, 2012, 2014).
However, these estimates were based on an assumption of usage of full allocation, rather
than what is actually used. As Rajanayaka et al. (2010) noted, the amount of water
actually used in New Zealand is 35% lower than what was allocated by councils in their
resource consents, implying (as later conﬁrmed by some respondents) that some permits
are retained for the sole purpose of adding value to properties.
2 Stated Choice Modeling and Attribute Non-Attendance
To estimate the value of irrigation water in our empirical study we use the stated choice
approach. Stated choice is a methodology based on a speciﬁc type of survey technique
where survey respondentsin our case farmersare asked to consider all the informa-
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tion presented and pick the most desirable option out of a set of mutually exclusive water
contracts. Respondents are generally asked to make a number of successive choices in
an experimentally controlled setting. Variants of this methodology also include ranking
the alternative, picking best and worst options, or assigning likelihood of choosing. Each
alternative contract is described in terms of attributes, and each attribute consists of two
or more levels to diﬀerentiate their contribution to alternatives. Young (2005) observed
that stated choice method is generally reserved for non-market valuation, especially com-
mon for ecological and environmental values. There are, however, a few recent studies
employing choice modeling in estimating the volumetric value of irrigation water (Barton
& Bergland, 2010; Alcon, Tapsuwan, Brouwer, & de Miguel, 2014).
Barton and Bergland (2010) aimed to value irrigation water in India using stated
choice methodology. The authors, however, ran in to the issue of serial non-participation
(choosing status quo over priced alternatives in a majority of choice tasks) since no one
wanted to pay for something what at that time provided for free. Rigby, Alcon, and
Burton (2010) conducted a choice experiment in Spain with the goal of estimating the
economic value of irrigation water. Since during the time of their choice experiment water
was an unpriced good (and the government was thinking of charging for water), they
also recorded a strong anti-pricing sentiment among the surveyed farmers. Anticipating
the potential serial non participation, the authors removed status quo as an available
alternative. Such approach, however, does not allow for unconditional WTP estimates.
2.1 Prevalence of ANA
For the purposes of analyzing stated choice data, standard econometric models com-
monly assume that respondents engage in a fully compensatory decision-making process,
meaning that they are expected to carefully consider all the information provided and
make their decision accordingly, by trading oﬀ the positive with the negative aspects of
each alternative. One concern which has recently been highlighted and studied is the
issue of attribute non-attendance [ANA] (e.g. Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005a; Carlsson,
Kataria, & Lampi, 2008; Scarpa, Gilbride, Campbell, & Hensher, 2009; Collins, 2012).
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This occurs when respondents do not follow a fully compensatory choice behaviour, but
instead engage in heuristics, or simplifying techniques to make the decision process easier.
If they do so, compensation for less than a good attribute cannot be obtained by provid-
ing more of another good attribute. While it is generally agreed that this phenomenon is
common in most stated choice surveys, there is much less consensus on its eﬀect on the
outcomes of the studies and on the best way to detect it or correctly measure it.
Some authors (indeed everyone who ignores the eﬀect of ANA in their studies) assume,
explicitly or implicitly, that it is not an issue since attributes that are ignored are thought
to have been ignored by the respondents because of low importance. Thus systematically
ignoring attributes during choice would have no discernible impact on parameter estimates
from that of low preference for the ignored attributes. However, it has been shown in a
simulation study by Kravchenko (2014b) that not accounting for ANA may signiﬁcantly
bias the estimates of not only ignored parameters, but also of other parameters that are
fully considered.
One reason why respondents may potentially ignore useful information is the vary-
ing levels of involvement and eﬀort with the choice tasks across the survey. Displayed
eﬀort, however, is diﬃcult to measure, although some research used time of completion
(response latency) as its proxy (Haajier, Kamakura, & Wedel, 2000). For example, Rose
and Black (2006) ﬁnd that response latency inﬂuences both the mean and variance of
parameter estimates. Since each respondent is faced with a number of tasks, the ﬁrst
tasks are typically given much more attention and time, while the latter tasks are given
less time and `fatigue' has been a disputed eﬀect: for example, Savage and Waldman
(2008) ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬀects from those found by Hess, Hensher, and Daly (2012) and
Czajkowski, Giergiczny, and Greene (2014). Arguably, when fatigue does occur, it is
not that respondents have varying preferences across choice tasks, but rather they are
less involved in later than earlier choice tasks and would answer diﬀerently if they paid
more careful attention to attribute levels of each alternative. Hence, it is possible that
ANA is a symptom of fatigueno necessarily showing zero preference, but rather than
an artifact of choice task exercises. If so, including the choices recorded towards the end
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of the sequence could introduce a systematic bias as these are more likely to be aﬀected
by ANA. Similarly, `learning' has also been highlighted as a possible reason for engaging
in heuristics and consequent ANArespondents get familiar with various attribute levels
at earlier choice tasks and engage in simplifying heuristics in later choice tasks Oppewal,
Morrison, Wang, and Waller (2010).
3 ANA & Heuristics Background
There has been an increase in recognition that when making decisions respondents de-
viate from a fully compensatory evaluation process, where every attribute level of every
alternative is weighted before a decision is made. Such deviations, however, can lead
to elimination of potentially good alternatives early in the decision process (Payne,
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993, p. 5). Decision makers have a limited cognitive capacity,
and resort to simplifying strategies, or `heuristics', so as to decrease cognitive burden
during decision making. As early as 1956, Miller, demonstrated that on average only 7
chunks of information can be stored in the cognitive brain for help with decisions, while
many choice modeling exercises have signiﬁcantly more. Payne et al. (1993) proposed
that there exists a tradeoﬀ between the eﬀort required to make a decision and accuracy
of that decision.
On the other hand, Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) argued the opposite and suggested
that there is no trade-oﬀ, and that using heuristics actually improves decision accuracy,
hence taking a `less-is-more' perspective. They suggested that forcing respondents to
consciously consider more information leads to lower precision (and hence more error) in
decision making than when using simplifying heuristics.
Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) summarized the heuristics recently mentioned in lit-
erature and organized them into a framework:
...the weighted additive rule and other optimal strategies place ﬁve demands
on people: to consider all available cues, to retrieve cue values accurately,
to weight cues properly, to integrate information for each alternative, and to
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examine all alternatives. We therefore believe that people confront limited
cognitive resources by addressing these ﬁve demands. They can reduce the
eﬀort associated with any of these ﬁve demands individually or collectively
(p. 219).
Within the context of environmental economics, the most commonly referred to heuristic
is that of attribute non-attendanceeither when the respondents ignore one or more
attribute levels over the whole experiment (serial ANA) or at the single choice task level
(choice task ANA). Under Shah and Oppenheimer (2008)'s classiﬁcation ANA can be a
symptom of `examining fewer clues' and `integrating less information'.
There is evidence of ANA being ubiquitous, Kragt (2012) looked at serial ANA and
reported that just half of the respondents stated they paid attention to all the attributes,
and almost 20% paid attention to just one. Reisen, Hoﬀrage, and Mast (2008) reported
that in their study, respondents examined only 22% of the available attributes. In Kaye-
Blake, Abell, and Zellman (2009)'s study, nearly 50% of attribute levels were not attended
to. Scarpa, Thiene, and Hensher (2010) monitored ANA via asking a question at the end
of each choice task along the sequence. Although their initial suggestion was to monitor
the level of attention, this was deemed to be too laborious during the pilot and it was
dropped in favor of a dichotomous attended/non-attended response. The authors also
noted that serial non-attendance is what is most commonly collected. Highlighting the
diﬀerence, the authors noted that when when ANA monitoring was serial, 5% of or
respondents admitted to ANA of the cost parameter, whereas when it was recorded at
the choice-task, the proportion increased to 20%, with strong implications for estimates
of marginal WTP.1
In an eﬀort to understand the causes of ANA in stated choice experiments, Alemu et
al. (2013) probed respondents about reasons behind ANA in their survey. They conclude
that the most common reason for ANA is lack of interest (zero preference) of particular
attributes. They also, however, ﬁnd that simplifying heuristicignoring an important
attribute level to make the choice easier also plays a part. The authors also noted that
1For a thorough overview of stated ANA studies see Alemu, Mørkbak, Olsen, and Jensen (2013).
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explicit questioning about ANA as part of the survey seemed to improve parameter
estimation. Puckett and Hensher (2008), also argued that the spread of attribute levels
may be signiﬁcant as when diﬀerences in levels are not suﬃciently large this may induce
ANA.
Notwithstanding recognition of ANA prominence in the decision making process,
Hensher (2009) suggested that the vast majority of choice modelers still ignore the topic
and assume a full compensatory decision making process. As Willemsen and Johnson
(2010) put it: decision making research has largely progressed through the use of models
that account solely for observed choices without extensive consideration of underlying
cognitive structures and processes. Studies that do account for ANA and heuristics usu-
ally ﬁnd that they have signiﬁcant impact on WTP and parameter estimatesHensher
(2009) purported that failure to accommodate process heterogeneity is a signiﬁcant con-
tributing inﬂuence [of a large hypothetical bias] p.27. Similarly, Hensher and Greene
(2010); Hensher and Rose (2009); Hensher, Rose, and Greene (2005b) found the WTP
to be signiﬁcantly higher when ANA was accounted for. Campbell, Lorimer, Aravena,
and Hutchinson (2010) found that by including strategies of attribute processing in the
model estimation, `more defensible' estimates were derived.
3.1 Approaches for Detecting and Dealing with ANA
There are two main methods of integrating ANA into choice modellingthrough `stated'
or `inferred' methods. Inferred methods (such as Scarpa et al. (2009); Hensher and Rose
(2009)) use an equality constrained latent class approach, with the main advantage being
that no further data is required. The main assumptions in such models is that there
is respondent heterogeneity where some groups do not attend to one or more attributes
(or, equivalently, have zero preference to those attributes). Stated method ANA involves
collection of speciﬁc respondent's statements on ANA, usually in the form of answers to
follow-up questions, such as is any of the information shown not relevant when you make
your choice? (Hensher et al., 2005b; Hensher, 2006). Coeﬃcients on attributes that are
ignored are then restricted to zero in model estimation (at either the choice task level or
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across the whole sequence of choices (the `serial' level)see Hensher (2009)).
There are contradictory ﬁndings with regards to the eﬃcacy of each method. Hensher
(2009) notes that stated ANA are not signiﬁcant when included in the latent class model,
meaning that the latent class model provides the same result, but without the need for
further information collection. Yet, Campbell and Lorimer (2009) ﬁnd a discrepancy be-
tween self-reported and modeled attributes that are ignored. Hensher, Rose, and Greene
(2012), too cite the concern of reliability of information. Similarly, Kragt (2012) and
Scarpa, Zanoli, Bruschi, and Naspetti (2013) ﬁnd that inferred and stated ANA models
provide diﬀerent results.
Alternative strategies to collecting information on ANA include eye tracking, mouse
tracking and debrieﬁng (`think aloud'). However, such tools are most frequently used in
the context of the actual decision making process, rather than in contexts that enable
the study of their eﬀect on the outcome. They are usually, but not always, conﬁned to
controlled lab environment (with notable exception of recent mouse tracking software,
such as recent version of MouseLab (Norman & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2010) and Mous-
tracker (Freeman & Ambady, 2010)). Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, and Ranyard
(2011) compare such decision process-tracking tools in the context of judgment and de-
cision making research and conclude that each method has its pros and cons, and argues
for using a multi-method approach. However, as noted, most research seems to focus on
`how' decisions are made as opposed on what eﬀect these strategies have on the decisions
made.
Examples of use of such process-tracking tools include, Russo and Dosher (1983),
who use eye-tracking to detect decision strategies. However, their experiment was forcing
a full compensatory decision strategymore concentrating on dimensional vs holistic
strategies, (i.e. attribute vs alternative based strategies). Similarly, Ball (1997) examines
the actual strategies via analysis of decision information windows. Meibner, Huber, and
Musalem (2013), on the other hand, examine ANA using eye-tracking techniques and
conclude that in choice tasks later in the sequence respondents tend to focus only on
important attributes. In an example, the authors describe the movement of attention
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of a respondent in a task near the end of the experimentconcentrating on the levels
of just one of several attributes. Once the desired level of that attribute (considered
most importanti.e. using a lexicographic heuristic) is found, the respondent is then
seen looking at the levels of other attributes in the alternativesensuring that nothing
too undesirable is detected before choosing the said alternative. Corresponding levels of
other alternatives are entirely ignored.
A study by Kaye-Blake et al. (2009), does consider the eﬀects on the outcome by us-
ing an on-screen information display matrix with concealed attribute levels that might be
revealed on demand by respondents (a type of mouse-tracking). The concealed attribute
levels that are clicked on become visible, thus allowing the researchers to track what in-
formation was sought and when, thereby deﬁning what information was potentially used
by respondents in each task, as well as what was deﬁnitely ignored. The study goes on
to conclude that incorporating ANA study signiﬁcantly inﬂuences parameter estimates.
However, Franco-Watkins and Johnson (2011) argue that mouse-tracking introduces an
experimental artifact, inﬂuencing the experiment outcomes: mouse-tracking takes longer
than eye-tracking and also comparatively increases search costs (eﬀort), hence respon-
dents spent less time evaluating attribute levels.
4 Survey Design
Following Kaye-Blake et al. (2009), we create an online information window with obscured
attribute levels to trace attention. The key diﬀerence with the Kaye-Blake et al. (2009)'s
study is that the levels are revealed to respondents when they hover the mouse's pointer
over the attribute space in the matrix cell and are hidden as soon as the mouse pointer
leaves the matrix cell. Importantly, this allows us to record timing of ﬁxations, which
is correlated with its use in the evaluation of alternative. No clicking is required, thus
reducing some of the respondent's eﬀort. The survey is conducted outside a laboratory
environment with a control group (thus allowing to estimate the cost of collecting this
data in terms of drop out rates).
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The stated choice survey was developed to target the population of farmers who irri-
gate and hence possess water consent. Because the current price of water is practically
zero, it was diﬃcult to imagine any farmer with an existing consent willing to volun-
tarily pay anything more than zero. Previous stated choice studies attempting to value
irrigation water under similar conditions grappled with this issue and either ran into se-
rial nonparticipation (Barton & Bergland, 2010) or had to resort to excluding the zero
priced status quo to avoid it (Rigby et al., 2010). An alternative, and possibly superior
approach, would have been to gain access to a sample of potential irrigators who were
refused a water resource consent. But in practice this population would have been very
diﬃcult to get in touch with or collect a large enough sample.
Therefore, to obtain meaningful willingness to pay for water estimates from existing
irrigators, water scarcity was simulated by designing hypothetical scenarios where respon-
dents were asked to imagine a drought and a local regional council instituting a full water
withdrawal ban (not an uncommon scenario during New Zealand's springs/summers
from September to February). The drought scenarios at each choice task also diﬀered in
terms of the month, level of soil moisture deﬁcit, cumulative rain forecast over the next
10 days and whether or not drought had been oﬃcially declared by the Ministry of Pri-
mary Industries [MPI]see Figure 1.45 Furthermore, if respondents identiﬁed themselves
as dairy farmers at the start of the survey, an additional dimension in the scenario was
added: the milk solid payout forecast.
4The scenario attributes had the following probability of occurring of their levels:
Months: September (1/10); October (
2/10); November (
3/10); December (
2/10); February (
1/10).
Soil Moisture Deﬁcit: -20mm (1/6); -70mm (
2/6); -120mm (
3/6).
Rain Forecast: 0mm (3/6); 20mm (
2/6); 50mm (
1/6).
MS Payout Forecast: $5 (2/7); $6 (
3/7); $7 (
2/7).
Drought Declared: yes (1/2); no (
1/2).
5In New Zealand, farmers get assistance from government agencies, trusts and cooperatives if a
drought is oﬃcially recognized.
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Figure 1: Example of a hypothetical scenario.
Respondents were then given a choice between status quo and 4 alternatives deﬁned
by the following attributes:
Attribute Name Description Levels Status Quo
Can sell water Ability to sell excess water rights
yes
no
no
Can buy water
Ability to buy additional water from
other users and/or the council
yes
no
no
Zero intake days Max days of zero intake (per month)
1 day
N/A5 days
10 days
Flow Limit
Flow Take Restriction (% of
consented)
25%
Full ban
50%
75%
100%
Volume Limit
Total Volume Limit Restriction (% of
consented)
25%
Full ban
50%
75%
100%
Contract Duration
The compulsory duration of the
contract to buy water at the speciﬁed
price
no contract
N/A1 month
2 months
Price per 1 m3
Price per 1 Cubic Metre (10 cubic
metres is equivalent to 1mm / ha)
$0.01
free
$0.02
$0.05
$0.10
$0.15
Table 1: Attributes and levels
A D-error minimizing design was generated using priors with expected signs and
relative magnitude using Ngene (Ferrini & Scarpa, 2007; Rose, Bliemer, Hensher, &
Collins, 2008; Scarpa & Rose, 2008).
After 40 completed choice task sets were collected, priors were updated and an im-
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proved D-error minimizing design was generated, following the incremental approach
suggested by Scarpa, Campbell, and Hutchinson (2007). The ﬁnal improved design con-
sisted of 8 choice tasks per respondent, with 4 unlabeled alternatives and the status quo
per each task. Since Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) point out that the use of heuristics
increases with cognitive load, this relatively demanding design was intentionally made
this way to induce respondents to resort to heuristics (see Figure 2). To avoid ordering
eﬀects, the order of vertical display of attributes were randomized across respondents
(but kept consistent in between choice tasks), the left-to-right position of alternatives
was also randomized, as well as the choice task order and the assignment to blocks (6 in
total).
Figure 2: Example of a choice task card.
To distribute the survey, Regional Councils and industry organizations were enlisted
to help reaching out the farming communitymost were very helpful and provided access
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to irrigation consent holders/farmers. In addition, online advertisements on Facebook and
Google Adwords were also trialled at the early stage, but dropped due to high costs and
low response rates. Finally, upon the completion of the survey, respondents were also
encouraged to share the survey with other farmers.
Figure 3 depicts geographic distribution and density of the location of farms surveyed
according to the respondents' stated closest weather station locations. Overall, the re-
sponse rates were very lowof approximately 2,000 physical letters sent out to consent
holders in Hawke's Bay, Waikato and Otago regions inviting them to partake in the sur-
vey, only 58 started the survey.6 The reasons for such a low response rate are not entirely
clear, but include factors such as low incentive value,7 a possibility that research topic
was negatively viewed (existing consent users would not want to pay for something they
consider should be free)8 and the fact that farmers are generally over-surveyed in New
Zealand and it is quite common to experience low response rates in surveys targeting
them.
6Deﬁned as answering the ﬁrst question regarding the classiﬁcation of the farm they were operating.
7Respondents were oﬀered to be in a draw to win an iPad mini upon the successful completion of the
survey.
8One respondent who chose not to complete the survey was helpful in emailing their comments and
allowed the following quote to be used, As far as paying some government agency a resource rental
goes, I would rather eat the tip oﬀ my left thumb than have any part of that....
In addition, one large industry collective speciﬁcally declined to be involved in distributing the survey
because it was their stance to be very much against charging for water
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Figure 3: Approximate location and concentration of surveyed farms based on
the stated closest weather station(n=113)
The response rates for other sources was less clear since invitations to participate in
the survey were placed on various organization websites, newsletters and also emailed
through internal distribution systems. Overall, 154 sets of 8 choice tasks were completed
by respondents.
4.1 ANA tracking
Respondents were randomly assigned into one of three ANA tracking conditions: in the
ﬁrst two ANA was based on self-reported statements. In the ﬁrst case the ANA statements
were collected at the end of the sequence of 8 choice task (serial ANA); in the second case
after each choice task (choice task ANA). Speciﬁcally, statements were collected using
the pop up window in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Stated ANA trackingin the serial ANA treatment, nonattendance
statements were collected after the completion of 8 choice tasks, whereas in
the choice task ANA treatment this question appeared after each choice task.
In the third case ANA was revealed by mouse-tracking. Speciﬁcally, attribute levels
were hidden until respondents hovered their mouse pointers over the cells of the attributes
in the display matrix (see Figure 5). This followed the earlier work by Kaye-Blake et al.
(2009); Johnson, Payne, Bettman, and Schkade (1989); Ball (1997). However, unlike
previous attempts, this survey instrument was administered outside of the laboratory
environment and was targeting a relatively involved decision in terms of both cognitive
load and ﬁnancial implications for the respondents. It was also intended to examine the
eﬀects of ANA on parameter estimates rather than to only identify the speciﬁcs of the
decision making process. In addition, the present study was also intended to compare the
three methods of collecting data on ANA, an intent that was never pursued in previous
attempts.
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Figure 5: Revealed ANA trackingAttribute levels were hidden until respon-
dents hovered their mouse pointer over the corresponding cell (or touched on
the touch devices)
5 Results
The survey went live between July 2014 till October 2015. While only 102 respondents
completely ﬁnished the surveyincluding answering all auxiliary questions about their
irrigation system154 respondents completed all of 8 choice tasks. In addition, the
actual choice task completion rates vis-a-vis the assigned ANA tracking method were
quite telling (see Table 2):
The completion rate of the full sequence of 8 tasks was lower for task and for the
revealed ANA tracking conditions. Assuming a completion rate of the Serial ANA method
of 35%, when applied to the other methods, the additional task burden of ANA tracking
resulted in the potential loss of (176×0.35)−50 = 12 and (161×0.35)−42 = 15 completed
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Serial Task Revealed Total
Passed screener 176 176 161 513
Answered 8 choice tasks 62 50 42 154
8 Task Completion Rate 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.30
Completed the survey 35 39 28 102
Table 2: Completion rate breakdown by ANA tracking type
sets of responses for task and revealed ANA conditions, respectively. Hence, collection of
ANA data at the choice task level, be it via mouse-tracking or via collecting self-reports,
signiﬁcantly impacts on completion rates (for the task condition the potential loss in data
collection is: 12/(50 + 12) = 19.4%, and for the revealed condition it is 15/(42 + 15) = 26.3%)
and should only be used if data collected adds signiﬁcant insights, which would otherwise
not be available.
5.1 Serial and Task ANA data comparison
The stated ANA for both serial and task conditions are largely the same (see Table
3)9Volume Limits and Flow Limits attribute levels are paid attention to the most,
whereas Can Sell Water and Contact Duration are attended to the least. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that even the attribute most attended to was so only 60% of the
times, implying thatcontrary to the fully compensatory principle assumptionnot all
attributes were considered all the time (Table 4).
Serial Task
Volume Limit 3.7 3.7
Flow Limit 3.6 3.6
Contract Duration 2.5 2.9
Can buy water 2.3 2.8
Can sell water 1.8 2.0
Zero intake days 2.9 3.4
Price per 1 m3 2.9 3.4
Table 3: ANA Reported - Simple Average Scores
An important consideration is whether ANA levels for attributes are stable across
choice tasksi.e. whether choice task ANA data collection adds signiﬁcant information
9To calculate the simple average score 0 was assigned if the respondent stated that the attribute
was ignored for all or most alternatives 2.5 for ignored for some alternatives and 5 for never ignored.
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ignored for all or
most alternatives
ignored for some
alternatives
never ignored
Serial Task Serial Task Serial Task
Volume Limit 12 13 29 27 59 60
Flow Limit 12 15 33 25 55 60
Contract Duration 29 27 43 31 28 42
Can buy water 40 36 28 18 33 46
Can sell water 55 51 17 19 28 31
Zero intake days 17 18 48 29 34 53
Price per 1 m3 29 19 24 25 47 56
Table 4: ANA Reported Frequencies (%)
over the much less burdensome serial ANA data collection. Table 5 reports the percentage
of respondents reporting the same level of ANA for each attribute across the number of
choice tasks. For instance, 51% of respondents consistently chose the same level of ANA
(whether `ignored all', `some' or `none') for the attribute of Volume Limit for each of
the 8 choice tasks, whereas a further 14% of respondents chose the same level of ANA
for 7 taskschoosing a diﬀerent level of ANA for one task. Interestingly, attributes with
lowest 8 choice task ANA consistency (Can sell water and Contract Durationfrom
Table 5) had the lowest overall reported attendance, as reported by overall serial and
task ANA summaries (from Tables 3 and 4). Overall, 66.8% of respondents consistently
reported the same level of ANA for diﬀerent attributes across 7 to 8 choice tasks, implying
that Serial ANA collection method is not a perfect substitute for ANA data at the Task
level.
8 7 6 5 4 3
Volume Limit 51 14 14 8 10 2
Flow Limit 49 24 10 10 6 0
Contract Duration 43 27 8 16 4 2
Can buy water 47 18 12 16 6 0
Can sell water 41 24 12 12 10 0
Zero intake days 49 16 12 12 8 2
Price per 1 m3 49 14 22 6 8 0
Table 5: Percentage of respondents reporting the same ANA level for each attribute
across choice tasks
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5.2 Revealed ANA data
5.2.1 Times spent looking at attribute levels
We mentioned before that as part of the the revealed ANA condition, each time a respon-
dent hovered their mouse pointer over a blank cell in the the display matrix (or tapped
with a ﬁnger on a touch device) the corresponding attribute level was revealed (see Fig-
ure 5). As soon as the pointer left the bounds of the matrix cell, the attribute level was
hidden again. The timing of each event was recorded (see Figure 6 for a distribution of
timing), along with the corresponding alternative number and attribute. Some events
would necessarily be the artifact of the data collection method (such as when making a
decision then having to drag the cursor across the matrix to the decision button on the
bottom, or when comparing attributes of alternatives on the opposite side of the display
matrix) and do not by themselves represent genuine instances of desire to disclose and
hence pay attention to attribute levels. It was hence necessary to identify these to re-
move them. Starr and Rayner (2001) report that a skilled reader on average would focus
(i.e. `ﬁxate') on 7 to 9 letters for 200-250 milliseconds before moving onto the next batch
of letters. These batches, or `ﬁxations', may be a combination words (e.g. `I went to'),
a whole word (`potatoes') or part of a longer word (`interme...'). Hence, events below
the 200 millisecond threshold were deemed to be too brief to represent genuine ﬁxations,
hence were removed from analysis on ANA. While the hover events are not ﬁxations
per sethe survey was not tracking eye movements, since respondents were instructed
to uncover attributes, it is reasonable to assume that the eye focus followed closely the
position of the cursor in the display matrix, henceforth referred to as `pseudo ﬁxations'
[PF].
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Figure 6: Duration of pseudo ﬁxations
5.2.2 Revealed `absolute position' attribute non-attention bias
Both the horizontal position of alternative and vertical position of attributes were random-
ized in this survey (for all types of ANA data collection methods). A fully compensatory
choice behaviour would thus imply that, on average, an equal amount of attention would
be spent on every cell in the display matrix (1/7 × 1/5 ≈ 2.9%). However, examining the
mouse tracking data10 shows that the number of hovering events is disproportionately
skewed towards the top and left of the display matrix. The ﬁrst alternative on the left,
on average, received 83% more events as the alternative on the far right, and attributes
placed on the very bottom received approximately 54% less attention that attributes on
the top. While mouse-tracking data does not guarantee that an attribute level was paid
attention to, it is arguably much more than a mere representation of convenience of un-
covering attribute levelsthe buttons for making a choice were below the display matrix
(see Figure 5). Accordingly, on each new choice task, each respondent's cursor would
initially be below the choice task matrix (after a page reload) and more hovering events
would be expected on the bottom. The opposite result suggests that on average, respon-
dents have an overall top left bias to information gathering, and vertical and horizontal
randomization must always be used. This is in line with ﬁnding by Campbell and Erdem
1011,652 PF records over 200ms based on the data from respondents who have made at least one choice
task decision.
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(2015) who investigate a positional bias heuristic in their best-worst scaling survey.
Alternative 1
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Figure 7: Percentage of mouse hover records across vertical and horizontal
positions within the display matrix
5.2.3 Attended-to Attributes
On average, only 14 alternative levels (cells in the display matrix) out of a total of 35 were
uncovered11 per choice task. The average was higher for the ﬁrst choice task (21) than
for the subsequent choice tasks (16, 14, 13, 11, 12, 12, 12 for choice tasks 2 through to 8).
Table 6 summarizes the average number of levels that were opened for each alternative
per choice task, and the average total duration per attribute per choice task. On average,
only 2 out of 5 attribute levels were uncovered, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
across diﬀerent attributes. This contradicts the self-reported data of serial and task
ANA conditions (see Tables 3 and 4) that suggested lower overall ANA and signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in attendance levels across attributes.
Average number of
attribute levels uncovered
per choice task (out of 5)
Average Total Duration per
Attribute per choice task
(seconds)
Volume Limit 2.2 5.1
Flow Limit 2.1 4.4
Contract Duration 1.9 3.4
Can buy water 2.1 4.2
Can sell water 2.0 3.4
Zero intake days 2.1 4.5
Price per 1 m3 2.0 3.6
Table 6: Revealed ANA data summary
11Deﬁned as having been viewed at least once for more than 200 ms
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5.2.4 Time spent on alternatives
In an eye-tracking study of binary choices Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010) report
that subjects spent signiﬁcantly more time on the alternatives that in the end they have
chosen. Conﬁrming this result, we ﬁnd that respondents had on average nearly twice as
many PF as well as time on the attribute levels of an alternative they ended up selecting
as most favourite in the set than on other alternatives (see Table 7). In addition, because
the Status Quo [SQ] alternative always had the same attribute levels across the choice
tasks, as expected it had lower overall PF scores and PF total duration as respondents
obviously remembered it from previous choice tasks. This conﬁrms the basis of the
empirical regularity of a lower variance of utility associated with SQ alternative captured
by error component models (Scarpa, Willis, & Acutt, 2005, 2007; Campbell, 2007).
As a result, in the 77 choice tasks the SQ was selected in the revealed ANA tracking
subsample, the time spent on looking at SQ was just 5.1 seconds. What is of concern,
if not unexpected, is that when the SQ alternative was chosen, the other alternatives
received just 2.8 seconds of attentionless than a quarter of the time spent on non SQ
alternatives when they were chosen. This implies that respondents were much more likely
to ignore information of the forgone alternatives when choosing the status quo. This is
consistent with selection of the SQ being motivated by some heuristics, such as the failure
of the non SQ alternatives to satisfy some cut-oﬀ threshold in terms of attribute values.
Combined
(n=377)
Status Quo
(n=77)
Not Status
Quo
(n=300)
C NC C NC C NC
Average Number of PF 9.8 5.0 5.1 2.7 11.0 5.6
Average Total Duration of PF 10.2 4.8 5.6 2.8 11.3 5.4
Table 7: Time Spent on Chosen [C] and Non Chosen [NC] Alternatives per Choice Task
Finally, in 68% of the 377 choices made, the highest number of PF for a given alter-
native correctly predicted the alternative chosenregardless of whether the alternative
was the SQ or an experimentally designed one. This suggests that number of PF per
alternative could have signiﬁcant explanatory power. Combined duration of all PFs for
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an alternative had a marginally lower predictive success rate of 60%. It is possible then
that either number of PF or duration of PF per alternative can be used to approximate
relative preference of alternatives not chosen, providing the sort of information usually
collected by favolurite choice, ranking or relative preference methodsthough this needs
to be conﬁrmed by further research.
5.2.5 Comparing Revealed and Stated Choice Task ANA across the choice
sequence
Both the stated and revealed ANA data conditions collected data across choice tasks.
The stated choice task ANA, however, was relatively consistent across choice tasks for
each attribute (see Figure 8(a)), whereas as stated in section 5.2.3, revealed attribute at-
tendance from mouse-tracking decreased substantially after the ﬁrst few choice taskssee
Figure 8(b). In addition, there was much less variation among the attribute attendance
within each choice task number than in the stated condition. Our initial suspicion was
that upon realizing that the SQ levels did not change across choice tasks, respondents
ceased to uncover them after the ﬁrst few tasks, thereby explaining the decrease in overall
ANA pattern. Indeed, the average number of PF on the SQ alternative in the ﬁrst choice
task was approximately the same as for non SQ alternatives (10.5 vs 10.4), whereas in
the subsequent choice tasks the average number of PF was always lower for the SQ al-
ternative. By the last 2 choice tasks, the number of PF for SQ was 2.9 and 2.5, whereas
for non SQ alternatives, the average PF per alternative was 5.4 and 4.3, respectively. A
lower response quality in the last part of the sequence was already reported by Savage
and Waldman (2008) for on-line surveys, and our results are consistent with this ﬁnding.
While explaining some of the decrease in overall choice tasks attribute attendance, it
does not explain all of it, since even after removing attribute levels that were part of the
SQ alternatives (Figure 8(c)), attribute attendance still decreased across choice tasks.
This result suggests that ANAas measured by the mouse-tracking methodtells a
very diﬀerent story from the one told by the self-report stated choice task ANA tracking
method, which arguably only reports respondents' own perception of the importance of
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attributes (discusses more in the section below), as opposed to an honest recollection of
what they paid attention to and accounted for while evaluating alternatives in order to
make a decision. Our proposed revealed ANA method on the other hand, tracks what
was actually paid attention to, whether or not respondents found to be important, and is
arguably a more reliable method to track information access and to make sense of choice
heuristics.
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Figure 8: Revealed and Stated Choice Task ANA across choice tasks. In the
Stated Choice Task condition (a) Mean Task ANA shows the average atten-
dance score across 8 choice tasks stated by respondent (see footnote 9), in
Revealed conditions (b) and (c) the Mean Task ANA score shows the average
number of PF per task.
5.3 Modeling Results
5.3.1 Benchmark MNL results
The combined data for all three ANA data collection methods was used to estimate a
benchmark Multinomial Logit Model (see Table 8 (1)). The variables Zero Intake Days
and Contact Duration were eﬀect-coded where a variable for zerointake5 equaled to 1 if
123
the zero intake days were either 5 or 10, zero otherwise. Variable zerointake10 took on the
value of 1 if the zero intake days was 10. As such, the coeﬃcient on zerointake5 should
be interpreted in combination with coeﬃcient on zerointake10.12 All the signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients had the expected signs. Willingness to pay estimates were derived by taking
ratios between each coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcient on cost, but in this case should be
interpreted in a special manner: because the deﬁnition of cost attribute was price per
m3, the corresponding WTP estimates are in terms of dollars per m3. For instance, the
WTP estimate for the benchmark model for volume restriction is 0.003/− 2.342 = −0.001411,
meaning that respondents, on average, were willing to pay 0.14 cents per m3 to remove
a 1% ﬂow restriction (with respect to the consented amount). Hence, a farmer who
would demand 50% of the 200,000 m3 of his consented amount, would be willing to pay
200, 000× 0.5× 0.001411 = $141.10, and twice that for a cessation of a ban altogether.
12i.e. subtract βzerointake10 from βzerointake5 to see the eﬀect of a 5-day restriction
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An interesting ﬁnding is that stated ANA roughly corresponds to signiﬁcance of at-
tributes, as deﬁned by their respective t-statistics. As per Table 3, Can sell water
attribute has the lowest stated ANA and the lowest t-statistic from Model (1) in Table 8.
While volume and ﬂow restrictions were both stated to be equally paid attention to, the
model output suggests that ﬂow restriction was more signiﬁcant than volume restriction.
Further investigation uncovered that for a sample of consent holders from Hawke's Bay for
whom irrigation consent data was available, all consent holders had ﬂow restrictions, but
only 71% had weekly volume limits (the rest had either maximum monthly and/or annual
volume limits speciﬁed). The respondents, therefore, logically stated that both restric-
tions were equally paid attention to, but the ﬂow restrictions were of immediate concern
(indeed Canterbury Regional Council updates such restrictions daily when they are in
place), whereas volume limits had a level of temporal uncertainty attached to it. Hence,
the immediate beneﬁt of stated ANA data collectionequivalently serial or taskwas
the conﬁrmation of parameter signiﬁcance. As such, stated ANA data may be a proxy of
respondents' own perception of the importance of attributes rather than a recollection of
what was being paid attention to. Future research should examine the relation between
stated ANA, statistical signiﬁcance and perceived importance of attributes.
5.3.2 The Eﬀect of ANA on Design Eﬃciency
To study the eﬀects of ANA on design eﬃciency, three sets of Monte Carlo simulation
analyses were carried out. First, parameters were estimated using pooled data from all
three conditions assuming no ANAsee Table 8 (1). The estimated parameters were
then used as Data Generation Processes (DGP). Next, for the ﬁrst set of simulations
(generated without ANA), full attendance was assumed in both the DGP and in parame-
ter estimation. Indirect utilities were generated by using the designs actually faced by the
respondents in each of the subsamples (n = 58, 49, and 42), with an extreme value type
I quasi-random draw added to each of the alternatives to simulate random utilities. The
parameters were then estimated using the same speciﬁcation as in the DGP, assuming
full attendance. The exercise was carried out 1,000 times for each subsample, and the
126
mean values of derived coeﬃcients and standard errors for each of the subsamples are
reported in Table 8 (2)-(4).
In the second set of simulations (generated assuming ANA), indirect utilities were
simulated by restricting parameters to zero when ANA was reported or observed (i.e. using
the actual data). In the Serial subsample, the coeﬃcients were restricted to zero in the
DGP where a respondent reported `always ignored [an attribute]'this restriction applied
to every choice task completed by a respondent, for every alternative with the exception
of the Status Quo alternative-speciﬁc constant, which was assumed to always beneﬁt from
full attendance. In the Choice Task subsample, the coeﬃcients were similarly restricted to
zero in the DGP when respondents reported that they `always ignored [an attribute]', with
a key diﬀerence that the restriction varied by choice tasks. In the Revealed subsample,
coeﬃcients were restricted to zero at a particular choice task and alternative when a
respondent did not hover above at attribute level at least once for at least 200 ms, again,
with the exception of Status Quo, which was always assumed to be attended to. When
re-estimating the coeﬃcients from the simulated data sets, coeﬃcients were similarly
restricted to zero in the same way speciﬁed in the corresponding DGP for each of the
ANA data subsamples. Mean value of derived coeﬃcients and standard errors from 1,000
simulations are reported in Table 8 (5)-(7).
The subsets of designs in each of the ANA conditions work reasonably well estimating
most parameters, with notable exceptions of the parameters on dur2month that show
signiﬁcant bias. This could be attributed to relatively smaller subsample size in each of
the ANA conditions (as compared to the pooled data sample), as well as the actual values
of parameters used in the DGP.
An important observation is the diﬀerence in the average standard errorswhen ANA
data was used in DGP and estimation, the resultant average standard errors are gener-
ally higher than when full attendance was simulated.13 This has important implications
for estimating the required sample size and design eﬃciency when conducting choice
experimentsassuming full attendance in design may erroneously lower the estimated
13An exception is Status Quothis `attribute' was assumed to be never ignored in the experiment
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required sample size for a given signiﬁcance and parameter. In addition, it is most likely
that given any pattern of ANA, a more eﬃcient design could be achieved. Modeling ANA
by restricting coeﬃcients to zero is equivalent to restricting design levels to zero in the
design. Hence, such `latent design' would comprise of (at least in the case of Revealed
Condition in this study) 60% zeros, very diﬀerent to the underlying design optimized for
the experiment. Therefore, an improvement over the current practice would be to update
the experiment design once better prior are available and incorporate ANA data in the
design considerations.
5.3.3 The Eﬀect of ANA on Parameter Estimates
As noted in the previous section, apart from the dur2month parameters, including ANA
data when re-estimating parameters in simulations largely produced the same results as
assuming full attendance, albeit with lower average signiﬁcance for most parameters when
compareding with simulations assuming full attendance in both the DGP and estimation.
To examine what happens when full attendance is assumed in estimation erroneously
because the DGP involved ANA, we use previously simulated datasets (with ANA), but
ignored ANA data when re-estimating the parameterssee table Table 8 (8)-(10) for
summary of mean parameters and standard errors (over 1,000 simulations per ANA con-
dition). Excluding the dur2month and Status Quo parameters, not accounting for ANA
signiﬁcantly attenuates the parameter estimates by an average of 59% in the Revealed
Condition, and 20% and 22% in the Choice Task and Serial ANA data condition, with re-
spect to their true DGP values. The parameter on Status Quo shows a signiﬁcant upward
bias in the Revealed Condition. The average standard errors remain largely similar to
those derived in simulations when full attendance was used in estimation and the DGP,
implying that in addition to downward bias, all estimates also incur a loss of statistical
signiﬁcance.
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5.3.4 Calibrating Parameter Estimates to Account for ANA
The usual approach of dealing with ANA when such data is available is to restrict co-
eﬃcients on the ignored attributes in the choice tasks (and speciﬁc alternatives if data
is detailed enough) to zero. However, in our case, due to low farmer response rates, the
resultant sample sizes (n = 58, n = 49, and n = 42 in Serial, Choice Task and Revealed
subsamples)14 in each condition rendered such analysis susceptible to small sample bias,
hence a diﬀerent approach was required. The question needing an answer was: assuming
that parameter estimates seen in Table 8 (1) were largely attenuated following ﬁndings
in section 5.3.3, what would the unbiased estimates have to be like to produce the biased
estimates seen, given the observed patterns of ANA? To answer this question, calibration
procedures were carried out in the following manner:
1. Utilities were simulated with ANA data and corresponding design using the esti-
mated parameters from the pooled data, βˆpooled, as the initial DGP parameters,
βDGP
15;
2. The parameters were estimated from the simulated utilities, without incorporating
ANA data;
3. The estimated parameters were averaged over a set number of simulations (1,000
for each ANA condition), β¯biased;
4. βDGP were updated by the diﬀerence between the pooled estimates and the observed
biased estimates, i.e. βDGPr+1 = βDGPr+(βˆpooled−β¯biasedr), where r subscript denotes
the run of 1,000 simulations;
5. Steps 1. through 4. were repeated until the diﬀerence between the parameters esti-
mated through pooled data without ANA and simulated biased data was suﬃciently
small.
14A total of 5 observations had to be removed from serial and choice task condition subsamples since
respondents, while completing all 8 choice tasks did not complete the subsequent ANA questions.
15Note that dur2Month variable was dropped due to poor replicability in simulations, hence the initial
model (serving as the initial βDGP and the βˆpooled throughout the simulations) was re-estimated and is
presented in Table 9 (1).
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The ﬁnal βDGPr after R = 100 runs (each involving 1000 simulations per ANA data
type) are presented in Table 9 (12) - (14). In essence, βDGPr are unobserved parameters
that if estimated by the pooled model without ANA data would yield the same attenuated
results as in Table 9 (11), given observed or stated ANA data of the respective condition
subsamples. The relative diﬀerence between the βˆpooled parameters (from Table 9 (1)) and
the average of those simulated with ANA data in the DGP and then estimated without
ANA data (βˆpooled − β¯biasedr) with respect to βpooled are given in columns (15) - (17) for
r = 1 and r = 100.
Due to the relatively poor performance of the design in small sample sizes used in
subsamples, the calibrating algorithm used here does not converge to negligible diﬀerence
for all parameters. However, the diﬀerences do fall signiﬁcantly for most other parameters
as r increased (see columns (15) - (17)), and are within error levels obtained through initial
simulations.16 Further increases in r did not decrease this diﬀerence, with parameter
diﬀerences (βˆpooled− β¯biasedr) oscillating within a few percentage points around an average
of 0%. Also note that the diﬀerence is loosely tied up to parameter signiﬁcancelow
signiﬁcance coeﬃcients seem to have higher diﬀerences, and vice-versa.
16See re-estimated parameters through simulations in Table 8 (5)-(7)they are −5% to 16% oﬀ the
parameters used for the DGP in simulations (8 (1))
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5.3.5 Inﬂuence of ANA on WTP estimates
The eﬀects of excluding ANA in estimation so far pointed towards loss of statistical
signiﬁcance as well as bias (for most part towards zero). Such bias, however, may not
necessarily translate in bias of WTP estimates as in MNL models with utility linear in
the parameters WTP is calculated as a negative ratio of coeﬃcient estimates. For WTP
estimates to remain unchanged, the bias should be of the same magnitude and in the
same direction. Alas, this is not so in our case. WTP estimates based on calibrated
estimates (βDGPr from Table 9 (12)-(14)) are presented in Table 9 (18)-(20).
WTP estimates for the SQ for the Revealed Condition (20) are vastly diﬀerent be-
tween those from attenuated (11) and Stated Conditions (18) & (20), with the Revealed
Condition calibrated WTP estimates being substantially lower. The coeﬃcients on vol-
ume restriction and ﬂow restrictions in the Revealed Condition are also substantially
lower than from the Stated Condition calibration or pooled data. The Serial and Choice
Task Condition calibrated estimates are generally much closer to each other than for the
Revealed Condition.
6 Conclusion
This study conducted a choice experiment amongst NZ farmers who irrigate. The choice
situations that farmers faced in the experiment included full restrictions on water with-
drawal during dry conditions against having an option to pay for water, which is some-
thing that farmers are currently unable to do. The ﬁndings suggest that most farmers
are happy to pay for water to avoid such restrictions to get access to their consented
withdrawal, or at least a part of it. The WTP estimates for a 1% decrease in restrictions,
ability to buy and/or sell water, and conditions under which water can be bought were
derived, with respect to the consented amounts .
The stated ANA self-reports, within both serial and choice task ANA conditions,
indicate that respondents are continuously engaged in ANA heuristics. Revealed ANA
data via mouse-tracking shows that the stated choice surveys require randomization of
132
both attribute and choice order as top-left corner of choice cards received approximately
three times more pseudo ﬁxations (deﬁned as cumulative duration of mouse hovering of
greater than 200 milliseconds) than the bottom right corner. Tracking ANA comes at a
cost: it signiﬁcantly impacts on survey completion rates, and should only be used if it
provides signiﬁcant advantages.
In the choice modeling literature there is a dissent over the eﬀects of ANA. It would
seem it derives from a diﬀerence in its deﬁnition. If ANA is due to respondents' per-
ception of relative unimportance of some attributes (whether overall or at a particular
choice task), such ANA represents preference heterogeneity, and is essentially inconse-
quential since zero preferences of attributes can be accommodated by latent class models
with no further information required (if preference heterogeneity is of particular inter-
est, perhaps attached to various demographics indicators), or can be downright ignored
since a researcher is typically after only an average preference. Stated ANA seems to
point to such behavior in this study, as those parameters that were stated to be least
attended to were also estimated to be least statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand,
if ANA occurs (for whatever reasonrespondent fatigue, or relative small diﬀerence in
levels) to attributes that are considered to be important by the respondents, this has
the potential to signiﬁcantly attenuate estimates and is not generally picked up by most
models. Previous simulations analysis by Kravchenko (2014b) demonstrated inability of
latent models to pick up ANA when ANA was not a result of preference heterogeneity.
Revealed ANA data obtained in the study suggests the existence of such ANAthere
seemed to be no persistent diﬀerences between the levels of ANA across attributes, and
ANA was more pronounced in the choice tasks appearing late in the sequence, implying
fatigue or satisﬁcing (as opposed to preference heterogeneity).
While in the context of this study it is possible that the observed diﬀerence between
ANA data collection methods was due to an experimental artifact. For example, respon-
dents who were forced to study cards more perhaps became more involved and convinced
of superiority of alternative, potentially explaining the discrepancy with the coeﬃcient
on the status quo. Our ﬁndings echo results from other studies, suggesting respondents
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generally pay less attention to alternatives in choice tasks at the end of the sequence.
In conclusion, ANA, if a symptom of pure preference heterogeneity need not be of
major concern since in most cases a researcher needs to ﬁnd an average preference. ANA
as a choice heuristics, howeverparticularly if it is a case of a survey fatigue (or design)
induced cognitive overload, where respondents ignore attributes they themselves consider
important in some choice tasks but not in othersmay strongly aﬀect estimation results.
For example, in this study revealed ANA (as opposed to stated, which may well be a
proxy of preference) has been shown to reduce statistical signiﬁcance, cause attenuated
parameters and inconsistent WTP estimates.
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ABSTRACT	
 
The aim of this study is to analyse the effect of irrigation water pricing on the New 
Zealand economy, using a modified version of the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model and database. The primary user of irrigation water in NZ is dairy and 
since 95 percent of New Zealand dairy production is exported, analysis using a global 
general equilibrium model will contribute important insights.   
While use of a global model brings significant benefits, a shortcoming of using GTAP 
for country-level analysis for analysis of issues such as water is the lack of regional 
specification within the country. Since regions within a country like New Zealand vary 
substantially in terms of what they produce and how much irrigated water is used, the 
impacts on different regions within the country may differ greatly. For example, the 
Auckland region is the commercial capital, producing over a third of country’s 
economic output, yet it produces only 2% of New Zealand dairy output. To overcome 
this limitation, New Zealand is split into 15 regions; in the absence of detailed regional 
input-output data, we use regional product output as weights.  
To examine the effects of irrigation water pricing, the GTAP model is further modified 
by splitting the land endowment into irrigated and non-irrigated for each New Zealand 
region. This, again, is highly unevenly distributed: the Waikato Region is the largest 
single dairy producing region in the country (producing 24 percent of all dairy), but it 
includes less than 3 percent of all irrigated land in New Zealand. By contrast, the 
Canterbury Region comprises over 60 percent of all irrigated land in New Zealand, but 
produces only 18 percent of the country’s dairy output. This model modification follows 
the approach of Calzadilla et al. (2011), used in the creation of the GTAP-Water 
(GTAP-W) model; however, in our work this is only implemented for the newly created 
sub-regions of New Zealand. 
This approach allows in-depth analysis of the impact of freshwater management 
policies in New Zealand that will affect the price of water with particularly important 
outcomes for the dairy industry, including on exports to international markets.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand has one of the world’s highest renewable freshwater resources per capita 
(World Bank, 2014). The problem, however, is that most of this water needs to be 
maintained within freshwater bodies for the purposes of ecological, recreational and 
cultural values (Land and Water Forum, 2010). The portion that is available for 
abstraction in many catchments has nearly (or indeed, already) passed the level that is 
legally allowed to be allocated. The current freshwater abstraction consent allocation 
mechanism is in effect on a first come first served basis: whoever initially obtained this 
resource essentially blocks out subsequent users from gaining access to it. Indeed, cases 
of regional authorities denying new resource consents abound (see, for example, 
Williams (2009), Littlewood (2011), and Hutching (2014)).   
There are limited ways of trading water rights in New Zealand, 16 and apart from the 
nominal consent application fee, there is no cost applied to water. At the same time, 
freshwater availability is very seasonal and highly dependent on rain; it is lowest during 
the months of summer when the demand is at its peak. It is not uncommon for the 
regional councils which manage New Zealand’s water resources to institute partial or 
even full bans on water withdrawals during the driest periods.   
While only 5% of New Zealand’s agricultural land was irrigable in 2012 (compared 
with the world average of approximately 20%), irrigable land area increased by over 
50% between 2002 and 2012 (Statistics NZ, 2012). Over 80% of irrigable land is in 
New Zealand’s South Island, with Canterbury alone comprising 62% of New Zealand’s 
irrigable land (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
16 Water rights are inseparable from land ownership, except in private irrigation schemes were trade is 
possible. Trade that does occur is comparatively scarce.  
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Agriculture is responsible for vast majority of consumptive freshwater use: of 
approximately 20,000 freshwater consented takes in 2010, 75% were for irrigation, with 
a further 6% for stock watering (Aqualinc Research, 2010). In addition, what is 
classified as “drinking” or “municipal” water intakes (8% of all consents) sometimes 
ends up being used for commercial irrigation as well (up to 50% in some instances). In 
terms of volumes of water, in 2010 78% of weekly consumption allocation went to 
 
Figure 6. Irrigable Land by Region, New Zealand 2002 to 2012 
Data sources for the figure: Statistics NZ, 2002, 2007, 2012 
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irrigation. Animal husbandry is the dominant sector of New Zealand’s land use, 
utilising 97% of New Zealand farmland and 86% of irrigable land (see Table 3).  
Land Use  Total Land 
Irrigable 
Land 
Sheep Farming (Specialised) *  34.4%  11.4% 
Sheep‐Beef Cattle Farming *  30.3%  3.9% 
Dairy Cattle Farming *  17.7%  48.8% 
Beef Cattle Farming (Specialised) *  9.3%  6.6% 
Deer Farming *  2.2%  1.3% 
Grain‐Sheep or Grain‐Beef Cattle Farming *  0.8%  5.1% 
Other Crop Growing n.e.c.   1.1%  2.2% 
Forestry   1.0%  0.0% 
Other Grain Growing   0.7%  6.6% 
Vegetable Growing (Outdoors)   0.3%  4.6% 
Grape Growing   0.2%  4.2% 
Apple and Pear Growing   0.0%  1.2% 
Other  2.0%  4.1% 
 
	
1.1.	 Motivation	
Although not currently in the legislative pipeline, establishing water markets, similar to 
the model of the Australian Murray Darling Basin, could potentially alleviate 
inefficiencies arising from demand management through bans in times of droughts and 
the aforementioned first-come-first-served principle of consent allocation. The first-
best method of volumetric pricing and market-based allocation and reallocation have 
been long recognized as an optimal outcome for the New Zealand water management 
(Agriculture NZ, 2001; Sinclair Knight Merz, 2006). These outcomes, however, are 
generally viewed as politically impractical and impossible to implement under the 
current legislative framework (water rights being inseparable from land rights which, 
Table 3. 2012: Largest Farmland Users - Total and Irrigable 
Data source: Statistics NZ, 2012 
* denotes animal husbandry sectors. 
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in turn, are owned by the Crown or/and local iwi17). Nevertheless, even the latest 
taskforce charged with looking into the issues, Land and Water Forum [LAWF], 
explicitly stated that “price based or economic instruments can incentivise desired 
behaviours or create disincentives through price and market mechanisms” and should 
be used instead of the current first-come first-served method where there is water 
scarcity (Land and Water Forum, 2010; Land and Water Forum, 2012).  
In this study, we build a model which simulates the economy with water-pricing 
imposed, to study the impacts including flow-on effects from irrigated farms to the rest 
the economy. We introduce water as an explicit factor of production for the New 
Zealand economy within the well-known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. We also split the New Zealand economy 
into a number of sub-regions.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we present a brief overview of water-
related literature using CGE methodology. We then outline the procedure used to 
introduce water as an explicit factor of production and undertake regional splits for New 
Zealand. Following model modification, we are able to obtain shadow price of 
irrigation water. We are then able to introduce constraints to water availability, contrast 
the scenarios with and without water trade and examine the effect of water pricing. We 
then analyse our results before making some tentative conclusions.  
                                                 
17 Iwi is roughly translated as “tribe” from Maori. According to the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840, the 
ownership of water resources is an inherent right of the local iwi.  
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2. CGE	AND	WATER	
2.1.	 International	CGE	Studies	
The first study to incorporate water in CGE analysis was by Berck, Sherman, & 
Goldman (1990), who model the effects of decreased water supply in San Joaquin 
Valley, California. In their model, water was explicitly included as a factor of 
production, along with land, labour, capital and intermediate inputs. Water was 
assumed to be in fixed supply, and apportioned among various agricultural sectors, 
which, in turn, are apportioned among a limited quantity of land. Thus, water mobility 
was implied if agricultural land use was converted from one crop to another (Figure 7). 
Given the Leontief functional specification, there was assumed to be no substitution 
between value added and intermediate inputs. There is assumed to be no substitution 
between value added and intermediate inputs (as per the Leontief functional 
specification). The elasticity of substitutability between value added inputs is assumed 
to be one. This method, in essence, is an aggregate programming model, as the authors 
use inequality constraints to specify the technology for the agricultural sectors and do 
not explicitly state their factor demand functions. However, through this method the 
authors were able to determine the shadow price of water by studying the effects on 
production through varying the supply of water in the model. 
Decaluwé, Patry, & Savard (1999) argue that incorporating water as an exogenous 
factor of production, coupled with assumptions that it cannot be substituted with 
intermediate inputs (such as fertilizers) and that only agricultural sectors use water, are 
very restrictive assumptions and require better incorporation in the modelling. Such 
assumptions are likely to be of concern when modelling water usage in New Zealand 
as well, since there is substitution between feed and water during the times of droughts, 
149 
 
and conflicts over water intakes involve municipal users as well as power generators 
(EW, 2008; DairyNZ, 2010).  
 
 
Decaluwé, Patry, & Savard (1999) construct an enhanced CGE model of Moroccan 
economy. They built on an earlier version of their model (as cited in Decaluwé, Patry, 
& Savard (1999)) in which they segregate the country into two regions: water stressed 
(South) and water-abundant (North). Both regions have separate production nests, 
producing similar output that is sold on national and international market as a composite 
commodity. Figure 8 depicts the agricultural production structure that incorporates 
water in the process, while allowing it to be substitutable with fertilizer. Model 
parameters used in this model were acquired through a wide range of literature surveys.  
                                                 
18 This is the “high-elasticity” variant of the model used. The “low-elasticity” variant assumes than land 
and capital are used in a fixed proportion and labour is combined to the capital-land aggregated using a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e. capital is effectively moved down a level under land, like 
water.  
OUTPUT
Domestic 
Intermediate 
Inputs
Value Added
Capital Land
Acres Water
Labour
Imported 
Intermediate 
Inputs
Figure 7. Nested Production Structure18 
Source: Berck, Sherman, & Goldman, (1990) (Berck, Sherman, & Goldman, 1990) 
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The model also disaggregates water in two segments: that are available through existing 
dams and water collected through more efficient efforts in retrieving surface water and 
pumping stations during the times of drought. This enables the authors to establish two 
types of costs – decreasing marginal costs in the cause of existing dams, and increasing 
marginal cost in the case of more intensive pumping of groundwater.  
 
Source: Decaluwé, Patry, & Savard, (1999) (Decaluwé, Patry, & Savard, 1999) 
The findings, albeit somewhat expected in terms of direction, do show the significance 
of such modelling over having water only in agriculture with no substitute. First, when 
water prices were increased for all agricultural producers, other water consumers 
experienced a decrease in water prices, as decline in the use of water by the agricultural 
sector reduced the aggregate marginal cost of water (a part of the marginal cost curve 
was modelled to be upward sloping). Moreover, fertilizer producers increased their 
production by 40%, since farmers choose to substitute it for relatively more expensive 
water. When combined with a reduction of production taxes, the welfare of the 
economy actually increases (as measured by equivalent variation), hence further 
OUTPUT
All Value Added
Intermediate 
Value Added
Intermediate 
Composite 
"Land Capital"
Capital Land
Intermediate 
Composite Input
Fertilizer Water
Labour
Other 
Intermediate 
Consumption
Figure 8. Branch of the Agriculture Production Structure 
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demonstrating the importance of modelling the whole economy when analysing water-
related policies, rather than just concentrating on agriculture alone.   
Appels, Fry, Dwyer, & Paterson (2004) use a modified TERM19 model – an Australian 
regional CGE model - dubbed TERM-H2O, to model the effects of water reductions on 
inter-state trade in water. Their version includes 20 regions that can be modelled as 
independent regions, and 48 industry sectors, which include detailed representation of 
the irrigated sectors. In each region, each sector uses a distinct production function, 
hence, for example, irrigated and non-irrigated grapes are treated as different farms. 
When water (or its price) is shocked, affected farms shrink or expand accordingly in 
each region. Water is treated as an endowment, and as such its production is not 
endogenized by the model (Figure 9). TERM-H2O is built ‘bottom-up’, meaning that 
all demands and supplies are built at the regional level, before being aggregated to the 
nation level (Wittwer, 2012). While this level of disaggregation offers an approach 
would be very attractive for New Zealand, it would be hard to undertake since Statistics 
New Zealand does not the publish regional Input/Output tables that would be necessary 
for such implementation, and estimating them would be beyond the scope of this 
research. 
                                                 
19 The Enormous Regional Model 
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Figure 9. TERM-Water Production Structure for each Sector 
 
 
The degree of substitutability in the TERM-H2O model between water and other inputs 
is explicitly differentiated across industries. For instance, the rice growing industry has 
very little available substitute for water, whereas the dairy industry can readily 
substitute more feed for water.  
Berrittella, Rehdanz, Roson, & Tol (2006) develop a GTAP-W model based on a 
similar extensification by Burniaux and Truong (2002 as cited in Berrittella, Rehdanz, 
Roson, & Tol, 2006), who develop a GTAP-E model to study energy markets and their 
effects. The key parameter they introduce in their model is a water intensity coefficient 
for each sector, which is defined as the amount of water required to produce a unit of 
output for that particular sector (Berrittella, Hoekstra, Rehdanz, Roson, & Tol, 2007). 
They let the price of water be determined by markets, with a quantity constraint. This 
way, water is explicitly introduced as a factor of production, a level above value added 
inputs (natural resources, land, labour and capital-energy composite) and at the same 
OUTPUT 
Non‐water 
inputs
Intermediate 
Inputs
Primary 
Factors
Capital Labour Land
Other Costs
Irrigation 
Water
Source: Appels, Fry, Dwyer, & Paterson, (2004) (Appels, Fry, Dwyer, & Paterson, 
2004)
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level as all other inputs (intermediate – both domestic and imported) – see Figure 10 
below.  
 
 
The elasticity of substitution between value added factors of production is constant, but 
different among 17 sectors in the model. The elasticity of substitution between water 
and value added and intermediate inputs is set to zero (perfectly inelastic – implying 
the assumption of fixed proportions). The degree to which water usage is sensitive to 
changes in prices is captured through water price parameters, specific to each sector. 
According to the authors, these elasticities, “are little more than informed guesses”, 
hence a parameter sensitivity analysis is used in all studies using this model (Berrittella, 
Hoekstra, Rehdanz, Roson, & Tol, 2007). In addition, the authors state that they were 
unable to distinguish between rainfed and irrigated agriculture due to unavailability of 
data. Hence water-related shocks are applied equally both types of agricultural sectors, 
even though rainfed sectors are not likely to be directly affected by any fresh-water 
policies.  
This version of GTAP-W model is used by Berrittella et al (2006) to determine the 
impact of increased prices of water (1¢ per cubic meter of water) on “virtual water 
OUTPUT
Value Added 
(including energy 
inputs)
Capital Enerty 
composite Land
Natural 
Resources Labour
Water Resource All other inputs
Figure 10. GTAP-W Nested Tree Structure 
Source: Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol, (2008) (Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol, Water 
S it d th I t f I d I ti M t A CGE A l i 2008)
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trade”. Their findings are that universal increases in water tariffs tend to lower world 
welfare as a whole, but countries that are relatively abundant in water (or low water 
intensity users) are actually better off since they increase exports of virtual water to 
more water-stressed regions. The authors note that welfare results are primarily driven 
by the agricultural sector and trade effects are almost entirely driven by the agricultural 
sector.  
In the next use of the GTAP-W, Berrittella et al (2007) study the impact of reduced 
water availability. The main difference in this is that they quantity of water is shocked 
(simulating, for example, a new law that prohibits intake of groundwater), rather than 
the price of water as in the previous study. When a restriction on water intakes is 
introduced, total world welfare falls, but some regions experience an increase in 
welfare, such as in the case of the US. The authors attribute this to the predominance 
of overproduction due to agricultural subsidies, which is partially offset when 
agricultural production falls due to lower availability of water.  
GTAP-W’s second version is presented in Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol (2008), where 
the authors use a newer GTAP base data (year 2001) and a new production structure. 
Rather than creating a non-substitutable factor, as in the previous version, the authors 
split the land endowment in the value-added nest into “Pasture Land”, “Rainfed Land” 
and “Irrigated Land-Water Composite” (Figure 11): 
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Pasture land (for the production of animals and animal product) and Rainfed land are 
assumed to require no irrigation, and command lower yields, whereas irrigated land has 
higher productivity, but is relatively more expensive. To account for the higher land 
price, this component is split into the value of the land itself as well as the irrigation, 
which includes the necessary irrigation equipment, as well as the actual water used 
(Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol, Water Scarcity and the Impact of Improved Irrgation 
Management: A CGE Analysis, 2008). This reclassification is accomplished through 
splitting the GTAP social accounting matrix land endowment component based on 
respective contribution to total production. The split of the irrigated land is undertaken 
through using the ratios of irrigated yield to rainfed yields. 
Taheripour, Hertel, & Liu (2013) adjust the GTAP-W model by combining it with 
GTAP-BIO model and splitting the Indian region into River Basins [RB] and Agro 
Ecological Zones [AEZ] to account for different regions’ land productivity and water 
availability with different basins. This model enables, for example, estimation of 
welfare reduction due to water scarcity in (Taheripour et al., 2015). In this way, the 
products were homogeneous, yet differentiated by RB and AEZ origin. Their model 
Value Added 
inputs
Irrigated Land‐
Water 
Composite
Irriated Lands Irrigation
Rainfed Land Pasture Land Natural Resources Labour
Figure 11. GTAP-W 2.0 Nest Structure (truncated) 
Source: Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol, (2008) (Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol, Water 
S it d th I t f I d I ti M t A CGE A l i 2008)
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allows for more accurate modelling of agriculture world-wide as well as enabling 
disaggregation of results by River Basin levels.  
Figure 12. Demand Structure for GTAP-BIO-W 
 
 
2.2.	 New	Zealand	Freshwater‐Related	CGE	Studies	
There is a relative paucity of New Zealand fresh-water-related CGE studies. This is 
most likely a result of relative lack of urgency, as compared to more water stressed 
regions such as the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia. Another reason is that there is 
no solid data on either prices or volumes used by various sectors, as discussed earlier. 
Below is a summary of the few fresh-water related studies using CGE methodology in 
New Zealand.  
Cassels & Meister (2001) utilized the GTAP model and database in an attempt to 
quantify the impact of dairy effluent controls. They shock productivity parameters by a 
factor estimated through analysis of costs involved in installing new effluent systems.  
A more relevant study is by Lennox & Diukanova (2010), who develop a CGE model 
of the Canterbury Region and integrate fresh water as a factor of production. They then 
Primary Inputs in 
Crop Industries 
Land‐Water
Basin 1 Basin 2 Basin 3
AEZ 1 AEZ 2 AEZ 3
Land  Water
Unskilled Labour Skilled Labour Capital Energy
Source: Taheripour, et al. (2013).  
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use this model to study the impact of water quantity reductions. According to the 
authors there were no other studies of water availability using CGE in New Zealand at 
that time. In their model they link water in fixed proportion to the land factor, used only 
by the agricultural sectors and sharing the same technology across all agricultural 
sectors. By having a land-water composite in the Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
[CES] nest with capital, they allow for substitution effects, should price or quantity of 
water change. Their preliminary results were that a 10% decrease in availability of 
water causes a 3% decrease in the dairy output and “other agriculture” sectors.  
Since the recent emphasis of fresh water management restructuring, the Ministry of 
Primary Industries [MPI] commissioned the New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research [NZIER] to conduct a study using their proprietary Dynamic CGE model to 
measure the impact of proposed new irrigation schemes across New Zealand (Kaye-
Blake, Schilling, & Zuccollo, 2010). While this study does not consider pricing of water 
per se, it does consider the changes in productivity of various sectors post-irrigation 
schemes installation, as well as the costs of installing the schemes.  
A more recent effort by NZIER was to update the value of irrigation to the New Zealand 
economy since the initial study in 2004 carried out by MPI (NZIER & AgFirst 
Consultants, 2014; Doak, Parminter, Horgan, Monk, & Elliot, 2004). The initial MPI 
study was an effort to estimate the impact on New Zealand’s GDP if there were no 
irrigation. This was done by applying non-irrigated land productivity rates to irrigated 
land, with the flow-on effects to the other sectors of the economy largely ignored. 
NZIER’s study re-estimated the aggregate difference in productivity as well as using a 
general equilibrium framework to examine the flow-on effects. The main findings were 
that in the absence of irrigation in New Zealand, GDP would be 2.4% lower than 
present, mostly due to lower output of the dairy sector in Canterbury.    
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3. METHOD	
This section describes the process of building the CGE model incorporating water as a 
factor of production. We start with the GTAP model and version 9 GTAP database, 
with a base year of 2011 (Narayanan, Aguiar, & McDougall, 2011).   
3.1.	 Splitting	Land	and	Adding	Water	as	a	Factor	of	Production	
Following Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol (2011) we split the land sector into irrigated and 
non-irrigated land. Unlike in the GTAP-W model, however, we only undertake this for 
New Zealand and pasture land is not separated as a stand-alone endowment since New 
Zealand’s agricultural sector is unique in that bulk of irrigation actually goes to the 
pasture land. The new model specification follows the nested structure described in 
Section 2.2 and depicted in Figure 11. GTAP-W 2.0 Nest Structure (truncated) with the 
exception that pasture land endowment is omitted.  
Land, as a factor of production, is recorded in the GTAP database as header “VFM” 
(firms’ purchases of endowments at market prices), with market prices being the units.  
To split this factor of production, it is necessary to know the how much income the 
owners of each factor receive from each sector (Burfisher, 2011). Therefore to split the 
land sector into irrigated and non-irrigated land, it is necessary to know the irrigated 
and non-irrigated areas in each sector in each region and the difference in productivity 
of each sector. Statistics New Zealand (2012) agricultural census statistics contain 
information on the total land area in various agricultural activities in each region, with 
and without irrigation. When estimating the value of irrigation to New Zealand, NZIER 
(2014) conducted an extensive study into the productivity differentials; these data are 
available for each region and for some of agricultural sectors (in regions where at least 
5% of farm area is irrigated and which constitute at least 7% of regional gross margin). 
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Where productivity figures are missing, we use parameters estimated by Calzadilla, 
Rehdanz, & Tol (2011) for Australia and New Zealand region, see Table 2:  
VFM Wheat VegFruit OthCGrains OtherCrops CattleSheep OthAnimal RawMilk Total 
Landold 9 221 13 20 234 39 599 1135 
         
Landnew 1 110 3 5 6 2 96 223 
Water 0 44 1 2 4 1 22 76 
Rainfed 
Land 8 66 8 13 224 36 481 836 
Total  9 221 13 20 234 39 599 1135 
         
Share  13% 70% 36% 36% 4% 7% 20%  
Yield Ratio 1.39 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.79 1.40 1.24  
 
To get new Land, Water and Rain-fed Sectors, the following formulae were used: 
Lnd୬ୣ୵ ൌ Lnd୭୪ୢ ൈ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ൊ ܻ݈ܴ݅݁݀ܽݐ݅݋  (2)  
RfLand ൌ Lnd୭୪ୢ ൈ ሺ1 െ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ሻ  (3)  
Wtr ൌ Lnd୭୪ୢ ൈ ݏ݄ܽݎ݁ ൈ ሺܻ݈ܴ݅݁݀ܽݐ݅݋ െ 1ሻ ൊ ܻ݈ܴ݅݁݀ܽݐ݅݋  (4)  
 
Where share parameter is the share of value of output within the corresponding 
attributed to irrigated (as opposed to dryland) agriculture, and YieldRatio is the relative 
productivity of irrigated land versus dryland. Splitting the original land endowment in 
such way maintains the database balance. 
Additional behavioural parameters were added to allow for substitution between land 
and water in the Land & Water composite for each agricultural sector based on 
Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol (2011) parameters for Australia and New Zealand (see 
Figure 11. GTAP-W 2.0 Nest Structure (truncated)).  
Table 4. Firms’ Purchases of Endowments at Market Prices, Modified New Zealand Database 
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3.2.	 Splitting	New	Zealand	into	15	regions	
New Zealand does not have a publicly available regional CGE model. Building such a 
bottom-up model from scratch would require detailed input-output tables, however, 
these are only available at the overall country level from Statistics New Zealand 
(Statistics NZ, 2005).  
One option explored was to divide New Zealand into 15 regions using a top-down 
approach using tools such as SplitReg or MyGTAP. While SplitReg has been developed 
with the intent to split regions that are commonly bundled together within the GTAP 
database, such as members of ‘XOC’ – Rest of Oceania, which include a multitude of 
Pacific Island nations (Horridge, 2011), it could also be used to split one country based 
on simple weights. For instance Lysenko, Ciuriak, & Xiao (2015) use SplitReg to study 
effects of trade policy on separate provinces within Canada. To perform the split using 
SplitReg, the program requires only proportional value added information for each 
sector of every new region. Sectors in other regions remain unchanged, and the sum of 
headers of new regions remain equal to the original region, thereby maintaining 
database balance.   
Such split would be relatively simple to carry out within relatively autonomous regions 
with balanced production. However, in NZ there is a highly unbalanced economic and 
agricultural output among regions, therefore this is would not be appropriate. For 
example, Auckland produces the greatest economic output, including many products 
requiring agricultural inputs with little of its own agriculture (i.e. limited land 
endowment), while Waikato produces extensive primary intermediate input products, 
though few final products (Statistics NZ, 2014). By default SplitReg does not assume 
any trade within the newly split regions, and while the splitting of database was 
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possible, any shocks would result in highly skewed results, particularly with respect to 
sectors relying on land.       
One could try to estimate the trade flow within regions. For instance, Standardi, 
Bosello, & Eboli (2013) develop a sub-regional modal of Italy based on GTAP through 
estimating inter-regional trade. They note that the most common method to fill-in 
missing regional trade data is by using gravity models, which involves econometrically 
estimating trade flows based on distances. However, the authors feel that such method 
is susceptible to the omitted variable bias and argue for a different approach: they 
estimate the inter-regional trade flows through using transport data and regional output.  
The method used in this research is partially based the methods used in Taheripour et 
al. (2015) who split GTAP agricultural sectors among Agricultural Economic Zones 
[AEZ] and River Basins [RB]. As such, they do not create new regions per se, but split 
commodities into AEZ-and-RB-specific commodities. The advantages of such an 
approach is that it enables specifying different factor productivity for each split 
commodities as well as being able to target each locality-specific commodity separately 
(by policy or climate shock).  
Similar to SplitReg, SplitCom enables disaggregating GTAP sectors based on user-
specified weights (Horridge, 2008). An additional advantage of only splitting 
agricultural sectors is that without creating separate regions, NZ-based [newly split] 
sectors remain local (meaning that they do not face a home bias from other New 
Zealand regions); and labour remains a mobile factor (whereas making it mobile across 
different regions would require further model modification). As such, only agricultural 
sectors that use land are split. 
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3.2.1. Data	for	Split	
Agricultural census statistics were used for weights to perform the sectoral split of the 
GTAP database (Statistics NZ, 2012). Since only regional proportions of production 
are required as input in SplitCom, it was possible to derive the split by looking at the 
agricultural sector census, which provided regional breakdown of selected agricultural 
production. For instance, GTAP sector 2, ‘Wheat’ was derived by linking the GTAP 
national ‘Wheat’ data with New Zealand Agricultural Census regional output of wheat 
in tonnage. ‘Milk’ was derived by linking the proportions of ‘Dairy cows and heifers in 
milk or calf’, while other sectors were linked by the total farm area in hectares. The 
following table summarizes the final weights used to perform the sectoral split:20 
Table 5. Percentage Split of Agricultural Production Among the New Zealand Regions21 
 
NT
L 
AU
K 
WK
O 
BO
P 
GIS
 
HK
B 
TK
I 
MW
T 
WG
N 
TSN
 
MB
H 
WT
C 
CA
N 
OT
A 
STL
 
TO
TA
L 
Wheat  2.4  2.3  2.6  2.8  1.3  1.8  2.8  1.8  3.0  2.9  2.5  2.1  61.5  4.4  5.9  100 
Veg. & Fruit  3.2  7.0  6.9  8.2  3.4  8.9  1.7  4.4  1.7  22.9  7.5  3.0  14.5  4.6  2.2  100 
Other Grains  1.6  4.0  9.2  8.0  2.3  7.4  2.1  7.2  6.1  1.8  2.0  1.5  34.0  7.2  5.7  100 
Other Crops  1.5  2.2  8.8  3.8  1.0  2.2  2.2  4.4  2.0  25.9  1.1  0.9  19.4  21.2  3.5  100 
Cattle & Sheep  3.2  3.6  13.9  4.4  2.4  6.8  4.6  8.4  12.1  3.1  2.8  1.4  19.2  7.6  6.3  100 
Other Animal  1.2  6.9  6.3  4.0  0.9  3.9  1.3  4.5  2.8  23.2  1.0  0.9  3.5  25.9  13.7  100 
Raw Milk  3.7  4.0  19.4  10.1  1.6  4.4  7.1  5.6  4.8  4.2  3.4  1.6  21.5  4.5  4.1  100 
 
The selection of sectors used was based on data availability in the GTAP database, 
along with regional output data available from Statistics New Zealand, information on 
                                                 
20 Note that SplitCom’s current settings to not allow commodity splits to be differentiated across the 
existing regions parsimoniously. While it is possible to specify production and trade splits per regions 
in greater detail, this would require further model modifications since agricultural products are used as 
inputs in further production, and splitting an agricultural product within New Zealand only would 
require careful calibration of any use of split sectors as an intermediary good could be cross regional, 
which again would complicate the set up and require either regional input/output data or estimation of 
trade flows.   
21 See Appendix A for the abbreviations’ definitions.  
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the proportion of land irrigated as well as difference in productivity between irrigated 
and non-irrigated land.22    
The regional split was performed in three steps. First, the single New Zealand region 
GTAP-W model was created with the separate Land, Rain-fed Land and Water 
endowment commodities, but without actually assigning any values to the new 
endowment sectors, to facilitate the splits according to more detailed weights once the 
new agricultural sectors were created.  Next, each of the seven agricultural commodities 
used (see Table 5) were split into 15 region-specific commodities, using the weights in 
Table 5. This created 95 new region-specific commodities within the database (i.e. 
WheatNTL, WheatAUK … RawMilkSTL) in place of the original 7 agricultural 
sectors. Finally, using the data on agricultural production data from Statistics New 
Zealand (2012), irrigated areas (Appendix B) and relative productivity yields from 
NZIER (2014), the Land Factor was split into rainfed land, water and [irrigated] land 
for each of the new commodities.23 
3.3.	 Shadow	Value	of	Water	
Freshwater abstraction has only been required to be metered since 2012 – and only for 
large intakes (Ministry for the Environment, 2010).  Consequently, at the time of 
development of this model, there was no reliable data to show the actual usage of water 
(as opposed to consented usage) in each region to match the GTAP database output data 
                                                 
22 See Appendix B for sector concordance and detailed statistics on irrigated land. 
23 The procedure described in section 3.1 was used, the yield and production share parameters for each 
region are given in Appendix C. A further modification was made to the standard closure used in usual 
GTAP. Since New Zealand is an open economy with commodity prices being largely driven by 
international prices, a restriction was placed for commodity agricultural prices to be fixed within New 
Zealand. For instance, all 15 wheat commodities were grouped into “wheat” set and the price such 
price restriction was imposed: ‘tradslack(Wheat,"NewZealand")=pm(Wheat,"NewZealand");’. 
Furthermore, when the analysis becomes partial equilibrium, walraslack in the standard GTAP model 
must be exogenised since equilibria must be forced on the final market as Walras’ Law no longer 
holds. 
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and the Statistics New Zealand Agricultural Census production data in the relevant year. 
However, efforts by Aqualinc Research (2010) aimed to provide accurate estimates of 
actual vs. consented use, with the aim of providing a viable alternative. Based on their 
report, in the 2009/2010 financial year the total actual water used by the irrigation was 
3.33 billion cubic metres.24  
As per Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol (2011), the shadow price of irrigation water can be 
calculated by looking at the payments to water factor within the GTAP-W database and 
dividing it by the corresponding volume of irrigation water used for that sector/region. 
Dividing the sum of all firms’ purchases of water endowment in New Zealand ($67 
million)25 by this figure yields a shadow price of 2.00 cents per cubic metre of water. 
This is in line with figures derived by Calzadilla, Rehdanz, & Tol (2011), if somewhat 
lower than in other developed countries (in US and Western Europe the prices are 3.5 
and 14 cents respectively). The results can perhaps be attributed to the fact that most 
irrigation water in New Zealand goes towards lower value added dairy sector – it 
requires approximately 20 cubic metres of water to grow enough pasture to feed cows 
to produce 1 kg of milksolid26 with a current market value of $2.67.27 It may also signal 
lower overall scarcity.  
The shadow price for irrigation water by region is reported in Table 6. It ranges between 
33 cents in the Waikato Region,28 to 1.1 cents in Canterbury, indicating that the shadow 
price is weakly related to its abundance and relative benefit (NZIER (2014) reported 
                                                 
24 Derived from the appendix of the Aqualinc Research (2010) report – figures for ‘Sum of actual 
annual water use (m3/year) for irrigation total 
25 Please note, as the GTAP database is based in the 2011 US dollars, all dollar figures presented in this 
paper are in US dollars, unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
26 See Kravchenko (2014) for a detailed breakdown. 
27 The 2015/2016 MS Fonterra payout forecast is NZD3.90 (as of March 2016), approximately 
USD2.67 
28 This is still not as high as in Japan and South Korea, where the shadow value of irrigation water was 
calculated to be 113 cents per m3 (Calzadilla et el, 2011). 
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that the gross margin difference between irrigated and non-irrigated dairy farming in 
Waikato was by far the widest). Similarly, Bay of Plenty, Auckland and Tasman use 
irrigation for relatively high return production (fruit and vegetables, including 
viticulture).   
Table 6. Shadow Value of Water by Region 
 VFM29 USD mil 
Sum of actual annual water 
used (m3/year) 
Shadow Value 
(cents) 
NTL  1.083  32,520,726  3.33 
AUK  1.404  4,695,362  29.90 
WKO  7.086  21,771,444  32.55 
BOP  2.379  20,594,232  11.55 
GIS  0.278  3,430,259  8.10 
HKB  5.780  81,454,183  7.10 
TKI  0.569  8,629,149  6.59 
MWT  1.536  27,866,857  5.51 
WGN  1.013  28,389,566  3.57 
TSN  5.665  44,625,605  12.69 
MBH  5.579  80,357,840  6.94 
WTC  0.190  11,943,165  1.59 
CAN  23.477  2,161,328,322  1.09 
OTA  9.757  792,090,607  1.23 
STL  0.809  11,652,810  6.95 
NZ Total  66.603  3,331,350,127  2.00 
 
3.4.	 Simulations	
3.4.1. New	Zealand‐Wide	Drought		
A New Zealand-wide drought can be thought of a fall in productivity of dryland farms 
– not affecting irrigated agriculture. One way to model to a drought through a GTAP 
simulation is through shocking the primary factor-augmenting technological change 
that applies to rainfed land only.  In an econometric analysis of the effects of droughts 
                                                 
29 Factor payments to water endowment 
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Kamber, McDonald, & Price (2013) note that the effects of droughts are much more 
pronounced in the North Island where agriculture is more reliant on dryland farming. 
Our results confirm this conclusion.  
Assuming a 10% decline in productivity of dryland production 30  New Zealand’s 
welfare, as measured by Equivalent Variation [EV], falls by $147 mil. Regional 
decomposition of output changes is presented in Figure 8. In relative terms (with respect 
to specific sector initial production), Bay of Plenty, Gisborne and Auckland Regions’ 
wheat sectors have the largest declines, but the relative size of this sectors makes the 
impact comparatively negligible. In absolute terms, the largest change is in Waikato’s 
raw milk sector which decreases by $206 mil. This is somewhat offset by an increase 
in production of the Canterbury raw milk sector, which experiences a growth of $143 
mil. The vegetable & fruit sector seems to benefit the most from the drought-induced 
re-allocation of resources, particularly in the Canterbury. In general, the drought affects 
the dairy sector the most in all regions except Canterbury.  
Note that due to the assumption of fixed commodity prices, the changes are driven not 
by relative price changes for the output, but rather through reallocation of factors of 
mobile factors of production (namely labour and capital).  
  
                                                 
30 GTAP shock of ‘shock afeall("RfLand",PROD_COMM,"NewZealand") = uniform -10’ – this shocks 
changes irrigation efficiency. 
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Figure 13. Regional Decomposition of Output Changes in a Drought Simulation in Absolute (Top Row) and Relative (Bottom Row) Terms 
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3.4.2. Removing	Irrigation	Water	as	a	Factor	of	Production	
Following the work of MPI (2002) and NZIER & AgFirst (2014) in estimating the value 
of irrigation through a hypothetical scenario where New Zealand had no irrigation and 
dryland productivity was applied to the irrigated sector, we modelled a similar 
experiment.31 This was achieved through the removal of the water part of the land/water 
composite endowment. Keeping in mind that in 2012, only 5% of all agricultural land 
in New Zealand was defined as irrigable (Statistics NZ, 2012), the impact on overall on 
the New Zealand GDP are still surprisingly small – a decrease in overall welfare by just 
$16.5 mil.  The agricultural output reduction in the most irrigated region – Canterbury 
– was relatively large – a reduction of 9% or $149 mil. This, however, was largely offset 
by a shift in resources to other sectors. Cattle & sheep and other animal sectors benefit 
from no irrigation in Otago and Canterbury, and dairy in Waikato and Otago especially 
– see Figure 9 for a depiction of results by region and commodity. 
The results are significantly smaller than NZIER’s estimate, but they come from 
different assumptions – in our model unirrigated land and capital is reallocated to other 
sectors, whereas in NZIER’s report the authors specify that their analysis “destroys 
some capital and land”, meaning it doesn’t get re-allocated to other sectors. Moreover, 
the results are likely to be cumulative, whereas in our scenario it is modelled as a shock 
akin to turning off all irrigation for a year.   
 
                                                 
31 ‘Shock qo("Wtr","NewZealand") = -95’. A larger shock would have been impractical to model in 
GTAP work and quantity restrictions generally follow this approach (see, for example Anderson & 
Strutt (2015) who model import bans via a similar approach); 
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Figure 14. New Zealand without Irrigation 
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3.4.3. Simulating	a	Tax	on	Water	in	Canterbury		
To examine the effects of a water tax, a tax rate on water endowment in Canterbury is increased 
to 100%.32 This tax decreases New Zealand’s welfare by $8 mil. As expected, quantity demanded 
for water falls for each sector in Canterbury – $0.5 mil (4.3%) in the dairy sector and $0.4 mil 
(6.9%) in the veg. & fruit sector are the highest. An interesting finding is that demand for water is 
increased in other regions. While it may be partially an artefact of endogenizing total endowment 
commodities in the standard closure, and the quantity of water consumed may not increase in other 
regions to the extend as the model indicates because of abstraction limits, the fact that the model 
does show an increase in demand means that policies in one region have the potential to put strains 
on water resources in other regions, even if the catchments are not interconnected.  
3.5.	 Sensitivity	Analysis	
The results of simulations were tested for sensitivity to elasticity parameter values. Key parameters 
driving the results of water-related simulations shocks are the ‘substitution elasticity of primary 
factors’ (ESBL), and ‘substitution elasticity between land and water’ (ELLW). Doubling the ESBL 
parameters increased the impact of shocks: for the drought scenario, the New Zealand’s overall 
welfare decreased by an additional $21.8 mil (on top of the $147 mil decrease), with small, 
proportional differences in the agricultural production changes.  Similarly, for the no irrigation 
scenario, the overall welfare fell an additional $1.7 mil (on top of $14.8 mil), with minor changes 
in agricultural production as well.  
                                                 
32 The original tax rate, close to zero, was the same as the tax rate applied to the New Zealand land factor 
endowment in the aggregated GTAP database.   
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Doubling the ELLW parameters made a comparatively smaller difference on the overall welfare 
in the drought scenario (the welfare was $1.4 mil higher), but the dairy sector in Canterbury 
increased by 6.1% instead of 8.9% with the substitution parameters used in the baseline simulation. 
Otago and Canterbury other animal sectors both experience an increase of 1.5% instead of a small 
decreases experienced in the baseline scenarios.  
The ELLW parameters were based on Calzadilla et al. (2011), who in turn based them on price 
elasticities of demand estimated by Resegrant, Cai & Cline (2002). In their original work, New 
Zealand’s price elasticity of demand and irrigation yield parameters are grouped together with 
Canada, Iceland, Israel, Malta, Norway, South Africa and Switzerland, whereas Calzadilla et al. 
(2011) group New Zealand with Australia, for which there is a separate elasticity and yield 
parameters. Sensitivity to doubling ELLW parameters suggests that there is scope to improve 
model accuracy with better parameters. Ideally, once more data on water usage becomes available 
and hopefully some regional authorities decide to price water, a much more accurate CGE model 
can be built. 
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4. CONCLUSION	AND	LIMITATIONS	
The main aim of this paper was to examine the effects of water pricing on the wider New Zealand 
economy. This research has culminated in the creation of, to our knowledge, the first publicly 
available multi-sectoral and multi-regional open economy CGE model of New Zealand. It is based 
on a well-developed and understood GTAP model, and hence has the appeal of being replicable 
and available to be used again for other research topics, particularly relating to agriculture.  
As theorized at the outset, regional composition of dryland and irrigated agriculture, as well as 
overall economic activity is highly uneven in New Zealand. Any water related simulation results 
are primarily driven by the dairy sector, which in turn are driven by Waikato and Canterbury 
Regions. Shocks benefiting dryland farming (such as water taxes or restrictions) benefit Waikato, 
whereas droughts benefit Otago and Canterbury. The main finding of the model is that regional 
policies targeting water has the potential to influence the demand of that resource in other regions, 
even without hydrological connections.  The imputed shadow price of water is 2 cents per m3 in 
New Zealand overall, and varies between 30 cents to 1 cent between regions, with Canterbury and 
Otago commanding the lowest shadow prices, and Waikato and Auckland Regions the highest.  
There is currently limited data on irrigation production differences between irrigated and non-
irrigated sectors between regions. Hence, there is scope for further disaggregation within this 
database if regional production data is made available to more sectors. These sectors are all for 
which irritable land data (and more recently water withdrawals) are available, including grape 
growing, vegetable varieties and fruit, sheep and beef, etc.  
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APPENDIX	A	–	REGION	NAMES’		ABBREVIATIONS		
Region Abbreviation 
Northland NTL 
Auckland AUK 
Waikato WKO 
Bay of Plenty BOP 
Gisborne GIS 
Hawke's Bay HKB 
Taranaki TKI 
Manawatu-Wanganui MWT 
Wellington WGN 
Tasman & Nelson TSN 
Marlborough MBH 
West Coast WTC 
Canterbury CAN 
Otago OTA 
Southland STL 
(Williams, 2009) (Littlewood, Dairy water plans denied, 2011) (Littlewood, Dairies denied river 
consent, 2011) (Hutching, 2014) 
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APPENDIX	B	–	SECTORAL	CONCORDANCE	BETWEEN	GTAP	AND	IRRIGATED	LAND	
DATABASE	
Land use  GTAP Code  Irrigated  Non Irrigated  Total 
Nursery Production (Under Cover)   Other Crops  156  589  745 
Nursery Production (Outdoors)   Other Crops  3,007  2,128  5,135 
Floriculture Production (Under Cover)   Other Crops  129  1,044  1,173 
Floriculture Production (Outdoors)   Other Crops  73  672  745 
Vegetable Growing (Under Cover)   Veg. & Fruit  285  662  947 
Vegetable Growing (Outdoors)   Veg. & Fruit  33,290  34,759  68,049 
Grape Growing   Veg. & Fruit  30,173  17,142  47,315 
Kiwifruit Growing   Veg. & Fruit  5,690  15,885  21,575 
Berry Fruit Growing   Veg. & Fruit  2,977  1,300  4,277 
Apple and Pear Growing   Veg. & Fruit  8,918  4,330  13,248 
Stone Fruit Growing   Veg. & Fruit  2,097  2,207  4,304 
Citrus Fruit Growing  Veg. & Fruit  430  2,335  2,765 
Olive Growing   Veg. & Fruit  746  1,735  2,481 
Other Fruit and Tree Nut Growing   Veg. & Fruit  2,495  6,575  9,070 
Sheep Farming (Specialised)   Cattle & Sheep  82,163  3,601,997  3,684,160 
Beef Cattle Farming (Specialised)   Cattle & Sheep  47,365  969,323  1,016,688 
Sheep‐Beef Cattle Farming   Cattle & Sheep  27,912  3,166,166  3,194,078 
Grain‐Sheep or Grain‐Beef Cattle Farming   Cattle & Sheep  36,783  83,755  120,538 
Other Grain Growing   Other Grains  47,431  72,122  119,553 
Other Crop Growing n.e.c.   Other Grains  16,110  113,764  129,874 
Dairy Cattle Farming   Raw Milk  352,240  1,853,329  2,205,569 
Deer Farming   Other Animals  9,327  231,005  240,332 
Horse Farming   Other Animals  2,314  27,119  29,433 
Pig Farming   Other Animals  1,239  6,551  7,790 
Other Livestock Farming n.e.c.   Other Animals  428  6,636  7,064 
Forestry     83  106,466  106,549 
Revised Other    174  7,781  7,955 
Total     721,394  10,465,746  11,187,140 
 
  
 
 
Source for irrigation data: Kaye-Blake, Schilling, & Zuccollo (2010) 
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APPENDIX	C	–	TABLES	FOR	REGIONAL	SPLITS	
 Wheat  VegFruit  OthCGr  OtherC  CtlShp  OthAnml  RawMilk 
NTL  12.80%  41.01%  0.00%  3.06%  0.42%  0.77%  3.09% 
AUK  12.80%  50.42%  0.00%  8.20%  0.23%  1.30%  4.91% 
WKO  12.80%  51.91%  0.00%  1.12%  0.33%  2.04%  5.90% 
BOP  12.80%  25.30%  0.00%  1.33%  0.65%  0.20%  10.31% 
GIS  12.80%  11.09%  0.00%  0.00%  0.32%  0.00%  0.00% 
HKB  12.80%  77.87%  15.79%  17.61%  1.79%  4.01%  24.56% 
TKI  12.80%  0.00%  0.00%  2.08%  0.39%  0.00%  4.01% 
MWT  12.80%  24.87%  0.00%  3.92%  0.47%  0.49%  11.32% 
WGN  12.80%  80.86%  21.89%  18.95%  1.10%  0.00%  32.21% 
TSN  12.80%  20.18%  0.00%  46.54%  1.17%  4.83%  22.34% 
MBH  12.80%  90.00%  83.98%  90.00%  1.42%  9.69%  31.65% 
WTC  12.80%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  1.80%  0.00%  3.35% 
CAN  12.80%  90.00%  69.74%  45.38%  14.35%  17.70%  81.06% 
OTA  12.80%  74.71%  32.04%  34.82%  6.77%  19.02%  38.93% 
STL  12.80%  0.00%  0.00%  4.92%  0.29%  2.64%  6.12% 
 
 Wheat  VegFruit  OthCGr  OtherC  CtlShp  OthAnml  RawMilk 
NTL  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.33 
AUK  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.54 
WKO  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  2.25 
BOP  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.54 
GIS  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.54 
HKB  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.71  1.71  1.31 
TKI  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.31 
MWT  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.25 
WGN  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.19 
TSN  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  2.35  1.79  1.54 
MBH  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.18  1.18  1.54 
WTC  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.54 
CAN  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  2.18  2.18  1.16 
OTA  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  2.51  2.51  1.54 
STL  1.39  1.39  1.38  1.33  1.79  1.79  1.22 
Table 7. Share of Irrigated Production by Region and Agricultural Commodity 
Table 8. Ratio of Irrigated and Dryland Yields by Region and Agricultural Commodity 
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This thesis was primarily concerned with determining the value of irrigation water and the 
responses to hypothetical water charges for agriculture in New Zealand, aiming to examine the 
effects of possible water charges that could address growing freshwater scarcity. Particular 
attention was paid to the dairy sector – being the largest consumptive user of freshwater. Dairy 
intensification, in terms of converting from dryland to irrigated pasture, is generally associated 
with water quality and environmental degradation (see Foote, Joy, & Death (2015) for an 
estimation of costs of externalities associated with dairy farming). In addition, dairy intensification 
has also been identified as one of the main driving forces behind the increase in the water demand 
- a resource that is reaching (or reached and indeed surpassed in many catchments) current 
allocation limits (Aqualinc Research, 2010; Statistics NZ, 2012). In addition to looking at the non-
market value of water, the secondary objective of this thesis was to advance methodological 
techniques in the fields of non-market valuation, choice modelling and Computable General 
Equilibrium [CGE] modelling. The first part (Chapter II) examined the dairy sector alone and 
aimed to estimate the potential demand for water by looking at the dairy farm production data. The 
second part (Chapters III and IV) involved conducting a choice experiment on farmers who 
irrigate. The final part (Chapter V) used CGE modelling to examine economy-wide effects of 
water-related shocks. The following sections will briefly review the main findings of each section, 
discuss their contribution to the relevant literature, as well as propose potential avenues for future 
research.  
5.1.	 Panel	Data	Analysis	
Using MPI’s dairy monitoring dataset, together with data on dairy payout forecasts that had to be 
collected from financial and news reports form across ten years, as well as weather data from 
NIWA, a relationship was established between weighted forecasted payout and the amount of milk 
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produced via a fixed effects regression analysis. With an assumption that a decrease in expected 
payout for a Milk Solid [MS] is equivalent to an increase of the cost of an input, it was shown that 
a price/quantity of MS relationship could be converted to a price/quantity of water relationship, 
conditioned on a parameters of a dairy farm.  
Findings by Watters, Rowan, & Williams (2004) confirmed that dairy farmers adhere to the basic 
economic principle of incentives – farmers increase production (and incurring higher marginal 
costs) when the expected payout is higher. To develop an accurate relationship between price and 
quantity, a more accurate measure of incentives was required than the final payout (which is 
announced months after the milking season is over). In place of the final annual MS payout from 
Fonterra, New Zealand’s largest dairy cooperative, a new weighted price measure was developed 
that more carefully reflected the incentives that dairy farmers faced throughout the years in the 
dataset: since the payout forecast changed throughout the milking season and farmers respond to 
expected payouts, a change in the expected payout would have triggered a response not accounted 
for by the final payout. Literature concerning farmer behaviour has not considered the effects of 
these changes but rather focused on the final payout. Future use of this method would benefit from 
use of more detailed regional milk production data to be incorporated as weights – only national-
level milk production was used in this study.  
Once a credible relationship was established between price and quantity of MS produced, together 
with the knowledge of pasture irrigation yields, and dry-matter to MS conversion, it was possible 
to impute the relationship between an increase in the price of water (proxied by a decrease in the 
expected payout) and the corresponding decrease in the quantity of water demanded (proxied by 
lower production, since however much production declined by, it was possible to estimate the 
corresponding amount of dry-matter not consumed, which in turn would have required less 
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irrigated water). In other words, a decrease in the expected payout simulated what would happen 
on an irrigated farm should the price of water suddenly increase by an equivalent amount.  
This method is a novel way of non-market valuation, which to the knowledge of the author has not 
been used previously. It does, however, rest on a strict assumption, namely that there is no 
substitution with other factors of production. More than likely, an increase in price of water would 
have resulted in an increase in demand of its substitute – brought-in feed. However, if a reliable 
source of temporal feed prices could be secured, this too could be accounted for.  
In addition, behavioural economists have long noted asymmetry in which people process 
information (see, for instance, Barberis & Thaler (2003), on behaviour psychology of stock market 
trading). While equivalent to the bottom line, it is possible that farmers would react differently to 
a decrease in a payout than to an equivalent increase in costs (aside from the issue of substitution). 
Data on cost increases (perhaps electricity, interest rates or minimum wage changes) could be used 
to test this hypothesis.  
5.2.	 Discrete	Choice	Modelling	
Following the initial findings with regard to irrigation water price demand in the case of dairy 
farmers, a choice experiment targeting farmers who irrigate was carried out. It was expected that 
most farmers would be against paying for something that they currently get for free (echoing 
results from previous such studies), hence in choice tasks consent holders were asked to imagine 
scenarios in which their local regional council instituted a temporary water withdrawal ban. The 
consent holder would then decide between having to wait out the ban or having to pay a fixed 
amount per cubic metre of water up to amount the full or partial amount of their initial consented 
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amount. The main aim of the survey was to see whether when faced with such choices respondents 
would still protest against water charges, or would be willing to pay some money to avoid the ban.  
In terms of methodological research questions, particular attention was paid to the issue of 
Atttribute non-Attendance [ANA]. Reviewed litereature provided mixed indicators about the 
influence of ANA, but its prevalance was well recognized. Initial simulation analysis (Chapter III) 
indicated that ANA can, under certain conditions, cause problems. However, if ANA is due to 
preference hetrogeneity (i.e. some resondents having a zero preferences, while others do not), 
latent class estimation could be used to pick up this heterogeneity and such heterogeneity does not 
really bias estimates as the estimates are an average (which includes those who had zero preference 
as well those who do not). When, on the other hand, ANA was assumed to be random (though not 
representing preference hetrogeneity) latent class modelling could not help, nor could reliable 
parameters be estimated without additional data on ANA. Simulations also revealed the 
importance of randomization – if ANA was order specific, not randomizing could lower the 
significance of estimates.  
Alemu, et al. (2013) sought to understand the reasons behind ANA via follow up questions and 
found that these included true zero preferences as well as simplifying heuristics. They conclude 
that not accounting for such heterogeneity biases the results. The research in this thesis did not 
seek to differentiate between two sources of ANA, and the results are confounded. However, the 
results suggest that different reporting mechanism yield different ANA evidence. The survey used 
three methods to collect ANA data for comparison – not previously explicitly done. In the first 
condition, respondents self-reported level of ANA after all choice tasks were completed; in the 
second condition they self-reported ANA after each choice task; in the third condition respondents 
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had to uncover attribute levels by hovering their mouse points across the location of attribute 
levels. 
The results of the survey indicate that self-reporting is generally constant and is stable across 
choice tasks. Together with the corresponding estimated parameter significance, this implies that 
stated ANA methods – both serial and task choice - pick up the first type of ANA – due to 
preferences heterogeneity. Revealed ANA, on the other hand – a method whereby respondents 
uncover attribute levels seems to pick different information – the frequency of hovering events 
over a 200 ms threshold (Pseudo Fixations [PS]) did not not vary significantly across attributes 
and declined significantly across choice tasks. Both stated choice task and revealed condition 
caused additional burden on respondents which caused attrition. Since choice task and serial 
conditions picked up largely the same information, the recommendation of this study is to use 
serial ANA data collection method only (if stated method is unavoidable). However, it is strongly 
argued that revealed method, particularly if it less burdensome, perhaps with an aid of eye tracking, 
can track ANA due to heuristics or fatigue.  
In the case of ANA due to preference heterogeneity, latent class modelling has been shown to 
improve model fit and also produce substantially different WTP parameters and welfare estimates 
(Scarpa, et al., 2009). Such modelling does not require (though can still benefit from) additional 
data collection with respect to ANA, and hence can theoretically be applied to any choice 
modelling dataset.  In the case of ANA due to heuristics (not associated with zero preferences) not 
tracking such ANA can cause a significant distortion to estimates as well as a loss of statistical 
significance. 
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5.3.	 General	Equilibrium	Modelling	
The main advantage of General Equilibrium Modelling is that unlike Partial Equilibrium 
Modelling, the spill-over effects of economic changes between different sectors are taken into 
account. As such, while it is obvious, for example, that a water charge in Canterbury would 
negatively affect farmers who irrigate in Canterbury, CGE modelling allows the estimation of the 
effect of such of a hypothetical charge on other sectors in Canterbury as well as other regions and 
the economy overall.  
To study the effects of water before introducing water trading in Australia, Appels, et al. (2004) 
use TERM-H2O to help policymakers examine wider economic implications of water trading 
policies within regions and catchments. New Zealand does not have a parallel publically available 
regional CGE model. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, a well-known global CGE model, 
GTAP, was adjusted to include water as a factor of production and disaggregated by the New 
Zealand regions.  
Data for splits was taken from publicly available sources, including Statistics NZ’s agricultural 
census results; an NZIER & AgFirst (2014) report on valuing irrigation in NZ; as well as Calzadilla 
et al. (2011) who created GTAP-W model to include water as a factor of production. By integrating 
irrigable area, relative productivity per hectare between irrigated and non-irrigated sectors, 
physical output per sector as well as total volume of water withdrawn (estimated by Aqualinc 
Research (2010)), it was possible to derive the shadow price of water by region. The average 
shadow value of a cubic metre of irrigated water in New Zealand is 2 cents,33 which is in line with 
estimates for other countries.  
                                                 
33 In 2011 US dollars. 
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After splitting the database using SplitCom, it was then possible to apply various shocks to see 
how they affect the New Zealand economy as a whole and by region. For example, assuming a 
drought that would decrease dryland farm productivity by 10% nation-wide, the largest negative 
effect was felt in the Waikato Region, whereas Canterbury region actually benefitted from re-
allocated resources. 
As far as the authors are aware, aside from NZIER’s proprietary CGE model of the New Zealand 
economy, this is the first successful attempt at creating working regional CGE model of New 
Zealand. While it lacks sufficient detail and assumes some strict assumptions (such as price 
restrictions of related sectors), it provides a viable starting point for any CGE research of New 
Zealand, particularly pertaining to agriculture. Further breakdown is possible for various 
agricultural sectors (i.e. kiwifruit, wine, apples) as there is already publicly available data on 
irrigated areas and only the corresponding production data would be required for further regional 
detail.  The model would also benefit from better behavioural parameters estimated specifically 
for New Zealand for more accurate results.  
5.4.	 Policy	Implications	
Only 19 out 154 survey respondents, approximately 12%, serially chose the Status Quo in each of 
the eight choice tasks, implying that vast majority preferred a priced alternative with an easement 
over a full-out ban (see Figure 15 for a distribution of total Status Quo selections per respondent). 
The actual figure may be somewhat higher as some respondents who refused to participate might 
have not done all eight choice tasks because they were not in favour of paying for water and did 
not want to participate in the study implying so. In fact, at least one respondent felt strongly enough 
to make his feelings known via email: “As far as paying some govt agency a resource rental goes 
I would rather eat the tip off my left thumb than have any part of that”. Similarly, a large industry 
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organization refused to promote the survey because “[our organization] is very much opposed to 
charging for water, especially in times of climatic stress”. 
 
Figure 15. Serial non-Participation by the Respondents: Frequency of Selecting Status Quo 
One other respondent called in and in great detailed explained why they thought that irrigation 
water should always be free, and you should not charge for it under any circumstances, they were 
opposed to it, etc. However… upon checking the answers they said they submitted, it turned out 
that facing a ban, even they stated they preferred to pay rather than having their orchard wither.  
Overall, this study has important findings that can be of benefit to water future policy 
considerations: 
 From Chapter II, the findings suggest that larger, more intense dairy farms have lower price 
elasticity of demand. The implication of water management policy is that if water charges 
are introduced, farming intensity needs to be considered – all else held constant, areas with 
the same amount of cows but with higher intensity farms would be less sensitive to water 
charges than less intense farming areas, at least in the short term. However, for more 
accurate responses substitutes, such as brought-in feed, would need to be considered, for 
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which data is scant. Other findings also point that irrigation, in terms of mm/ha is 
approximately twice as efficient as the same quantity of rain, hence this could be a gauge 
of water demand as rainfall data is more readily available. 
 From Chapter IV, the choice experiment results suggest that farmers are more concerned 
with flow restrictions than with volume restrictions, and would be willing to pay more than 
twice for a decrease in a restriction for flow limit over a restriction for volume limit. This 
suggests that charges on flows would be effective at managing water demand. In terms of 
setting up possible water markets, farmers are interested in buying more water, and there 
seems to be no desire to sell the water at present (no excess available) – hence any selling 
would have to come from idle consent holders or regional authorities. In addition, a number 
of respondents confessed to holding onto their irrigation consents without actually using 
any of it because they know it would raise the value of their property. Such ‘hoarding’ may 
make it difficult to rely on consent data alone to determine demand, and suggests that the 
value of such access as part of property needs to be examined in its own right.  
 From Chapter V, CGE modelling results suggest that the impact of irrigation shocks would, 
as expected, predominantly felt in Canterbury dairy. This is because Canterbury is by far 
the largest irrigating region in New Zealand, but CGE modelling highlights 
interconnectedness of sectors and regions.  For example, an important modelling result is 
that when Canterbury dairy declines, Waikato dairy seems to pick up misallocated 
resources, and vice versa;. Land and other resources released by irrigation tend to go to the 
cattle & sheep and other animal sectors. Hence, a national coordination policy may be  
necessary as repercussions from one region’s water policy may spill over to other regions. 
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5.5.	 Final	Words	
The largest freshwater user in New Zealand is actually a single hydroelectric power station in 
Southland – the Manapouri Power Station. It is classified as a consumptive user because it 
discharges freshwater from Lake Manapouri into the Doubtful Sound (thereby preventing other 
potential users from using this freshwater, unlike all other hydroelectric power stations in New 
Zealand). Every year it consumes over 10 billion cubic metres of freshwater – more than all of 
irrigated agriculture in New Zealand put together. Of course, this does not really imply that this 
power station prevents irrigated farms from all over New Zealand from benefiting from this water 
– far from it – literally: the power station is located in Fiordland National Park where there is not 
one farm in its vicinity. The point here is that each water catchment has its own particularities and 
it is difficult to fathom a central body applying a one-size-fits-all policy to such a diverse resource. 
Freshwater management should be very much catchment-based – regional authorities are in the 
best position to govern them as they know the local conditions best. That is not to say that there is 
no scope for central government involvement – having a well thought through national legislation 
to rely on to allow regional authorities to implement efficient resource policies is precisely what 
the regional governments need. The RMA, implemented when water scarcity was not an issue, has 
outlived its usefulness, and is now the central cause of inefficient management. From the looks of 
it, the National Freshwater Policies implemented recently are heading in the right direction – the 
water takes are now measured, standards on water quality and quantity are going to be set at the 
national level. The author’s biggest concern is that these polices will stop short of laying 
groundwork for implementing water markets, or, at least, irrigation water charges. If they stop 
short, the process of re-developing legal framework for resource management will have to happen 
all over again in the very near future.  
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When RMA was enacted, freshwater was essentially a public good – there was enough for it to go 
around for everyone. It has long since became a common-pool resource – now one user’s actions 
have very much an impact on other users’ benefit. The tragedy of the commons dictates that such 
a resource is in danger of being depleted. One need not look far to find similar situations elsewhere 
– the Murray River in Australia has at one point stopped flowing because of over allocation to 
irrigation. The government actions were swift – Australia now has arguably the world’s best 
working water market. While the results of the survey conducted as part of this thesis indicate that 
some respondents are strongly averse to paying for water, the vast majority seem to prefer paying 
for water than facing the alternative of lack of water access.  
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